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In this dissertation I address two related questions pertaining to Aristotle’s philosophy of 
science and his biology and zoology. They are: (1) what are the goals of Aristotle’s Historia 
Animalium (HA) and how does the treatise achieve these goals? And, more generally, (2) what is 
the role of a historia in Aristotle’s philosophy of science? Together these questions touch upon a 
long recognized problem in the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophical and scientific works 
related to the relationship between Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his actual scientific 
practice. I pursue this broad question by focusing my attention on Aristotle’s historia of animals 
and the related discussions of scientific investigation and demonstration, primarily in the 
Analytics. I argue that the term historia was used by Aristotle with a range of meanings that 
center around the notions of investigation and inquiry (or the reports thereof), and, in some 
instances, emphasize the early stages of inquiry, dedicated to establishing and organizing facts 
prior to causal explanation. I proceed by considering the theoretical background of a historia 
provided by the Analytics and Parts of Animals, before turning to a detailed analysis of select 
passages from the HA itself. I argue that the Analytics provides the framework for a method of 
correlating facts regarding a field of study that acts as a guide to further causal research, but that 
establishing the actual causal relations that hold within a field depends upon additional 
considerations that are largely domain-specific. I turn to the HA in order to illustrate this method 
of correlation, noting examples where the correlation of features appears to prefigure causal 
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 v 
explanations. I conclude by considering the relationship between Aristotle’s notions of historia 
and experience (empeiria), and argue that a historia provides the sort of comprehensive, factual 
knowledge of a domain of study that Aristotle often notes is necessary for coming to recognize 
causal relations, and thus coming to have scientific knowledge (epistêmê). 
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PREFACE 
The Greek text for the many quotations in this dissertation was taken from the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae (TLG). Their web site may be consulted for the details regarding the exact 
editions used. The important exception is the text used for passages from the Historia 
Animalium, which were copied from TLG but checked against Balme’s 2002 text. 
Like many dissertation, but perhaps more so than most, this project was long in the 
making. For their help in researching and writing this dissertation, and in general for their 
support and encouragement, I would like to thank the following people: Kathleen Cook, Jessica 
Gelber, Christopher Kurfess, Mariska Leunissen, Patrick MacFarlane, and Ron Polansky. Special 
thanks goes to my advisor, Jim Lennox, for his detailed comments and high standard of 
scholarship, and to the other members of my committee: James Allen, Jim Bogen, Alan Code, 
and Peter Machamer. In addition I would like to acknowledge Allan Gotthelf, who provided the 
initial inspiration for this project, and who unfortunately did not live to see the dissertation 
through to completion.  
Finally I would like to thank my wife, Jessica Bemer, without whose love, support, and 
encouragement none of this would be possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle’s History of Animals has variously been interpreted as a disorganized, loosely 
connected collection of facts about the animal world, whose purpose is to provide something like 
the “raw material” from which a demonstrative science of animal life may be constructed; to a 
highly organized and structured treatise that deeply reflects the prescriptions on demonstration 
and inquiry espoused elsewhere in the corpus, and especially in the Analytics. At a minimum, 
there is agreement that the treatise does report a host of purported facts about animals and the 
features they exhibit, but what principles structure the presentation of those facts, and the precise 
purpose of their collection, remains debated.  
The issue is challenging because Aristotle says little explicitly within the HA itself 
regarding its purpose and methodology. This is rather unusual, as many Aristotelian treatises 
begin with fairly lengthy discussions that place the subject matter under consideration into some 
sort of investigative context, and often include extended considerations of the methodology 
appropriate to the area of study.
1
 What is said in the HA in this regard, as we shall see, is open to 
a fair amount of interpretation. However, Aristotle’s use of the term historia in a number of 
presumed references to the treatise (as well as in the traditional “title” itself) provides a possible 
                                                 
1 E.g. Phys. I.1, PA I, Meteo. I.1, EN I, An. I.1. See Lennox 2011, pp. 28ff. 
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link to the theory of inquiry and demonstration put forth in the Analytics.
2
 Indeed, some have 
argued that a fairly coherent picture of what a historia is and its role in scientific investigation 
and explanation may be constructed based on various methodological discussions within the 
corpus. However, these very methodological discussions, and especially those of the Analytics, 
have proven just as difficult to interpret as the HA itself, and disagreement regarding the 
interpretation of these passages has carried over to the interpretation of the historia of animals 
that is the HA.
3
  
Further complicating the matter is the fact that no other similar historia is preserved in 
the corpus, or even referred to in the ancient lists of Aristotelian writings.
4
 Why this should be—
why a historia of animals was composed and preserved as a separate treatise, but no other 
historia—is a question yet to find an adequate answer, and makes the task of interpreting the HA 
the more difficult, as we have no other examples to turn to. 
In this dissertation I seek to address two related questions pertaining to what we might 
call Aristotle’s philosophy of science and his biology/zoology. They are: 
 
                                                 
2 The extent to which the Analytics considers methodological questions regarding the 
manner in which an investigation should be conducted, and the reasons why, as opposed to 
the manner in which knowledge should be exhibited or formalized, is debated in the 
literature. 
3 See especially the discussions of Lennox and Charles below. 
4 However, there are stretches of text in some treatises that report information in a manner 
arguably similar to that found in the HA, e.g. Meteor. III.2 on rainbows and haloes : 
“Regarding halos and rainbows, both what each is and because of what cause they come to 
be, we must speak, and mock suns and rods too. For all these things come to be because of 
the same causes. But first we must grasp the affections and attributes (ta pathê kai ta 
sumbainonta) regarding each of them” (371b18-23). See Freeland 1990. Also Theophrastus 
famously composed his own historia on plants. On the relationship between Aristotle’s and 
Theophrasutus’ historiai, see Gotthelf 1988. 
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(1) What are the goals of Aristotle’s History of Animals and how does the treatise 
achieve these goals? 
(2) What is the role of a historia in Aristotle’s philosophy of science? 
 
Together these questions touch upon a long recognized problem in the interpretation of 
Aristotle’s philosophical and scientific works, namely, what is the relationship between 
Aristotle’s philosophy of science, as it is discussed in works such as the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics, and his actual scientific practice, as it is exhibited in the treatises dedicated to natural 
philosophy? I shall pursue this broad question by focusing my attention on Aristotle’s historia of 
animals, the HA, and the related discussions of scientific investigation and demonstration, 
primarily in the Analytics. My goals are to provide a critical reading of existing interpretations of 
the role a historia is designed to play; to analyze Aristotle’s own comments, in the Analytics and 
elsewhere, regarding the stages of scientific investigation and, in particular, the character of the 
early stages; and to provide a close reading of select portions of the HA itself in support of my 
understanding of what a historia is and what its relationship is to the ultimate goal of scientific 
investigation.  
In chapter 1 I provide a survey of the relevant prior literature on the interpretations of HA 
and its relationship with the theory of demonstration and inquiry presented in the Analytics. The 
focus is on the line of interpretation initiated by David Balme, and carried forward by James 
Lennox and Allan Gotthelf, I then turn to comments made by David Charles regarding the role of 
historia in Aristotelian natural philosophy, and how Charles’s view differs from those of Balme, 
Lennox, and Gotthelf.  
 4 
In chapter 2 I examine the various uses of the term historia in the Aristotelian corpus, 
focusing on two major groups: (1) passages that use the term in a general way, and (2) passages 
that use the term in what appear to be direct references to the HA. I argue that though the term 
historia is used by Aristotle with a range of meanings, these meanings are related, and point to a 
“technical” use of the term that refers to an early stage of research dedicated to collecting and 
organizing data prior to causal explanation, and that this technical use is the one intended in the 
title of HA.  
In chapter 3 I discuss the theoretical background to the concept of historia provided by 
the Analytics and the first book of Parts of Animals. The focus of the discussion of the Analytics 
is on the distinction Aristotle draws between knowing the fact (to hoti) and knowing the reason 
why (to dioti), and how the hoti-stage of investigation can facilitate the move to the dioti. This 
leads to a consideration of Aristotle’s method of correlation introduced in the second book of the 
Analytics, and the various ways that correlation can be used to guide causal research, even if it 
cannot, alone, reveal causal priority. This in turn leads to a consideration of PA I, where Aristotle 
discusses the kind of causality that takes precedence in nature, and thus points the way towards 
arranging correlated features according to cause and effect relationships.    
The first six chapters of the first book of HA form something of an introduction to the 
entire treatise. Aristotle describes the stretch of text as a “sketch” or “outline” (tupos) that is 
designed to provide a “taste” of what will be discussed with greater precision later. This suggests 
that a proper understanding of exactly what is accomplished in this stretch of text will shed light 
on the rest of the treatise. In chapter 4 I provide a detailed analysis of this tupos. I argue that in it 
Aristotle provides an introduction that both outlines the rest of the treatise, and provides a more 
 5 
theoretical discussion of concepts and points of method that will play crucial roles in what 
follows. 
In chapter 5 I analyze a number of select passages from the body of the HA, and compare 
them with the picture of a historia developed thus far. The chapter begins with an extended 
consideration of why the HA begins with a study of the parts of animals (rather than e.g. their 
activities, manners of life, or characters), and why this discussion begins with the parts of 
humans. This leads to a reflection on Aristotle’s comment that a goal of the historia of the parts 
of animals is to provide the logos of the parts in addition to the perception of them. I then turn to 
an extended analysis of the structure of the discussion of the parts of animals in HA, followed by 
a consideration of passages that appear in each of the remaining major sections of the treatise, 
dedicated, respectively, to generation and reproduction, other activities and manners of life, and 
the characters of animals.   
Finally, in chapter 6 I consider the relationship between Aristotle’s notions of historia 
and experience (empeiria). I argue that in addition to the sense of empeiria as a sort of cognitive 
middle ground between perception and knowledge, as developed in passages found in Metaph. 
A.1 and APo. II.19, Aristotle also used the term to connote a broad and comprehensive 
knowledge of the facts pertaining to a field of investigation. This sense of empeiria corresponds 
well to the stated goals of a historia. I then consider how this second sense of empeiria, and thus 
how a historia, may facilitate the discovery of causal knowledge. 
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1.0  PROBLEMS AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
1.1 INTERPRETATIONS OF HA 
In reviewing the various claims regarding the purpose and method of the HA it is useful 
to organize the discussion around two main camps of modern interpretation. On the one hand we 
have a line of interpretation originating in the work of David Balme, and continuing with the 
work of Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox; and on the other hand we may take the detailed and 
difficult discussion of HA and its aims in David Charles’s book Aristotle on Meaning and 
Essence. In what follows, I begin with a consideration of some modern commentators on HA 
prior to Balme, and then continue by developing the views of Balme, Gotthelf, and Lennox. I 
shall then present a summary of David Charles’s discussion of HA and its goals/methods, and 
conclude with a reflection on the problems and puzzles that remain. 
 7 
1.1.1 Prior to Balme (Louis, Peck) 
Prior to Balme’s work we do not find great scholarly interest in HA,5 at least from a 
philosophical point of view, and its contents were often viewed as a disorganized mess of 
information, perhaps groping towards a taxonomic classification of animal kinds, but failing in 
this regard badly.
6
 In the introduction to his 1964 French edition of HA, Pierre Louis defends the 
organization of HA from such criticism, and rightly points out that much confusion is caused by 
the chapter divisions, which were late, Renaissance-era additions that often interrupt or obscure 
the flow of discussion and argumentation.
7
 According to Louis, the organization of the treatise is 
more easily grasped by following Aristotle’s own remarks near the beginnings and ends of 
various discussions, in which he indicates what was previously discussed and what is to be 
discussed moving forward.
8
  
Louis understands the HA to be a treatise dedicated to collecting facts regarding the 
animal world that are to be explained later in treatises such as PA and GA. He holds that HA was 
“undoubtedly” composed prior to these other explanatory works,9 and that the HA is a 
                                                 
5 This is especially true of the English-speaking world. Scholars on the continent exhibited 
greater interest in Aristotle’s biological works dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries. 
See Gotthelf 2012b, p. 263 n.5 for French, German, and more recent Italian references. 
6 See Balme 1987b, pp. 80-5; Gotthelf 1988, pp. 309-10. 
7 See Beullens and Gotthelf 2007, pp. 477-483. 
8 See Louis 1964, pp. xx-xxii for references to such “sign posts” in the treatise. 
9 Louis 1964, pp. xiv-xviii. As evidence, Louis cites both the apparent “logical” relationship 
between a historia and the explanations it facilitates (i.e. first establish facts, then search 
for explanations), as well as the apparent references to HA in the other biological treatises, 
many of which refer to the HA in the past tense, as a treatise already completed. Louis does 
not seem to seriously consider the possibility that the references to HA in PA and GA may 
be relatively late insertions (either by Aristotle or someone else), and that the verb tense of 
the textual reference may reflect something other than the chronology of composition (e.g. 
may indicate a didactic chronology).  
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representative (perhaps the sole existing representative
10
) of a kind of treatise designed to report 
on an early stage of investigation, focused only on collecting facts without regard to possible 
explanations, and destined to be replaced by more complete, explanatory accounts of the same 
material.
 11
 In this regard, Louis is clearly influenced by Aristotle’s own comments, in HA I.6, 
PA II.1, IA 1, etc., that the historia is designed to precede causal explanation, but Louis does not 
elaborate on how, or indeed whether, the HA actually facilitates the discovery of such 
explanations. In fact, Louis seems to banish any consideration whatsoever of causes or 
                                                 
10
 Louis argues that the Aristotelian corpus may be divided into two main categories: (1) 
philosophical dialogues written for a wide audience, and (2) scientific treatises, written for a 
much narrower audience of specialists. As only fragmentary evidence of Aristotle’s dialogues 
has survived, the corpus as we have it today is comprised solely of this second category. Louis 
further divides the scientific treatises into two categories: (2a) didactic treatises dedicated to a 
particular problem or set of problems, written to be reproduced for students, and composed with 
an aim of giving explanations of established facts, and (2b) treatises dedicated to recording, 
classifying, and establishing these facts (“les classer”). This second category of scientific 
treatise, into which, according to Louis, HA falls, provided the basis for the didactic treatises: 
“Ce sont des collections de faits, des recueils de remarques et d’observations, destines a fournir 
la matière des traites didactiques. Telle est l’Histoire des Animaux” (Louis 1964, p. xii). 
11
 As evidence, Louis provides a number of examples of passages in PA and GA that have 
corresponding passages in HA, with the difference that the former include explanations of the 
phenomena discussed, while the latter do not (specifically he cites: GA III.1, 749b28 and HA 
IV.1 558b15; PA III.4, 666b23-35 and HA I.17, 496a4-27). This suggests to Louis that the HA 
passages, lacking explanatory content, were replaced by the PA and GA passages. Based on a 
comparison of such passages, Balme came to a different conclusion, namely that the HA was 
likely composed after PA and GA, and that in composing the HA Aristotle likely began by 
culling relevant information from these treatises, then added to it. See Balme 1991, pp. 21-6. 
Lennox 1996, a critical assessment of “The Balme Hypothesis,” agrees with Balme’s dating the 
HA after these other biological treatises, though he remains skeptical that an absolute dating of 
the biological treatises may be determined. In addition Louis notes the absence of HA from the 
programmatic statements that Aristotle periodically appends to the beginning or end of treatises, 
stating the order in which study of the natural world or living things should proceed. He argues 
that this indicates that HA was not intended to be a part of such a program of study, but rather 
was meant to furnish the other treatises with the material necessary for their work. In other 
words, once these other treatises were written, HA (or at least the relevant portions of HA) was 
no longer needed.  
 9 
explanation from HA.
12
 Whether he saw the project of the HA in any way related to the 
discussions of demonstration and inquiry in the Analytics is unclear since he makes no mention 
of this. Thus according to Louis HA was to furnish the material for works like PA in only the 
most rudimentary of ways, providing facts in need of explanation, and perhaps also facts that 
could themselves serve as explanations, but with no attention to distinguishing or relating the 
two. He offers no detailed account of the complicated arrangement of data in the treatise, nor 
does he speak to the manner in which the data was presumably culled from observations.  
In the introduction to the first volume of his 1965 Loeb HA, Peck, like Louis, argues that 
the aim of HA is not taxonomy or classification of animal kinds, but rather the collection of facts 
regarding animals. More specifically, Peck emphasizes that HA’s primary interest is in collecting 
information regarding the different attributes exhibited by animals prior to searching for their 
causes. Quoting Balme’s 1961 paper “Aristotle’s use of division and differentiae,”13 Peck states 
that the error underlying the mistaken view that HA is primarily concerned with taxonomy is the 
assumption that Aristotle “put systematics first in zoology, and morphology first in 
systematics.”14 That is, it is an error to think that Aristotle holds that (1) explaining zoological 
phenomena requires the construction of a systematic taxonomy of animal kinds, and that (2) the 
construction of such a system must be based on the parts of animals. Peck concedes that Aristotle 
does introduce a basic classification of animal kinds into megista genê, but he states “the purpose 
                                                 
12 “L’auteur (i.e. Aristotle) ne s’est préoccupé que de recueillir le plus grand nombre 
possible d’observations. Il ne s’est pas soucié, quand il l’a rédigé, d’expliquer les 
phénomènes dont il faisait ni d’en rechercher les causes” (Louis 1975, p. 80). 
13 Reprinted, in expanded form, in 1975 and finally as Balme 1987.  
14 Quoted in Peck 1965, vi. 
 10 
of this is not to provide a starting point for systematic division and subdivision; it is for 
convenience in reviewing the various observable differences.”15  
Instead of taxonomy or classification, Peck holds that the aim of the HA is “to collect 
data for ascertaining the causes of the observed phenomena.”16 As Peck writes: 
 
Until we have got the historia, we are not in a position to see what we are dealing with, 
or how to deal with it. Once we have got it, we can go on to the second stage, which is to 
attempt to find out the “causes” of these observed and recorded differences.17 
 
That is, a comprehensive view of the actual differences exhibited by animals (i.e. 
features/attributes that differ among different kinds/forms of animals) will facilitate the 
discovery of the causes of those differences by making clear “what we are dealing with” and 
“how to deal with it.” More specifically, Peck claims that the historia brings to light correlations 
between features that may act as “clues” to causal explanation: causes will be found “by looking 
to see whether certain characteristics are regularly found in combination: this is how the clues to 
the causes will be brought to light.”18 Peck gives no examples or arguments to support his case, 
and does not explicitly connect this method of searching for causes with any of the discussions of 
demonstration or inquiry in the Analytics. In fact, it’s not clear whether Peck attributes the aim of 
identifying correlations to the HA itself, or whether he thinks that the HA simply prepares the 
researcher to find them. 
                                                 
15 Peck 1965, vii. 
16 Peck 1965, vi. 
17 Peck 1965, v. 
18 Peck 1965, vi. 
 11 
Although Peck agrees with Louis that the focus of HA is not on the classification of 
animal kinds, he nonetheless appears to think that classification is an ultimate aim of the project 
for which HA is the preliminary stage: 
 
If we are right in supposing that the purpose of the treatise is preliminary, viz., to collect 
together as many records of differentiae as possible as a basis for discovering the causes 
of observed phenomena in animals, then it constitutes an earlier stage of the whole 
process than classification, to which it will be a prelude.” (xi) 
 
According to Peck, the project of discovering the causes of the attributes of animals will 
lead to a satisfactory classificatory scheme by identifying the single cause (or few causes) most 
responsible for determining the character of animal kinds. Peck takes natural heat (sumphuton 
thermon), and what according to Aristotle is its most observable indicator, mode of reproduction 
(i.e. live-bearing, egg-bearing, etc.), as offering the true classificatory principle for Aristotle’s 
biology.
19
 But following a long discussion of the ways in which natural heat operates to 
determine the characteristics of animals, Peck concedes that Aristotle would probably not have 
claimed that such a classification based on natural heat could be made “wholly tidy,”20 by which 
I take it he means that it would not produce a perfectly comprehensive and mutually exclusive 
taxonomy of all animal kinds, leading from the highest, most general kinds to the infimae 
species, and passing through a number of sub-genera in between. Rather, it provides a basic 
                                                 
19  This is the same criterion Lloyd puts forward in his 1961 Phronesis article as Aristotle’s 
most mature view on animal classification. See Gotthelf 2012b, p. 267 for a rejection of this 
view, with which I largely agree. 
20 Peck 1965, xxxi. 
 12 
classification that captures the true cause of variation between kinds of animals, namely, level of 
“perfection,” which is correlated with degree of natural heat and, further, mode of reproduction. 
He does not specify whether the megista genê, or “very large kinds” discussed by Aristotle in HA 
I.6 and elsewhere, embody this basic classification. 
It is odd that Peck rejects classification as a significant aim of HA, and yet spends the 
majority of his introduction to discussing this very topic. He was clearly influenced by his work 
on the Loeb GA (first published in 1942) and the important role played there by natural heat and 
the “movements” resident in the generative residues, and he seems to take the introduction to his 
translation of the HA as an opportunity to work out his views on classification in Aristotle’s 
biology and the role of vital heat. Regarding his “positive” views on the HA, we are told little 
other than (1) it is primarily a “factual” treatise, (2) its focus is on the differentiae exhibited by 
animals, and (3) it is meant to precede a search for the causes of the differentiae. His suggestion 
that significant combinations of differentiae will provide “clues” regarding their underlying 
causes is left undeveloped, and he provides no real insight into the manner in which the data 
presented in the HA are handled. He notes that the megista genê are introduced “for 
convenience” in examining the observed attributes of animals, but provides no explicit guidance 
regarding how that might work. 
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1.1.2 Balme 
David Balme lays out what continues to be the most influential interpretation of the aims 
and methodology of the HA.
21
 Following Aristotle’s own statement on the aims of the treatise (at 
491a7ff.), Balme states that the work’s primary aim is to grasp the differentiae (diaphorai) and 
attributes (sumbebêkota) that belong to all animals.
22
 Though he notes that these are technical 
terms derived from the practice of division (diaeresis), Balme claims that in the HA these 
distinctions, as well as that of an attribute holding in itself (kath’hauto) and not in itself (mê 
kath’hauto), disappear, and all attributes are treated on an equal footing: 
 
In HA . . . no use is made of distinctions between differentiae and attributes nor between 
proper and accidental (i.e. kath’hauto and mê kath’hauto): all characteristics are 
examined on the same footing and are called differentiae or attributes indifferently—if 
there is a difference it exists only in their basic sense . . . but not in their full technical 
sense. The reason is that presumably the technical distinctions have meaning only in 
relation to the defining of whole objects, whereas HA does not study animals as wholes 
but only their separate characteristics. 
23
 
 
That is, a feature can serve as a differentia only relative to a given genos (i.e. the technical use of 
a differentia is to divide a genos into eidê). Similarly, a feature holds kath’hauto or mê 
kath’hauto only relative to a given eidos. Considered on their own, apart from the genê or eidê of 
                                                 
21 See also Gotthelf 1988, pp. 309-12, and 2012b, pp. 263-75 for excellent summaries of 
Balme’s views on HA. 
22 Balme 1987a, p. 11; 1991, p. 13. 
23 Balme 1991, pp. 14-5. 
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the animals that exhibit the features, these distinctions have no meaning, and thus, according to 
Balme, are not used in the HA. Balme maintains that the focus of the treatise is not on animals 
considered as “wholes,” but rather on the attributes exhibited by animals. He describes the aim of 
the treatise as “to collect, screen, distinguish, and describe correctly the differentiae requiring 
explanation.”24 It is both a “collection” and an “analysis” of the differences between animals,25 
and thus the treatise has a “theoretical” purpose. The attributes themselves are analyzed at 
varying levels of generality, from the very high, generic level of blooded and bloodless, to “sub-
specific” features and “variable accidents” that are unique to certain individuals.  
Balme takes the ultimate aim of collecting and organizing these features to be causal 
explanation. However he emphasizes that what is to be explained are the features/attributes that 
are collected and analyzed. That is to say, the focus on attributes carries over to the explanatory 
project that is to follow HA, and thus the question of animal kinds and a classification of animals 
is not raised.
26
 Balme notes the close connection that, for Aristotle, causal explanation has with 
                                                 
24 Balme 1987b, p. 80. 
25 Balme 1987b, p. 88. 
26 This is important when we consider exactly what sort of facts are collected at the hoti 
stage of investigation. One very plausible possibility is that the facts collected are 
propositions of the form AaB, where A refers to an animal kind (species, etc.) and B refers 
to a characteristic/feature. So understood the fact to be explained is, Why AaB? However, 
on Balme’s reading, the focus is not on which animal kinds exhibit which features, but 
rather on the variety of features present in the animal world. This de-emphasis of animal 
kinds brings into question the role of the historia as providing hoti-level facts. I think Balme 
is wrong to say that Aristotle is not concerned with identifying which animals exhibit the 
features discussed in the treatise, but I agree with him that it is not always a primary aim. 
Often a given attribute is said to belong to “some” of a given group of animals (typically 
with a ta men . . . ta de construction), without any further indication of precisely which 
members of the group do so, but just as often Aristotle does provide additional criterion for 
picking out the animals within a group that possess the feature (typically with a second 
attribute, using the hosa . . . panta construction). In these cases I very much doubt that 
Aristotle is identifying a specific kind of animal with this second feature (especially if one 
understands by “kind” some ontologically preferred mode of classification). 
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definition, in so far as a definition (or at least one form of definition) is a causally explanatory 
demonstration with its terms rearranged, but again what is defined in this context is the attribute, 
and not the animal possessing the attribute.
27
  
But how, according to Balme, does Aristotle actually go about finding such causal 
explanations? That is, borrowing from the title of Balme’s 1961 article, how does Aristotle use 
the differentiae collected and described in HA to find causes? Balme’s answer is that he looks for 
“significant, causal groupings of differentiae . . . as offering a clue to the problem under 
discussion.”28 “His method is in fact what he briefly describes at APo. II 98a14-19: by looking 
for those characteristics which are regularly associated we may detect their cause.”29 Balme’s 
claim is that, in the explanatory treatises like PA and GA, Aristotle looks for the solution to a 
problem at hand (e.g. Why does this kind of animal possess feature X?)
30
 by examining the 
features that are correlated to the problem in order to try to determine a common or underlying 
cause. For example, in determining why certain animals have an epiglottis while others do not, 
                                                 
27 However, if it is the case that what explains the presence of an attribute must itself be an 
essential feature of the animal, then causal explanations of features will also reveal 
essential attributes of animal kinds.  
28 Balme 1987b, p. 86. 
29 Balme 1987b, p. 86. The use of the term “clue” here makes me suspect that this is what 
Peck has in mind . . . 
30 As will be discussed in greater detail below, the exact form of the “problems” Aristotle 
seeks to solve in the explanatory treatises needs to be made more precise. The 
parenthetical formulation I provide here suggests that the problem consists of a 
characteristic or attribute predicated of a kind of animal, i.e. the subject role is played by an 
animal kind, such as bird, hawk, etc. However, it is often the case that the subject role in 
such problems is quantified by an expression similar to “all animals that possess/exhibit 
feature X,” such that the quantifying expression does not appear to pick out a definite kind 
of animal, but rather a group of animals sharing an attribute. The distinction begins to 
break down if one regards kinds or forms of animals as simply differentiae-groups, i.e. 
groups of animals with select shared features. Most discussions of kinds in Aristotle (such 
as the discussions in Charles 2000) do so interpret them, but confer greater significance to 
certain attributes over others, as being the true differentiae, i.e. the attributes that correctly 
divide a higher kind into lower forms.   
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Aristotle looks for the other features animals with an epiglottis share, and the features that 
animals without an epiglottis share. At PA III.3 664b22 Aristotle states that those animals that 
have lungs and are hairy have an epiglottis, while those that have scales or feathers do not. What 
does this suggest? Animals that have scales or feathers have drier flesh and harder skin compared 
with hairy animals, such that an epiglottis in them would not be able to move easily enough to 
serve its purpose.
31
  
The APo. passage Balme cites reads: 
 
At present we speak in terms of the common names which have been handed 
down to us. But we should inquire not only in these cases, but also if any other 
common feature has been observed to hold, we should extract it and then inquire 
what it follows and what follows it. For example having a third stomach follows 
having horns, as does being without both rows of teeth. And again having horns 
follows something. For it is clear why the feature mentioned will belong to them, 
for it will hold because they have horns.
32
 
 
   Νῦν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὰ παραδεδομένα κοινὰ ὀνόματα 
λέγομεν, δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τούτων σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
98a15  ἂν ἄλλο τι ὀφθῇ ὑπάρχον κοινόν, ἐκλαμβάνοντα, εἶτα τίσι  
τοῦτ’ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ποῖα τούτῳ ἕπεται, οἷον τοῖς κέρατα 
ἔχουσι τὸ ἔχειν ἐχῖνον, τὸ μὴ ἀμφώδοντ’ εἶναι· πάλιν τὸ 
                                                 
31 Cf. PA III.3 664b20-665a5. 
32 Translation modified from Lennox 1987a and Barnes 1993. 
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κέρατ’ ἔχειν τίσιν ἕπεται. δῆλον γὰρ διὰ τί ἐκείνοις ὑπάρ- 
ξει τὸ εἰρημένον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν ὑπάρξει. 
 
The example in the passage states that having a third stomach and not having both rows 
of teeth “follows” having horns, or in other words, all animals that have horns also have a third 
stomach and lack both rows of teeth. Aristotle next asks: from what feature does having horns 
follow? If we call that feature “X”, then he states it will be clear from this why all animals that 
possess feature X will also have a third stomach and lack both rows of teeth, namely because all 
such animals have horns. The procedure recommended is to find “common features” i.e. features 
that are always correlated with a given feature under study, and to attempt to arrange them in 
such a manner as to show “what it follows and what follows it.”33  
However Balme does not appear to attribute this aim (viz. identifying correlations 
between features) to the HA itself (the examples he provides in his discussion of this aim all 
come from other treatises).
34
 Rather this is the procedure for finding causes that is to come after 
the HA. According to Balme, the HA makes it possible by providing the necessary factual 
information regarding the differentiae, but since the relevant correlations will vary based on the 
problem under consideration, the HA is not primarily concerned with such correlations. 
The ultimate aim that the causal explanation of animal features is to serve, according to 
Balme, is the definition of “this visible animal,” i.e. the definition of the concrete particular 
animal. In this regard, Balme sketches out an interpretation of the metaphysical difficulties 
                                                 
33 The example seems to assume that the “follows/followed by” relation tracks causal 
priority, but this is not clear. See my ch. 3, section 3.2.5, below. 
34 All the examples Balme gives to illustrate this method come from PA. See Balme 1987b, 
pp. 86-7.  
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regarding the form and essence of an animal that Aristotle wrestles with in the central books of 
the Metaphysics, according to which Aristotle’s mature view is that the form of a given animal is 
particular to that numerically specific animal, and includes both “essential” and “non-essential” 
attributes.
35
 The fusion of matter and form in the living thing allows for the “formalization” of 
material aspects of the living thing’s nature, and thus allows for what would typically be 
considered non-formal attributes to be included in the animal’s form. Essence is a generalization 
over particular animals that share certain common features in their form. The ultimate 
explanatory project Balme sees Aristotle as envisioning is one where all the features exhibited by 
an animal are explained—from shared features to “sub-specific” ones due to things like 
variations in environmental climate, disease, etc. In describing the method Aristotle would have 
followed, Balme states: “it is likely that he would have wanted to pick out the significant generic 
combinations (of attributes) and to show the specific differentiae as flowing from them.”36 In 
other words, beginning with the visible, individual animal, Aristotle would enumerate all the 
attributes exhibited by the animal, indicate which of them are “particularlizations” of some more 
general kind of attribute, and look for the causally relevant features that determine the specific 
particularizations. 
But why don’t we actually find such animal definitions, in HA or elsewhere? Balme 
conjectures that Aristotle may ultimately have realized that arriving at a complete definition of 
an animal was an impossible task, “for there is no end to the recognition of fresh significant 
attributes”.37 Rather, Balme seems to have envisioned HA as an investigation into all animal 
differentiae that is intended to precede this more grand explanatory project that was apparently 
                                                 
35 See Balme 1990 (“Matter in the Definition: a Reply to G. E. R. Lloyd”). 
36 Balme 1987, p. 89. 
37 Balme 1987b, p. 80. 
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never completed.
38
 In some of his last writings, Balme tepidly conjectures that, just as the project 
of classification of animal kinds may have come to be seen by Aristotle as an unnecessary and 
perhaps impossible task, so too the notion of definition may have fallen by the wayside, at least 
in the biology.  
 
But if I had the courage . . . I should be tempted to say that definition and its associated 
logical apparatus became irrelevant to Aristotle as it has done to modern philosophers of 
nature.
39
 
 
In any event, as regards the HA, Balme’s final view seems to have been that the HA is a 
collection and analysis of the attributes exhibited by animals, one that does not distinguish 
between features that are per se, incidental, etc., and one whose goal is to facilitate the 
identification of correlations between features at varying levels of generality, in the service of 
discovering causal explanations of the features. Balme explicitly links this method of discovering 
causal explanations to the Analytics, but apart from noting one supporting text, he does not 
develop the notion in any significant way. 
1.1.3 Lennox and Gotthelf  
While it is not clear to me that Balme saw the project of identifying important groupings 
of differentiae as an important aim of the HA, rather than as the first step in the search for causal 
explanation that is to follow the HA, the idea was developed with greater sophistication by 
                                                 
38 Balme 1987b, p. 88. 
39 Balme 1990, p. 54. 
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Gotthelf and Lennox. They argue that identifying such correlations is a prominent feature of the 
HA. In a number of papers
40
 based on research conducted both separately and together, Gotthelf 
and Lennox have spelled out the importance of establishing these correlations and the role they 
play in facilitating causal explanation; and also, importantly, have demonstrated that a concern 
with establishing such correlations does form an important aim of HA. In doing so they have 
stressed the close relationship between the discussions in the HA and the Analytics model of 
explanation and investigation. Both Gotthelf and Lennox have consistently maintained that there 
is much in the Analytics that shaped the investigations presented in the biological corpus, 
including the HA. 
In his 1987 and 1991 papers, reporting on research conducted in collaboration with 
Gotthelf, Lennox shows, first, that Aristotle recognized, in the Analytics and elsewhere, a pre-
causal, pre-explanatory (yet still theoretical) stage of investigation, and, second, that he was 
inclined to call such an investigation a historia. This being the case, Lennox suggests that one 
might find clues elsewhere in the corpus, and especially in the Analytics, on how to interpret the 
historia reported in HA. He goes on to demonstrate
41
 that there is a persistent concern in HA with 
identifying “widest class” correlations of features, and that this concern is motivated by the 
distinction between sophistical and unqualified knowledge discussed in APo. Lennox plausibly 
argues that the concern with finding the widest class at which given features are correlated is 
grounded in the attempt to find the right level of generality at which an explanation should be 
sought. By connecting the discussion in APo. with what they demonstrate to be a clear concern 
                                                 
40 See for example Lennox 1987a, 1991; and Gotthelf 1988. 
41 As does Gotthelf in his 1988. 
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with finding such correlations in HA, Lennox and Gotthelf are able to make sense of many 
passages in HA that otherwise would be quite puzzling. 
In his 1991, Lennox discusses a procedure for using “divisions” described in APo. II.14 
to facilitate the identification of the correct level of generality at which a given attribute holds of 
a subject.
42
 According to Lennox, this procedure involves taking a preexistent set of divisions 
and identifying those features that belong universally to the forms that fall under each division. 
For instance, using Lennox’s example, if peregrine falcons are being studied, one should consult 
a set of divisions that include peregrine falcons, presumably as a lower level form in a branching 
kind-form tree of divisions. Such a set of divisions may look like: animal, bird, crook-taloned-
bird, and peregrine falcon. Next locate the attribute possessed by peregrine falcons under 
consideration, e.g. a hooked-beak, as belonging to one of the levels of division on the tree. In this 
case, some, but not all, animals possess hooked-beaks, and some, but not all birds do too, while 
all crook-taloned birds have hooked beaks, as do all the forms that fall under crook-taloned. Thus 
hooked-beaks belong primitively to crook-taloned birds, and peregrine falcons have hooked 
beaks because they are crook-taloned.
43
 
Lennox calls such explanations that amount to identifying the wider kind to which a 
feature belongs primitively as “A-type” explanations. These are to be followed by “B-type” 
explanations that identify the essential feature of the wider kind that is responsible for (i.e. the 
cause of) the presence of the given attribute under study. Why do peregrine falcons possess 
                                                 
42 Lennox 1991, pp. 47-50. 
43 In fact it must be “all AND ONLY crook-taloned birds” if the feature truly belongs 
primitively to crook-taloned birds. Thus the divisions one uses must include the form that 
does in fact primitively exhibit the feature. The example could be expanded so that more 
than one form of bird is given that possesses a hooked-beak (are there any?), and thus the 
“A-type” explanation would be that a bird possesses a hooked-beak because it is EITHER 
this form OR that. The project would then be to identify other features the two forms share. 
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hooked beaks? Because they are crook-taloned (A-type explanation). But why do crook-taloned 
birds possess hooked beaks? This is the new question or “problem” under consideration, and the 
procedure of using the existing set of divisions allowed for the identification of the proper level 
of generality at which the B-type explanation is to be sought. Lennox claims that the concern 
with identifying the widest class to which a feature belongs primitively is clearly present in HA, 
and further that this concern reflects the very methodological prescriptions set forth in APo, as 
well as PA I. 
Both Lennox and Gotthelf point to the relative ubiquity of a certain hosa . . . panta 
locution (and its variants) that seems aimed at identifying a subject class that possesses a given 
feature primitively.
44
 Often times the subject class is marked-off as the group of animals that 
possess a certain feature, such that the resultant proposition states a correlation between two 
features (i.e. as many animals / birds / four-footed live-bearers / etc. as possess feature X, all also 
possess feature Y). Such correlations typically do not place animal kinds in the subject role, and 
both Gotthelf and Lennox argue, following Balme and others, that in large measure the HA is 
relatively unconcerned with identifying animal kinds or establishing a classification of them. 
Instead, as Balme emphasized, the focus is on features/characteristics, and the correlations 
between them. For instance, using the peregrine falcon example again, clearly bird refers to a 
kind of animal, as does peregrine falcon, but it is not clear that the features crook-taloned or 
hook-beaked serve to divide the kind bird into forms that are somehow ontologically privileged 
(i.e. are sub-genê that fall under the megiston genos “bird,” under which the eidos “peregrine 
falcon” ultimately falls). Instead, the emphasis is on identifying the features exhibited by 
animals, many of which (such as crook-taloned and hook-beaked) are possessed only by certain 
                                                 
44 Lennox 1987a; Gotthelf 1988, pp. 313-5; 2012b, pp. 272-3. 
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kinds of animals (in this case birds), and finding correlations between those features at the 
highest level of generality. This shows that in HA Aristotle was less concerned with establishing 
a classification of animal kinds (understood as some ontologically preferred way of classifying 
animals), but was more concerned with finding correlations between features.
45
 
But what of the relationship between the HA and the notion of hoti/dioti discussed in 
APo. II? On one plausible reading, a hoti-level proposition is one that connects a subject and an 
attribute universally, is established to be true, but is lacking a causal explanation, understood as 
the identification of the essential feature of the subject responsible for the presence of the 
attribute. On Balme’s reading of HA, the aim of the treatise is to lay out and analyze the 
attributes, but not to determine which subjects exhibit the attributes, nor how they exhibit them 
(essentially, per se incidental, etc.). The method of correlating features in order to uncover 
“clues” to the causes suggests that such correlations will reveal causal relationships between 
attributes. The causally relevant attributes can then be used to mark off animal kinds, in so far as 
they will be the attributes that make up the essence of an animal kind, but this is not an aim 
attributed to HA.  On the Balme/Gotthelf/Lennox reading, what are the primary hoti facts 
collected in HA, if not facts that link attributes to subjects that refer to animal kinds? Are they the 
correlations expressed by the hosa . . .panta statements and the like, or are they simply the facts 
that some animals possess feature X? If they are the latter, then the correlations represent a step 
                                                 
45
 However, if animal kinds are understood simply as “differentiae classes”, then one may 
be able to use the correlations to mark off animal kinds, e.g. by finding the few features to which 
many others are correlated. 
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beyond the mere collection of hoti facts, and perhaps represent initial attempts at zeroing in on 
causal explanations.  
1.1.4 Charles 
David Charles, in his book Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, provides a very different 
interpretation of the aims and methodology of the HA. However, like Balme, Gotthelf, and 
especially Lennox, he bases his interpretation in part on his reading of APo., and especially book 
II. Thus we have different readings of the Analytics leading to different readings of HA. 
In the first part of his book, Charles lays out his case for attributing to Aristotle a three-
stage view of scientific investigation, derived primarily from his reading of APo. II.1-10.
46
 The 
stages focus on the grasp of kinds, whether they exist and what their essential natures are. 
Charles develops an account of Aristotelian definition that ties it closely to the notions of 
explanation and demonstration. According to Charles, the Analytics prescribes that the heart of a 
definition of a kind will contain a single, essential feature that explains the presence of the other 
definitional features of the kind, as well as the other per se predications. He understands the 
project of the HA as determining both the features that hold of animal kinds in themselves, as 
well as the identification of the relevant kinds and sub-kinds by means of identifying the 
differentiae that properly divide genê into eidê. He reads PA I as recommending that the first 
goal of biological research is to identify those features that belong per se to the correctly marked-
off kinds of animals. Following this interpretation, he reads the “kai” in the HA I.6 passage “first 
establish the differences and attributes” as a true conjunction–that is, the goal of the historia is to 
                                                 
46 See Charles 2000, ch. 2. 
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correctly identify two different sorts of things, differentiae and attributes, and to identify them as 
such.  
By attributing to diaphorai in the HA I.6 passage a “technical” sense, Charles argues that 
a central goal of the HA is to establish which kinds exist and which attributes belong to them. 
This, to Charles, implies a “taxonomic task” of laying out the kinds.47 He ascribes to the HA the 
“double aim” of laying out the features and identifying the kinds to which they belong: 
 
Historiai are, thus, essential first steps towards causal explanation, and ones which 
involve determining which genera and species, in reality, differ from each other . . . and 
which properties genuinely belong to each kind or sub-kind.
48
 
 
Charles reads HA I.1-5 as laying the groundwork for the identification of the megista genê 
discussed in I.6. In effect, he sees these chapters as developing the notion of a common nature 
(as discussed in PA I.4) in terms of the basic life or soul functions: breathing, locomotion, 
reproduction, and nutrition.
49
 The method of HA is not simply an “empirical” one of listing 
differentiae and searching for shared groups of attributes; instead the focus is on a short-list of 
certain basic soul functions: 
 
                                                 
47 Charles 2000, p. 315n9. 
48 Charles 2000, p. 316. 
49
 Charles 2000: “Thus certain activities (such as feeding, moving, breathing, and reproducing) 
are taken as the central ones in characterizing differences between animals.” (318) “In the case of 
a unified genus, there is a distinctive way of moving, reproducing, feeding, and breathing. 
Difference with respect to one of these life functions undermines the unity of the genus.” (319) 
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. . . Aristotle’s project in the Historia Animalium is not that of determining the relevant 
genera and species merely by collecting a ‘large group’ of counter-predicable properties, 
and then using division to establish the species. Nor does he merely seek those general 
differentiae which are distinguished by continuous variations of their sensible affections. 
The significance he attaches to differences in basic soul functions shows that he is 
making major assumptions about what features are important in establishing genuinely 
common natures. His enquiry is, in effect, the progressively more systematic elucidation 
of controlling concepts of this type, one which results empirically in differentiation into 
kinds and sub-kinds. It involves both empirical data and a powerful background theory.” 
(324-325) 
 
This method of identifying kinds of animals is in line, Charles argues, with the 
prescriptions from APo. II.13, a difficult chapter of which he provides a novel interpretation.
50
 In 
summary, he reads APo. II.13 as laying out a “non-ad hoc” procedure for determining the 
differentiae that divide genê into eidê, and sees that procedure, with some modification, at work 
in the opening chapters of HA I. Regarding the incompleteness of the taxonomic classification 
provided in HA, which all commentators seem to agree on, Charles argues that the HA is meant 
to provide only the “basic outline for a system of classification rather than to carry it through in 
every detail.” (326). Like Lloyd,51 Charles argues that the incompleteness of the classification in 
HA does not indicate that Aristotle was uninterested in classification, or that he was engaged in a 
wholly different task of simply collecting differentiae. (326 n6) According to Charles, Aristotle’s 
                                                 
50 See Charles 2000, ch. 9. 
51 Prefatory note to reprint of 1961 article on classification. 
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biological research program required that he first find a way of correctly distinguishing different 
kinds of animals, and then identify which features are unique to the kinds so distinguished – “it is 
an essential preliminary for explanation of this type that one grasp genuine kinds and their non-
accidental properties. This is what grasping the relevant ‘the that’ (i.e. to hoti) consists in.” (329) 
1.2 REFLECTION 
In the foregoing discussions I have attempted to present the reading of HA by Gotthelf 
and Lennox as an extension of Balme’s interpretation, but an important one that adds much to 
our understanding of the treatise. In this regard, I am following Gotthelf and Lennox’s own 
words on the relationship between their writings. I have contrasted the Balme/Lennox/Gotthelf 
reading of HA with that of Charles. In this respect, I am aided by Lennox’s own statement of 
disagreement with Charles, based on an exchange of essays dating back to 1990. It is of interest 
that Charles’s restatement of his position, which appeared in his 2000 book, is in large part a re-
trenchment of his initial position, supplemented with text and a number of footnotes aimed at 
deflecting or, indeed, disarming, many of the criticisms leveled by Lennox in 1990. In other 
words, Lennox’s criticisms seemed to have failed to persuade Charles that his reading of HA is 
incorrect, and Charles’s own position is further supported by his forceful reading of many 
difficult passages from the Analytics. It seems we have before us today the most sophisticated 
interpretations of Aristotle’s historia of animals ever before on offer, yet they differ and disagree 
in important and fundamental ways.  
If we accept an interpretation of HA that situates it within the context of Aristotle’s 
notions of explanation and demonstration, as discussed in the Analytics (as Lennox, Gotthelf, and 
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Charles do), and, in particular, if we associate a historia with a preliminary stage of inquiry 
aimed at establishing what APo II.1 designates as to hoti, i.e. the facts in need of explanation, 
then is it the case that such facts take the form of an attribute predicated of a subject, where the 
subject identifies a specific kind? Or are the hoti-level facts reported in the HA concerned 
primarily with attributes, and not with subject kinds? That is, the hoti-level facts reported in a 
historia may emphasize predicative relationships between attributes, without exhibiting great 
concern with kind/form divisions of subjects.
52
 Further, is the explanatory project embarked 
upon in such works as PA one that requires the correct identification of animal kinds in order 
that proper demonstrations may be constructed?More generally, my concern is with the ways in 
which Aristotle envisioned a historia as not only preceding a subsequent causal investigation, but 
potentially facilitating the discovery of causes, or at least prefiguring the identification of such 
causes.
53
  
 
                                                 
52 As I will try to develop below, this is the view I hold, at least as it pertains to HA, which I 
read as providing kind/form analyses of attributes, as well as correlations among them (e.g. 
as many as possess attribute X, also possess attribute Y). But note that even on this 
interpretation, such correlations, as presented by Aristotle, typically range over certain 
kinds of animals, most typically over the megista genê, such that the hoti facts presented 
often have the form of “as many e.g. birds as possess attribute X also possess attribute Y.”  
In such an instance one might argue that e.g. the first attribute listed differentiates the kind 
bird into a specific form, thus rendering the hoti-fact one that essentially identifies a 
kind/form as subject. However I find no great evidence to support the notion that Aristotle 
held that the attributes he discussed functioned as specific differences in this manner.  
53 By prefiguring here I mean that the historia may be composed so as to guide/prepare the 
reader for the identification of causes, which may already be known at the time of its 
composition. In this case, structuring the historia in this manner may serve pedagogical 
purposes. 
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2.0  PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS I: REFERENCES TO HISTORIA IN THE 
ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS 
Prior to analyzing the HA itself, it is useful to first see if we can develop Aristotle’s 
notion of historia by examining his other uses of the term in the corpus. In so doing we will 
come to the treatise armed, as it were, with a sense of the role Aristotle envisioned historia 
playing. As I argued in the preceding chapter, two different pictures of what a historia is meant 
to accomplish emerge from discussions in the prior literature. In particular, the 
Balme/Gotthelf/Lennox view holds that the primary purpose of a historia of animals is to collect 
facts about the features and characteristics animals exhibit, without focusing great attention on 
the kinds of animals that exhibit those features. The goal of collecting this information is, first, to 
identify the various features and attributes actually exhibited by animals, and, second, to 
organize the features in order to show their similarities and differences according to kind, form, 
and analogy. Gotthelf and Lennox additionally argue that an aim of the historia is to identify 
primitively universal correlations between features in order to aid in the discovery of causal 
relationships. Charles, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of identifying the kinds of 
animals that exhibit the features studied in the historia, and to differentiate between features that 
divide kinds into sub-kinds (i.e. the diaphorai), and features that are exhibited per se by the 
kinds and sub-kinds so identified (i.e. the sumbebêkota kath’hauto). This, he argues, is the 
important first step that a historia plays in the investigation leading to causal explanation.  
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 In the following sections I discuss Aristotle’s use of the term historia and consider 
whether the term implies any specific stage of investigation. I will review the many appearances 
of the term in the biological corpus where it is used as a reference to what appears to be the HA, 
and consider whether these references give us any insight into what a historia should include, 
how it should be composed, and what one might expect to gain from reading it. 
2.1 MEANING OF HISTORIA 
The term historia is perhaps first, and best, known to us as belonging to the titles of the 
great “histories” written by Herodotus and Thucydides.54 These works are in many ways similar 
to what we count today as history, certain historiographic differences aside. That is, they are 
accounts (however accurate or true) of particular actions, done by particular people, at particular 
times in the past. Despite their focus on such particulars, both Thucydides and Herodotus 
recognize a greater purpose or aim of their histories, beyond merely retaining for posterity the 
details regarding past events.  For example, following the opening of his history, in which he 
claims that the events surrounding the Peloponnesian War represent perhaps the greatest 
“movement” of peoples in all of human history, Thucydides states his true purpose for 
recounting the details of the war:  
 
[1] The absence of romance will, I fear, detract somewhat from its [i.e. the history’s] 
interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact 
                                                 
54
 Interestingly the word historia does not appear anywhere in Thucydides’ great work, other 
than in the titles to the books.  
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knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the 
course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In 
fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the 
moment, but as a possession for all time. (I.22.4)
 55
 
 
καὶ 
ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον 
φανεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς 
σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον 
τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ 
ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ 
παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται. 
 
Thucydides’ true interest (or at least a primary interest) is to preserve the knowledge of 
the past in order to better understand the future, since in human affairs, the future is bound to 
resemble (or indeed “reflect”) the past. That is, the focus on past events is (at least in part) for the 
sake of understanding and in some sense explaining those that are happening now or have yet to 
happen. In this passage he does not expound upon the manner by which one might use 
knowledge of the past to gain insight into the future, but we might speculate that his intention in 
studying the past is to reveal certain universal propositions regarding the affairs of men–lessons, 
as it were, that transcend particular time and space, which may be applied to future events to 
better understand the changing course of history. 
                                                 
55 Trans. Crawley, from Strassler (ed.) 1996. 
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Herodotus too recognizes a greater purpose to his history than mere antiquarian interest. 
Here are the opening lines of his great work: 
 
[2] Herodotus of Halicarnassus here presents his historia so that human events do not 
fade with time. May the great and wonderful deeds–some brought forth by the 
Hellenes, others by the barbarians–not go unsung; as well as the causes ( di’ ên 
aitiên) that led them to make war on each other. (I.1.1)
56
  
 
Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ 
γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε 
ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρ- 
βάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλέα γένηται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι’ ἣν 
αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι. 
 
Similar to the passage from Thucydides, Herodotus here claims that preservation of the 
knowledge of past events serves a greater purpose than merely imparting to it a measure of 
immortality (though he clearly sees this as an important goal). In addition, he believes that a 
historia can make clear the causes (aitia) that were responsible for bringing these peoples to war. 
The statement is of particular interest, given the relationship between historia and aitia Aristotle 
eludes to in the methodological passage from HA I.6 (passage [13] below).  
In short, there is some basis for regarding a historia as something more than a mere collection of 
facts (much less, facts tethered to particular times and places). Rather we see, in the writings of 
                                                 
56 Tr. Purvis, from Strassler (ed.) 2009. 
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these two “fathers of history,” a clear interest in their work being used to interpret, understand, 
and explain not just the past, but the present and future as well. 
2.2 USES OF THE TERM HISTORIA IN THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS 
But what exactly does Aristotle mean by historia?
 57
 Although it is not clear that Aristotle 
intended the term to appear in the title of the work we know as the HA,
58
 we need not rely on this 
title alone for evidence that the term applies to the treatise, or the project embodied by the 
treatise. Not only does the term appear in the HA, in what seems to be a reference to the work at 
hand,
59
 it is also commonly used in other Aristotelian treaties as a reference to what most 
scholars take to be HA.
 60
 
Still, the term, as it was used by Aristotle, appears to have had a range of meanings, not 
all of which may be applicable to the project of the HA. A TLG search reveals that Aristotle did 
not often use the term historia outside of specific references to the HA or some other similar 
treatise. In those places where he does employ the term presumably with its traditional or 
standard meaning, it often seems to carry with it either something similar to our notion of 
“history,” or the basic notion of an inquiry, study, or investigation (or the reports or results of 
these), perhaps synonymous with theoria, zêtêsis, or skepsis.  Such instances do not appear to 
                                                 
57 See Louis 1955; Lennox 1991, n4; Gotthelf 1988, n6. 
58 Balme 1991, p. 7 notes that certain manuscripts make reference to HA as the treatise on 
the “parts of animals”, reflecting the words in the first line of the treatise.  
59 HA I.6, 491a12 (passage [13] below). 
60 It is difficult to confirm that the various references to a historia of animals in the corpus 
are in fact references to the HA as we know it today. Often passages in the HA may be found 
that correspond well to the given reference, but that, in itself, does not secure the reference 
to our HA.  
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call out any particular stage of inquiry. However, as we shall see, some such uses do seem to 
make reference to a specific, early, pre-explanatory stage of investigation, one that combines, as 
it were, the notions of historia as “history” and “investigation.” It will be these uses that point 
the way towards understanding the role of historia, and HA, in Aristotle study of animals. 
In the following sections I discuss the varying uses of the term historia in the Aristotelian 
corpus. I argue that, though these varying uses tend to have shades of differing meaning, all 
converge on the same general sense, and it is possible to use this general sense to better 
understand the more “technical” sense in which the term is used by Aristotle in reference to a 
particular, early stage of investigation. I divide the uses of the term into two main categories: 
general uses of the term (section 4), and uses that appear to act as specific references to HA 
(section 5). The first category will assist us in developing Aristotle’s more technical sense of 
historia (the sense I believe is relevant to HA), while the second will help fill out the picture of 
the content one might expect to find in the historia of animals, and provide some sense of the 
role the historia should play. 
2.2.1 General uses of historia 
Aristotle’s use of the term historia spans a range of apparent meanings, but they are 
related. I shall consider nine passages in which the term historia appears and is used in a 
“general” way, i.e. not as a reference to HA.61  
 
                                                 
61 The passages are arranged in such a manner as to facilitate the narrative flow of my 
discussion, and not e.g. by Bekker number. 
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2.2.2 Historia as “story” and “history” 
The first passages to consider are those in which the term historia is used in much the 
same manner as our word “history.” The first such passage appears in Mir. Ausc. 62 : 
 
[3] In the city called Utica in Libya, which is situated, as they say, on the gulf 
between the promontory of Hermes and that of Hippos, and about two hundred 
furlongs beyond Carthage (now Utica also is said to have been founded by 
Phoenicians two hundred and eighty-seven years before Carthage itself, as is 
recorded in the Phoenician histories (historiais)) men state that  . . . (Mir. Ausc. 
134, 844a6-11)
63
 
 
844a6  Τῆς δὲ Λιβύης ἐν Ἰτύκῃ τῇ καλουμένῃ, ἣ κεῖται 
μέν, ὡς λέγουσιν, ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τῷ μεταξὺ Ἑρμαίας καὶ 
τῆς Ἵππου ἄκρας, ἐπέκεινα δὲ Καρχηδόνος ὡς σταδίους 
διακοσίους (ἣ καὶ πρότερον κτισθῆναι λέγεται ὑπὸ Φοινίκων 
a10  αὐτῆς τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἔτεσι διακοσίοις ὀγδοήκοντα ἑπτά,  
ὡς ἀναγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς Φοινικικαῖς ἱστορίαις γίνεσθαί 
                                                 
62 It may be objected that treatises such as Mir. Ausc. are not authentically Aristotelian, and 
thus should not be used to fix the meaning of a term as it was used by Aristotle. While I 
recognize this problem, my response is (i) the spuriousness of such treatises is, as I 
understand it, still debated (more for some, less for others) and thus their consideration is 
still warranted, even if they should be taken with the proverbial grain of salt; and (ii) even 
if such treatises were not written by the hand of Aristotle himself, it is quite possible that 
they were composed by close associates, who very well may have used such terms in 
similar, if not identical, ways.  In either case, I believe a consideration of these texts is 
instructive. 
63 Translated by L.D. Dowdall, in Barnes 1984. 
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φασιν . . . 
 
In this passage historia appears to be used in much the same sense as in Herodotus and 
Thucydides, and corresponds to our notion of “history.” The fact of the founding of Utica by the 
Phoenicians some three centuries before Carthage is recorded in the Phoenician historiai. While 
the term historiai may just be what these records of past events were commonly called, it seems 
reasonable that the term historia itself carried, or came to carry, this meaning, and was not used 
merely as a proper name in reference to such works. 
The next two passages both appear in the Poetics: 
 
[4] And it is also evident from the things that have been said that the work of the poet 
is to speak not of things that have happened but of the sort of thing that might 
happen and possibilities that come from what is likely or necessary. For the 
historian (historichos) and the poet differ not by speaking in metrical verse or 
without meter (for it would be possible to put the writings of Herodotus into 
meter, and they would be a historia with meter no less than without it). Rather, 
they differ in this, that the one speaks of things that have happened, but the other 
of the sort of things that might happen. For this reason too, poetry is a more 
philosophical and more serious thing than history historia, since poetry speaks 
more of things that are universal, and historia of things that are particular. (Poet. 
9, 1451a36-b7)
64
 
 
                                                 
64 Trans. Sachs 2006. 
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1451a36 Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενό- 
μενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο 
καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ 
b1  ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα 
διαφέρουσιν (εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι 
καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέ- 
τρων)· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέ- 
b5  γειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ  
σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις 
μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγει. 
 
 
[5] About the art of narrative imitation in meter, it is clear that one ought to organize 
the stories just as in tragedies, as dramatic, concerned with one action, whole and 
complete, having a beginning, middle, and end, in order that they might, like one 
whole living thing, produce the appropriate sort of pleasure; the putting together 
of them ought not to be made like that of historiai, in which it is necessary that 
they make a display not of one action but of one time, with all the things that 
happen in that time involving one or more people, each of the events related to the 
others in any random way. (Poet. 23, 1459a17-24)
 65
 
 
                                                 
65 Trans. Sachs 2006. 
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1459a17 Περὶ δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, 
ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις συνιστάναι 
δραματικοὺς καὶ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχου- 
a20  σαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος, ἵν’ ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον  
ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν, δῆλον, καὶ μὴ ὁμοίας ἱστορίαις τὰς 
συνθέσεις εἶναι, ἐν αἷς ἀνάγκη οὐχὶ μιᾶς πράξεως ποιεῖσθαι 
δήλωσιν ἀλλ’ ἑνὸς χρόνου, ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα 
ἢ πλείους, ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα. 
 
In both [4] and [5] poetry is contrasted with historia, which seems to take on the sense of 
our “history.” In [4], poetry is said to be philosophôteron and spoudaioteron than history because 
poetry’s subject matter is more universal and deals with the sort of thing that might have been, 
while history deals with particular things in the past that have been. That is, the historian is 
restricted in his writing by the events that actually did take place. He is not free to craft his story 
as he chooses, as the poet might, and thus he is unable to tailor his story to meet the goals of his 
choosing. In [5], poetry is said to deal with a single action (mian praxin) that possesses a unity 
similar to that of an animal, while history deals with a single period of time (henos chronos) and 
all the events that took place during that time, whatever their relation to one another. The 
passages emphasize, as did passage [4], the factual nature of a historia, that it is meant to 
document the events that actually did happen during a certain time. 
While the previous uses of historia agreed best with our term “history,” this next passage, 
from the Problêmata, uses the term in a sense closer to our term “story” or “narrative” : 
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[6] Why do we listen to historiai organized around one thing with more pleasure than 
those that deal with many? Is it because we pay more attention, and listen with 
more pleasure, to what is more easily comprehended? But the limited is more 
easily comprehended than the unlimited. Now what is one is defined, whereas 
what is many partakes in the infinite. (Prob. XVIII.9, 917b8-12)
66
 
 
917b8  Διὰ τί ποτε τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἥδιον ἀκούομεν τῶν περὶ ἓν 
συνεστηκυιῶν ἢ τῶν περὶ πολλὰ πραγματευομένων; ἢ διότι 
b10  τοῖς γνωριμωτέροις μᾶλλον προσέχομεν καὶ ἥδιον αὐτῶν 
ἀκούομεν· γνωριμώτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου. τὸ 
μὲν οὖν ἓν ὥρισται, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου μετέχει. 
 
The problêma suggests that we enjoy listening to stories that center on a single point or 
topic rather than many, because a single thing is more easily “comprehended” or “understood” 
(gnôrimôteros), since the many shares in the infinite, which presumably is not understandable. A 
historia, in this sense, is a recounting of actions, deeds, events, happenings, etc., and does not 
necessarily imply any sort of explanatory reasoning. However, the problêma seems general 
enough to include any sort of expository writing, and not just a “history” in our sense. 
                                                 
66 Trans. Mayhew 2011. Mayhew translates historia as “historical accounts,” but this seems 
overly influenced by our English cognate word. Nothing in the problem, or the surrounding 
problems, suggests that this problêma deals exclusively with historical accounts, versus e.g. 
other sorts of stories, narratives, etc. The traditional title of Prob. XVIII is hosa peri 
philologian, which Mayhew translates as “Problems Connected with the Love of Letters,” 
which he glosses as “love of (or interest in) literature or letters” (p. 515). The focus of the 
problems of this book is on reading and listening in general, and typically not on specific 
kinds of writing or speaking. 
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2.2.3 Historia as “investigation” or “inquiry” 
Whereas in the preceding examples the term historia took on a meaning often quite 
similar to our “history,” in the following passages the term appears to mean something closer to 
“investigation” or “inquiry,” or a report of the results of an investigation or inquiry. 
I consider first a passage from the Rhetoric that arguably “tows the line” between the 
senses of “history” and “investigation”: 
 
[7] So it is evident that for lawmaking, travels around the earth are useful, since it is 
possible to grasp the laws of various nations from them, and for political advice, 
the historiai contained in writings about the deeds of those nations, but all these 
things are work for the study of politics and not of rhetoric. (Rhet. I.4 1360a33-
37)
67
 
 
1360a33       ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι  
πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι ἐν- 
a35  τεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τὰς  
πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστο- 
ρίαι· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ’ οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν. 
                                                 
67 Trans. Sachs 2009. 
 41 
 
Here one might understand the phrase “historiai contained in the writings about the deeds 
of nations” to be what we would generally call a “history,” or one might take the historiai here to 
refer to something more general, since Aristotle specifies the kind of historia he is referring to, 
namely the kind “contained in the writing about the deeds of those nations.” One might argue 
that a “history,” in our sense, is the writings about the deeds of nations. Thus historia, as used 
here, might refer to a more general “investigation.” As such, Sachs translates historiai here as 
“investigations,” while Roberts68 loosely (or rather, “interpretively”) translates the phrase as “the 
researches of historians.” Since these historiai are to be consulted for “political advice” (tas 
politikas sumboulas), it may be that they contain not just an account of the deeds of the nations, 
but rather some sort of lessons or maxims derived from these accounts. So understood the 
purpose of the historiai would be to cull or distill these lessons from the historical accounts.  
Whereas the use of historia in the previous passage from Rhet. was somewhat ambiguous 
as to whether the term would be best rendered by our “history” or “investigation,” this next 
passage, from de Caelo, uses the term in a less ambiguous manner for something akin to 
“investigation”: 
 
[8] . . . it is clear that for the most part it is the case that the historia of nature is about 
bodies; for all natural substances either are bodies or come to be from bodies and 
magnitudes. (DC III.1, 298b1-4) 
 
298b1      . . . φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν  
                                                 
68 In Barnes 1984. 
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πλείστην συμβαίνει τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας περὶ σωμάτων  
εἶναι· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι ἢ σώματα ἢ μετὰ σω- 
μάτων γίγνονται καὶ μεγεθῶν. 
 
In this passage Aristotle argues that the historia of nature is primarily concerned with 
bodies (sômata), since all natural substances (phusikai ousiai) either are bodies or are dependent 
upon them (this last claim is deduced in the lines immediately preceding, 498a27-b2). The 
passage reverberates with verbal echoes of the opening lines of DC I.1, which state: 
 
[9] The epistêmê of nature is for the most part clearly about both bodies and 
magnitudes and those things that are properties and motions of these, and further 
of principles, as many as belong to these sorts of substances. For among things 
that are put together by nature, some are bodies and magnitudes, others belong to 
bodies and magnitudes, and others are the principles of these. (DC I.1, 268a1-6) 
 
268a1  Ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμη σχεδὸν ἡ πλείστη φαίνε- 
ται περί τε σώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ τούτων οὖσα πάθη καὶ 
τὰς κινήσεις, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅσαι τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας 
εἰσίν· τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνεστώτων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα καὶ 
a5  μεγέθη, τὰ δ’ ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν 
ἐχόντων εἰσίν. 
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The phrase tês peri phuseôs historias in [9] appears to function similarly to hê peri 
phuseôs epistêmê in [10], but are they therefore synonymous? Epistêmê, in this context, is used 
to refer to an organized body of knowledge, and is often translated as “science.” Here historia 
may refer, not so much to the end result of an investigation, but rather to the investigation 
itself—the process leading to the end result. Both passages appear at the beginnings of their 
respective books, in the introductory discussions meant to situate the subject matter currently at 
hand within a broader investigative context. If Aristotle is making a distinction in these passages 
between the inquiry or investigation into nature (historia), and the results of that inquiry 
(epistêmê), it is not obvious from the context, and does not seem especially relevant to the matter 
at hand. Rather, it seems these terms are here used synonymously to refer to the project of 
investigating nature. 
 The next passage, from the beginning of de Anima, uses the term historia in a manner 
similar to passage [8]: 
 
[10] Since we consider knowledge (eidêsin) to be something beautiful and honored, 
the one sort more so than another either on account of its precision or because it is 
about better and more wondrous things, on both these accounts we should with 
good reason rank the historia about the soul among the primary studies. And it 
seems that acquaintance with it (hê gnôsis autês) contributes greatly toward all 
truth and especially toward the truth about nature, since the soul is in some way 
the principle of living things. (DA I.1 402a1-7)
69
 
 
                                                 
69 Trans. Sachs 2001. 
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402a1  Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- 
λον δ’ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε 
καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυ- 
χῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 
a5  πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ- 
λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ 
τῶν ζῴων. 
 
In this passage the historia of soul is argued to rank first or be primary because the 
knowledge (eidêsis) that results from the historia is both more precise and pertains to a more 
wonderous thing, relative to other historiai, and because this knowledge aids in the 
understanding of nature, since the soul is a principle of living things—the quintessential natural 
substances. The historia of soul, on this reading, results in the knowledge of soul, and thus is 
best translated as “investigation” or “inquiry.” The use here is very similar to that of passage [8] 
from DC: both use historia to denote a study or investigation. 
 This usage is in keeping with the use of the term in the next passage, from PA I.1: 
 
[11] So it is clear that for the historia into nature, too, there should be certain 
standards, such that referring to them one can appraise the manner of its proofs, 
apart from the question of what the truth is, whether thus or otherwise. (PA I.1, 
639a12-15)
70
 
 
                                                 
70 Trans. Lennox 2001. 
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639a12 Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινας  
ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν  
τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές,  
a15  εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως. 
 
Similar to passages [8] and [10] above, this passage appears in the introductory remarks 
of PA I.1, which focus on the general features to which any scientifically conducted investigation 
should conform.
71
 In this passage, Aristotle claims that, for the historia of nature, there should be 
certain standards (horous) according to which one might appraise the manner of its proofs 
(deiknumenôn). Thus the historia of nature, as it is used here, will include proofs of the various 
claims it makes: the historia involves not just factual claims, but also proofs of these claims. 
Thus “the historia into nature” refers to the entire project of the investigation or inquiry into 
nature, and is not restricted to a collection or report of facts about nature, devoid of explanatory 
content.  
Thus we have moved from a sense of historia as something akin to our “history” to one 
closer to our “inquiry” or “investigation.” This next passage, from Prior Analytics, seems to use 
the term in a more restricted sense, referring to a particular stage of investigation: 
 
[12] Consequently, if the facts concerning any subject have been grasped, we are 
already prepared to bring the demonstrations readily to light. For if nothing that 
truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of our historia, then concerning 
                                                 
71
 The first part of PA I.1 is especially rich with words that denote investigation, inquiry, 
research, and knowledge: theoria, methodos, 639a1; epistêmê, a3; historia, a12.  
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every fact, if a demonstration for it exists, we will be able to find that 
demonstration and demonstrate it, while if it does not naturally have a 
demonstration, we will be able to make that evident. (APr. I.30, 46a22-27)
72
 
 
46a22        ὥστ’ ἐὰν ληφθῇ  
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις  
ἑτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παρα- 
a25  λειφθείη τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἕξομεν  
περὶ ἅπαντος οὗ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὑρεῖν καὶ ἀπο- 
δεικνύναι, οὗ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν.   
 
In APr. I.27-30 Aristotle discusses a method for identifying middle terms that can serve 
to connect the major and minor terms of a proposition that one wishes to prove.
73
 The method 
comprises identifying all the terms that “follow” the major term, and all the terms that “are 
followed by” the minor term, and comparing the lists in search of common terms. The passage 
suggests that the historia is to contain all these facts about what is predicated of the major term, 
and what the minor term is predicated of. In this way, if a deduction can be constructed, the 
historia will help bring it to light by including all such facts. This use of the term suggests that a 
historia is primarily a collection of facts regarding the subject matter under consideration, one 
which facilitates the construction of deductions, and presumably precedes attempts at 
demonstration. The factual nature of the historia here agrees well with the uses of the term in 
                                                 
72 Trans. Smith 1989. 
73 See Lennox 1991, pp. 43-45, and ch. 6 below for a fuller discussion of this topic. 
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passages [3], [4], and [5], where the term seemed to denote an inquiry or report of factual 
information, similar to our “history,” but also fits with the usage in [8], [10], and [11], where the 
terms was used to refer to an investigation or inquiry, since the historia is here used to facilitate 
demonstrations, and thus plays a role in our coming to know why certain facts are the case. Thus 
a historia, as used here, occupies a stage in an investigation, one dedicated to collecting and 
arranging data for the purposes of constructing demonstrations.  
This is the use the term historia that appears to be in play in the following important 
methodological passage from HA itself.    
 
[13] So then, these things have now been said in this way as an outline – for the sake 
of a taste of which things and how many things must be studied. We shall speak 
later with precision, in order that we should first grasp the existing differences and 
features/attributes for all.  After this we must attempt to discover the causes of 
them.  For this is the natural way to conduct a study, there being a historia about 
each; for about which things and from which things demonstration must be comes 
to be clear from these things. (HA I.6, 491a7-14) 
 
491a7   Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· δι’ 
ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας  
a10  διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν. Μετὰ δὲ 
τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς 
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περὶ ἕκαστον· περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπό-    
δειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. 
 
I shall have the opportunity to discuss this passage at length later in the dissertation,
74
 but 
presently we may ask, What sense might be derived from the use of historia in 491a12? 
Just prior to a12, Aristotle states that first we must grasp the actual differences and 
attributes belonging to all animals, and after this attempt to find the causes. This method of 
procedure is described as “the natural way to conduct an investigation.” The genitive absolute 
clause that follows, in a12, is difficult to interpret: what meaning should we attach to the verb 
huparchousês? Gotthelf translates the line as: 
 
For that is the natural way to pursue such an inquiry, once one has completed a 
historia concerning each of these . . . 
75
 
 
According to this rendering, the natural way to pursue an inquiry is to search for the 
causes after the facts have been established in the historia. That is, the historia represents the 
stage of investigation dedicated to establishing certain facts regarding the subject matter under 
study, prior to searching for the causes. 
Notice how well this interpretation agrees with the use of the term historia in passage 
[13] above from APr. There the claim was that a completed historia will aid in the construction 
of deductions by facilitating the identification of middle terms. Here that point of method is not 
                                                 
74 See ch. 4, section 4.7, below. 
75 Gotthelf 2012b, p.  271. 
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made explicit, but what is clear is that there is or should be a stage of investigation that precedes 
the search for causes, and that presumably facilitates the discovery of them. 
As will be argued at greater length below, I believe this is the correct understanding of 
historia in this context, and that this is the sense of historia that applies to the investigation 
reported in HA. In fact, the connection between this use of historia and the HA can be made 
stronger by considering the other uses of the term in the biological corpus that appear to refer to 
the HA itself. 
2.2.4 Reflection on general uses of historia 
In the passages looked at so far, the term historia has ranged in meaning from “story” or 
narrative, to something like our common notion of “history,” to “investigation” or “inquiry,” to a 
first stage of inquiry. These various meanings are clearly connected: a “history” is a sort of 
“investigation” or “inquiry,” but one that typically focuses on reporting certain facts, perhaps 
with an eye towards some sort of understanding that might lead to identifying the causes 
responsible for the reported facts, but precedes any definite attempt to determine those causes. It 
is this last sense of historia that applies best to the historia of animals reported in the HA.  
2.3 SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO HA 
Among the instances of the term historia in the Aristotelian corpus, a great majority of 
them appear to be used as references to the HA itself. These passages, which all appear in the 
biological or zoological works, typically refer the reader back to a historia in order to find 
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additional information regarding the subject matter at hand.  Our question is: What can we learn 
about the historia of animals from these references? What role should we expect the historia to 
play? What should we expect to find in the historia? Does the HA meet these expectations? 
A list of all these references (with Greek text and English translations) is included in 
Appendix A. In what follows below I will make some generalized observations on all the 
references, and discuss a few in particular.  
There is some variability in the manner in which the passages refer to HA. Most typically 
use either the Greek preposition en or ek followed by some form of historia peri tôn zôôn, which 
mirrors the traditional title of HA. Of the 24 passages I studied, the majority are found either in 
PA or GA, and these typically point the reader back to historiai in order to gain additional 
information or clarity regarding some topic under discussion—typically a part of an animal: its 
form, position, etc.
76
 In most cases it is possible to identify passages in HA that “answer” the 
reference in the other work, however it is not always the case that the corresponding passages in 
HA do include more or more detailed information.
77
 
In what follows below, I organize these passages as follows. First I consider the 
references to HA that characterize the historia as a preliminary investigation. These passages 
further confirm Aristotle’s “technical” use of the term, as argued above. Next I consider those 
references that are paired with references to the anatomai—a lost work, thought to include 
pictures or diagrams. These passages provide some clue as to what kind of information a historia 
                                                 
76 See Appendix A for details. 
77 In fact, Balme argues that many of the corresponding passages in HA contain less 
information than the other works, and often appear to be brief summaries or abbreviations 
of the passages in these other works. Balme argues that it is likely that Aristotle composed 
the HA after these other works (i.e. PA, IA, etc.) and that he began by culling the relevant 
information from those works and often adding to them. See Balme 1987a, pp. 12-6, and 
Lennox 1996 for a critical analysis of the “Balme Hypothesis.”  
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is meant to provide. Next I consider those passages that specifically make reference to the 
historia identifying the differences between the parts of animals, animals themselves, etc. These 
are important because they help us understand Aristotle’s comment (in passage [13] above) that 
the historia will document our grasp of the “differences and attributes” belonging to all animals. 
2.3.1 Historia as hoti investigation 
The first passages to consider refer to the historia of animals, not in order to provide 
additional detail to a specific argument, but rather in a more general way, contrasting the project 
of the historia with that of the investigation presently at hand.  
The first such passage to consider appears in PA II.1: 
 
[14] From which parts and from how many parts each of the animals is constituted has 
been exhibited more clearly in the historiai about them; it is the causes owing to 
which each animal has this character that must now be examined, on their own 
and apart from what was said in those historiai. (PA II.1, 646a9, 11) 
 
646a8  Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν μορίων καὶ πόσων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον 
τῶν ζῴων, ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ αὐτῶν δεδήλωται σα- 
a10  φέστερον· δι’ ἃς δ’ αἰτίας ἕκαστον τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, 
ἐπισκεπτέον νῦν, χωρίσαντας καθ’ αὑτὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις 
εἰρημένων. 
  
In this passage Aristotle makes a distinction between two stages of investigation: a preliminary 
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stage dedicated to establishing certain facts regarding the parts exhibited by animals, and a later 
stage dedicated to determining the causes that explain why each animal possess the parts that it 
does, and why the parts have the character that they do. The first stage is accomplished (or 
reported) in the historiai, while the second is the business of the PA. This distinction appears to 
be the same one made in the important methodological passage in HA I.6 (passage [13]). The 
actual reference is to the hisotriai “about them” (peri autôn). The antecedent of “them” is either 
“the parts” (in a8), or, more likely, “the animals” (in a9). In either case, that the reference is to 
HA is reasonably secure, in so far as the first four books of HA may be considered a historia 
about the parts of animals. 
The relationship between the two stages of investigation is made somewhat confused by 
the final lines of the passage, where Aristotle states that the causes must be considered “on their 
own and apart from what was said in those historiai.” Should not the historiai aid in the 
discovery of causes? Why should the discussion of causes take place “on their own” and “apart 
from” the historiai? Perhaps Aristotle’s point is that the discussion of causes represents an 
advance on the discussions of the historiai, such that what must be said of the causes is not said 
in the historiai, and thus must be said “apart from,” i.e. in addition to, what was said in the 
historiai. 
This raises the question of the precise role of a historia. The process by which we come 
to know (or should go about coming to know) why something is the case—the stages we do or 
should pass through—need not be reflected precisely in the treatises that report on these stages. 
That is, a historia, which reports the facts regarding an area of study that must or should be 
grasped prior to search for causal explanation, need not be composed prior to the discovery of 
these causes, or at least the discovery of all the causes.   
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The next passage to consider appears in IA 1: 
 
[15] Regarding all these things, and as many others as are similar to these, we must 
investigate the causes. That these thing hold in this way is clear from the natural 
historia, but why they do, must now be examined. (IA 1, 704b8-11) 
 
704b8  περὶ δὴ πάντων τούτων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα συγγενῆ τούτοις, 
τὰς αἰτίας θεωρητέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτω ταῦτα συμ- 
b10  βαίνει, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς φυσικῆς, διότι δέ, νῦν  
σκεπτέον. 
 
The facts referred to in this passage all pertain, as the entire treatise does, to aspects of 
animal locomotion, and include such facts as all blooded animals move at four points, all 
bloodless animals move at more than four points, all animals with feet have an even number of 
feet, humans and birds are the only two-footed animals but bend their legs oppositely, etc. The 
reference to the “natural historia” renders it slightly uncertain as to whether it is HA that is being 
referred to, however the extended discussion of animal locomotion in HA II.1 answers 
reasonably well to the facts described in IA 1.
78
 
In this passage, the connection with hoti and dioti forms of inquiry, discussed in APo. II, 
is especially strong, in so far as these terms are actually used in the appropriate sense in the 
                                                 
78 See especially the discussion of the bending and movements of the limbs at HA II.1, 
498a2ff. 
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passage itself: the historia establishes that certain facts hold, while the IA will explain why they 
hold.  
These passages suggest that a historia of animals will primarily include a factual report of 
the features and characteristics exhibited by animals. What the passages do not address directly 
is the precise nature of the facts that are to be reported. In passage [14] from PA, the claim is that 
the historia includes information about the parts of animals, but does not specify whether this 
includes, for example, identifying which kinds of animals possess which parts. 
2.3.2 Historia and anatomai 
Of the passages I considered, half (12 to be precise) refer the reader back both to the 
historiai and to the anatomai. The anatomai is a lost work ()or collection of works) that 
presumably was, or included, a number of drawings or diagrams of animals, in particular of their 
inner parts.
79
 These passages presumably refer to both works because the subject matter under 
discussion can be profitably illuminated by both a detailed description in words and a visual 
picture or display. For example, consider this passage from PA III.14: 
 
[16] The study of the way in which these parts are related to one another in position 
and in their form should be based on the historia about animals and the anatomai. 
(PA III.14, 674b16) 
 
674b15   Ὃν δ’ ἔχει τρόπον ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ 
                                                 
79 Diogenes Laertius V.25: lists 8 books of Dissections and one Selection from Dissections (6 
and 1 in the Vita Hesychii). 
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θέσει καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἔκ τε τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα 
δεῖ θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν. 
 
The context of this passage is a discussion of the multiple stomachs possessed by some 
animals. The reference back to the historia and the anatomai is to help the reader better 
understand the position (thesis) of these parts relative to one another, and their form (eidê). 
Presumably a detailed picture could well-exhibit the position of these parts relative to one 
another, in a manner that might more easily be grasped compared to a narrative description of the 
same. Similarly, the form of these parts, in so far as form includes shape, might be made clearer 
by a picture. But there are some aspects of a part of an animal, such as precise structural features, 
that might not be as readily grasped by a picture, and might better be explained in words, 
especially when one considers the great obstacles facing the 4
th
 century B.C. author from 
producing and reproducing such pictures. Written accounts of such details would appear in the 
historia. 
Of special interest are the few passages that suggest a student might learn different things 
from each. For example, consider this passage from Resp. 4: 
 
[17] The position of the heart relative to the gills should be studied visually from the 
anatomai, and in detail by reference to the historiai; but to summarize for our 
present purpose, the facts are as follows. (Resp. 4, 478a34-b2) 
 
478a34      ὡς δ’ ἡ θέσις ἔχει 
τῆς καρδίας πρὸς τὰ βράγχια, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ τῶν 
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b1   ἀνατομῶν δεῖ θεωρεῖν, πρὸς δ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν· ὡς 
δ’ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, ἔχει τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. 
 
In this passage the historiai are said to provide detail or precision (akribeia), while the 
anatomai are to be studied visually (pros . . .tên opsin). The implication of this passage is that the 
reader will learn different things from studying the two: the akribeia provided by the historiai is 
to be supplemented by whatever is additionally provided visually by the anatomai. What 
Aristotle thought that might be is difficult to determine from this passage, but that he believed 
one might profitably learn different things from the two works is clear. 
The point is made again in the following passage from PA IV.5: 
 
[17] All these, and the other hard-shelled animals, as was said, have a mouth, a tongue-
like part, a stomach, and a residual outlet, though each part differs in position and 
size. (The manner in which each of them has these parts should be studied with 
the help of the historiai about animals and of the anatomai. For some of these 
things need to be clarified by an account, others rather by visual inspection.) (PA 
IV.5, 680a1) 
 
679b34       Πάντα μὲν οὖν 
ἔχει, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα στόμα  
τε καὶ τὸ γλωττοειδὲς καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος 
τὴν ἔξοδον, διαφέρει δὲ τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν. Ὃν δὲ 
680a1   τρόπον ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον, ἔκ τε τῶν ἱστοριῶν τῶν 
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περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρείσθω καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ 
λόγῳ τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῶν σαφηνίζειν δεῖ μᾶλλον. 
 
The context of this passage is a discussion of the parts of bloodless animals, specifically 
the malakia, malakostraka, and ostrakoderma. While he does not specify precisely how the 
different works aid in our understanding differently, he does make the point that some things are 
better clarified by means of an account or argument (logos), while others are by “visual 
inspection” (pros tên opsin).  
Our interest here is primarily in the historiai and what these references can teach us about 
them. One thing that emerges from these double references to historiai and anatomai is that the 
historiai were clearly written accounts in words, and that Aristotle believed such written 
accounts provided a level of akribeia that visual inspection could not, or could not easily, 
provide.
80
 Rendering what is seen into words provides a level of detail that may be otherwise 
missed. 
2.3.3 Passages that explicitly reference differences 
A few of the passages considered make explicit reference to the historia documenting the 
differences between animals, in their parts, manners of reproduction, etc. These references are of 
particular interest due to the interpretive debate, discussed above, regarding the methodological 
passage from HA I.6 (passage [13] above), in which Aristotle claims that the first stage of 
investigation or inquiry is to grasp the “differences and attributes” that belong to all animals. 
                                                 
80 See ch. 5, sections 5.1.1.3, and 5.1.1.4, for a more detailed argument for this claim. 
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Recall that, on the Balme/Lennox/Gotthelf reading, Aristotle recognizes little or no difference 
between these terms in the HA, while on the Charles reading, “differences” refers to something 
like “specific difference,” i.e. the feature or features that divide a given kind into forms, while 
“attribute” refers to the features that belong to those kinds and forms per se.  
Consider, for example, the following passage from PA IV.8: 
 
[18] Each of the parts – what their positions are and what differences there are from 
one animal to another, including in what way the males differ from the females – 
should be studied with the help of the dissections and the historiai about animals. 
(PA IV.8, 684b5) 
 
684b2         Καθ’ 
ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μορίων, τίς ἡ θέσις αὐτῶν καὶ τίνες διαφο- 
ραὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῶν τ’ ἄλλων καὶ τίνι διαφέρει τὰ ἄρρενα 
b5  τῶν θηλειῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατομῶν θεωρείσθω καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱστο- 
ριῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ ζῷα. 
 
The “parts” referred to here are primarily locomotive parts, such as feet, claws, tail, etc.  
The immediate discussion is of the differences of such parts in different kinds of malakostraka. 
However this passage marks a transition from a discussion of the external parts of bloodless 
animals to the internal parts, so the antecedent of “these parts” may be the external parts of 
bloodless animals, rather than those of the malkostraka.  
The reference to the differences of these parts relative to one another (pros allêla) 
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suggests that the differences are keyed to the different kinds of animals, so that the historia is to 
include data about which kinds possess which parts. However it is not specified how the kinds of 
animals will be marked off, i.e. whether reference will be made to the proper names of specific 
kinds/forms, or whether e.g. animals will be grouped according to shared features. Nor is there 
any indication that the differences so identified will be the specific differences responsible for 
dividing a kind into its proper forms.   
Consider next the following passage from PA IV.10: 
 
[19] Both how the parts concerned with the seed and embryo are arranged internally 
and in what manner they differ are apparent with the help of the historia about 
animals and the dissections, and will be stated later in the works on generation. 
(PA IV.10, 689a18) 
 
689a17    Ἐντὸς δὲ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ πῇ διαφέρουσι τά 
τε περὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κύησιν, ἔκ τε τῆς ἱστορίας  
τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ἀνατομῶν, καὶ ὕστερον 
a20  λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως. 
 
Again, similar to passage [18] above, the reference to the manner in which these parts 
differ pertains, presumably, to how they differ in different kinds of animals, and thus the historia 
is to include information not only about parts, but also about the kinds of animals that exhibit the 
parts. But again, it does not appear that these differences are the very ones responsible from 
dividing the kinds in question into various forms. 
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Finally, consider the following passage from GA III.10: 
 
[20]   To find out the various differences between each of these kinds (tôn toioutôn 
genôn), and between them and bees, the records given peri tas historias should be 
studied. (GA III.10, 761a10) 
 
761a8          πόσας 
δ’ ἔχουσι διαφορὰς ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἕκα- 
στον ἢ πρὸς τὰς μελίττας ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἱστορίας ἀναγε- 
γραμμένων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. 
 
The discussion is of the generation of hornets and wasps, and how it differs from that of bees. 
Thus the differences noted are again aligned with particular kinds of animals, such that the 
historia will provide information regarding which kinds of animals differ in which ways.  But the 
differences so identified do not appear to be prioritized or used as specific differences. Rather 
they appear to be considered on par with the others. 
These passages are important for our understanding of historia because they emphasize 
the role a historia plays in documenting the differences between attributes exhibited by animals, 
and suggest that the historia will in some way specify or identify the groups of animals that 
exhibit these differences. As I’ve pointed out above, it is unclear whether these groups will be 
identified according to a classification that grasps the animals’ essential natures (as Charles’s 
understanding of a historia may lead us to expect), and indeed no special emphasis appears to be 
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placed on the differences so identified as being the specific differences used to divide a kind into 
forms, and thus no indication is given that a historia s to play this role. 
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3.0  PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS II: THE ANALYTICS AND PARTS OF 
ANIMALS I. 
As discussed in chapter 1, scholars have recognized and elaborated on the relationship 
between the project of the HA and Aristotle’s discussions of explanation and demonstration, 
especially those in the Analytics. Differences in the interpretation of these discussions have in 
turn led to difference in the interpretation of the role and function of the HA. Prior to turning to 
the HA itself, in this chapter I examine the relevant passages from the Analytics (especially APo. 
II) in an attempt to determine what we can learn from those discussions regarding the project of a 
historia. 
First, I shall begin by looking at the methodological passage from HA I.6 for “clues” 
regarding the relationship between a historia and Aristotle’s theory of explanation and 
demonstration. Next, I discuss Aristotle’s treatment of the stages of investigation in APo., and 
consider whether Aristotle offered any insight regarding how an investigation progresses from 
the early stages of establishing and organizing facts to the later stages of discovering causes and 
formulating causal explanations. This discussion will focus especially on APo. II. Finally I 
discuss Aristotle’s extended reflections in PA I on the method of investigation that is most proper 
to the study of living things and consider what insight that discussion offers on the project of a 
historia of animals, given the picture developed throughout the chapter. 
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3.1 HA I.6, 491A7-14: METHODOLOGICAL CLUES REGARDING AIMS AND 
PURPOSES OF HA 
The task of elucidating Aristotle’s aims, purposes, and methodology in composing a 
historia of animals is facilitated by an important methodological reflection that appears in an 
early chapter of HA.
81
 The first six chapters of book one form something of an introduction to the 
entire treatise; a detailed examination of this portion of text appears below.
82
 For now I want to 
focus on a passage near the end of chapter 6, perhaps the most important methodological passage 
in the entire treatise.  It provides the necessary “clues” to help develop Aristotle’s conception of 
historia. The passage reads: 
 
[1] So then, these things have now been said in this way as an outline – for the sake 
of a taste of which things and how many things must be studied. We shall speak 
later with precision, in order that we should first grasp the existing differences and 
features/attributes for all.  After this we must attempt to discover the causes of 
them.  For this is the natural way to conduct a study, there being a historia about 
each; for about which things and from which things demonstration must be comes 
to be clear from these things. (HA I.6, 491a7-14) 
 
                                                 
81 See above ch. 2, passage [13]. 
82 See below ch. 4. 
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491a7   Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· δι’ 
ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας  
10  διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν. Μετὰ δὲ 
τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς 
περὶ ἕκαστον· περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπό-    
δειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. 
 
A number of points are made in this passage, some of which are obscured by the use of 
pronouns whose antecedents are not immediately clear. What does seem clear is the following:  
 
 HA I.1-6 is offered as an “outline” (tupos) meant to provide a “taste” of the things that 
will be discussed with greater precision later. This includes both the content of these 
chapters, and the manner of presentation (touton ton tropon, a7).  
 The goal of the later, more precise discussions will be to “grasp the existing differences 
and attributes for all” (tas huparchousas diaphoras kai ta sumbebêkota pasi 
lambanômen), presumably all animals.83  
 After this is accomplished, there will be an attempt to discover the causes of the 
differences and attributes, for this is the natural way to conduct an investigation, when 
                                                 
83 On the face of it, it is unclear whether diaphora and sumbebêkota are intended to be 
distinct concepts or are here used almost synonymously.  
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there is (or perhaps beginning with) a historia about each (each kind of animal? each 
kind of attribute?).  
 This is because the “about-which-things” (peri hôn) and the “from-which-things” (ex 
hôn) that demonstration (apodeixis) must make use of are made clear from these things 
(i.e. from a grasp of the differences and attributes).   
 
The passage provides important clues regarding the relationship between the HA and 
Aristotle’s philosophy of science, as it is discussed in such works as the Analytics, Metaphysics, 
and Parts of Animals. In those works, many of the terms used here (e.g. diaphora, sumbebêkota, 
historia, apodeixis, aitia, methodos, peri hôn, ex hôn) take on rather “technical” meanings. Their 
appearance in this passage suggests that the theories developed in those other works may be at 
work here, and investigating those discussions may shed light on what Aristotle is attempting to 
accomplish.
84
 For example, the stages of investigation discussed in the passage (i.e. first grasp 
the differences and attributes present in all animals, then attempt to discover their causes) are 
reflected in a number of methodological asides Aristotle makes in other treatises, and are made 
thematic in APo. II; the sense in which a historia may provide the necessary starting point for 
apodeixis is discussed in APr I.27-30;
85
 the role of the peri hôn and ex hôn in apodeixis is 
                                                 
84 One must use caution against “over-systematizing” Aristotle’s language, especially the 
language associated with demonstration and proof. See Lloyd’s “The theories and practices 
of demonstration” in Lloyd 1996 (see Lennox 2001c for a critical response). However the 
use of the terms here is suggestive enough to warrant investigation into the relationship 
between the methodology recommended here, and that discussed in the so-called “logical” 
works. 
85 See especially APr. I.30, 46a23ff.; above ch. 2, passage [12]; below ch. 6, section 6.1.    
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discussed in APo. I; the use of the term diaphora suggests the language of division (diaireisis), a 
topic discussed at length in both APo. II and PA I.
86
  
In the following sections I will pursue these methodological clues as a precursor to the 
discussion of the HA itself. 
3.2 ANALYTICS AS BACKGROUND TO HA 
3.2.1 Hoti knowledge in APo. I.13 
In the methodological passage from HA I.6 discussed above (passage [1]), Aristotle 
recommends that the investigation of animals should proceed by first “grasping” the differences 
and attributes exhibited by all animals, and only then by attempting to discover their causes. This 
methodological prescription maps onto the distinction Aristotle makes between knowing the fact 
(to hoti) and knowing the reason why (to dioti), and is rooted in the discussions of 
demonstration, knowledge, and inquiry in APo.
87
  In book I of that work we learn that epistêmê is 
achieved by possessing a demonstration that meets certain well-defined and very strict criteria—
an apodeixis. This takes the form of a syllogistic deduction
88
 whose middle term is the aitia, the 
cause, and thus the explanation of why the subject possesses the predicated attribute. It may 
happen that one comes to know that the conclusion of such a demonstration holds, without 
                                                 
86 See APo. II.5, 13 (my discussion in section 3.2.4 below); PA I.2-3 (on which see especially 
the related discussions in Balme 1972 and Lennox 2001a).  
87 The connection between historia and to hoti is also suggested by passages in IA 1, APr. 30, 
etc. See above chapter 2, section 2.3.1. 
88 Commentators disagree regarding the extent to which Aristotle’s “syllogistic” is fully at 
work in his account of apodeixis in APo. I. See e.g. Barnes 1981; Ferejohn 1991, part I. 
 67 
knowing why it holds—that is, without knowing the cause. This distinction between knowing 
what Aristotle calls to hoti—“the that” or “the fact”—and knowing to dioti—“the why” or “the 
reason why”—plays a fundamental role in Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of science. 
In APo. Aristotle labors to show that knowing, in the fullest and most complete sense of the term, 
requires knowing the reason why a fact holds. One can trace these concerns back to various 
epistemological discussions in Plato.
89
 The distinction between to hoti and to dioti shows that 
Aristotle’s countenances different degrees of knowing, or different cognitive states that each can 
count as instances of knowing, but in a delimited manner. 
The distinction makes its first appearance in APo. I.13,
90
 where Aristotle discusses 
various deductions that fail to meet the requirements of apodeixis, but are nonetheless sound. In 
these cases the conclusions follow from the premises, but they are not properly explained, and 
thus the possession of such a deduction does not produce epistêmê in the knower. The failure 
stems from the middle term not being the true cause, and thus not being properly explanatory: 
either the premises are not immediate (78a24ff.) such that further deductions, and thus further 
middle terms, are needed to arrive at the “primary cause” that explains the connection between 
the major and minor terms; or the middle term “converts” with one of the other terms (78a27), 
cause with effect, such that the deduction proceeds through the effect instead of the cause, and is 
thus not explanatory of the conclusion. In each of these cases a deduction is provided with true 
premises, such that the conclusion follows of necessity, and one can be said in some sense to 
                                                 
89 See, for example, Meno 97e-98a (“Dedaelus’ statues”); Gorgias 465a (rhetoric as 
experience without an account of the cause), etc. See Charles 2010 and Ferejohn 2014. 
90 However in APo. I.8 Aristotle does make the distinction between three forms of 
definition, one of which is like the conclusion of a demonstration (i.e. similar to to hoti), and 
one which is like a demonstration with its terms rearranged (similar to to dioti). The third 
form is like an archê, i.e. an indemonstrable, un-mediated proposition. This same 
distinction structures the discussion in APo. II.10. 
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know that the conclusion holds based on the deduction, but since the middle term is not properly 
explanatory (i.e. is not the cause of the major term inhering in the minor) the deduction does not 
reveal the reason why the conclusion holds, but only provides the fact that the conclusion 
holds.
91
  
APo. I.13 continues by discussing another situation in which to hoti is grasped without to 
dioti. This happens in the “mixed” sciences, such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy, which 
study mathematical features of natural objects. Here according to Aristotle to hoti is established 
by the aisthêtikon (“perceiver” or, as Barnes translates, “empirical scientist”) while to dioti is 
provided by the mathematician.
92
 The two sciences in question (an observationally based natural 
science, and mathematics) are related, as Aristotle describes, “one under the other” (thateron 
hupo thateron). In these cases mathematical regularities involving natural subjects are 
established through perception (e.g. all rainbows are semi-circular in shape), but the explanations 
of these regularities, according to Aristotle, involve mathematics alone, and thus fall under the 
purview of the mathematician.
93
 The details regarding the relationship between such sciences 
are, for the present purposes, not as important as the distinction Aristotle draws here between 
establishing the fact of a certain regularity by means of perception, and then proceeding to 
provide its explanation. Presumably many, if not all, natural sciences proceed in a similar 
                                                 
91 Aristotle does not discuss how one might come to recognize that the middle term is not 
the cause, or that the terms are converted, etc. I believe the example he provides (of the 
planets twinkling because they are near, not near because they twinkle) is meant to be an 
obvious one, though it may not be so obvious in all cases.  
92 See APo. I.13, 78b35. 
93 That is, the explanation of the mathematical regularity is based on other mathematical 
features of the natural subjects, such that there is a purely mathematical explanation of the 
mathematical regularity. Applying that explanation to natural phenomena requires “bridge 
propositions” (my phrase) that include both natural and mathematical terms that allow one 
to apply the mathematical demonstration to the natural subject. On this topic see 
McKirihan 1978, 1992; Lear 1982;  Lennox 1985; Hankinson 2005, Distelzweig 2013. 
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manner, even if the explanations of the perceptually grounded facts are not provided by a 
different science. That is, natural science proceeds by first recording observed natural regularities 
and then searching for explanations (rather than, for example, beginning by positing certain 
premises and proceeding by deducing various conclusions from those premises).  
Although he does not say so explicitly in I.13, one may reasonably presume that it is by 
induction (epagogê) that the observer is able to formulate and verify these universal 
propositions: these are instances where perception of the particulars “make the universal clear.”94 
But it is of note that in these instances the universal that is thereby made clear is not an 
unmediated fact/first principle. Rather it is a fact that has an explanation, but one which is not yet 
known. Throughout book I of APo. Aristotle hints at another way of knowing something other 
than through demonstration, and this “principle of knowing” is later identified as nous, which 
operates in conjunction with epagogê. However in those instances it is first principles that are at 
issue: since all knowledge cannot be demonstrative, on pain of infinite regress or circular 
demonstration, there must be another way of securing the ultimate premises upon which 
demonstrative knowledge rests.
95
 The difference I wish to highlight here is only that epagogê 
may be equally employed to establish the fact of many mediated universal propositions, prior to 
our grasping their causes, and indeed this seems to be the path followed in the investigation of 
natural things. 
The methodological passage from HA I.6 hints at this very point in stating that the 
historia provides both the peri hôn and ex hôn of apodeixis, i.e. both the ultimate premises of 
                                                 
94 See e.g. APo. I.1, 71a8. 
95 But, as Bolton has stressed (1991), even our coming to know first principles is an 
instance of learning through preexistent knowledge, only in this case what is known first 
pertains to particulars, and is delivered immediately by aisthêsis. 
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demonstration, and the conclusions that are to be demonstrated.  How one differentiates between 
these—how one comes to know what is cause and what is effect—is not specified, and may very 
well fall outside of the scope of the historia.
96
  
Aristotle thus countenances a sense of knowing that exceeds mere opinion or conjecture, 
but falls short of knowing in the fullest sense of the term. His discussion of opinion in APo. I.33 
makes it clear that one can be of the opinion that something is the case without knowing it to be 
so—knowing neither that it is the case nor the reason why. That chapter argues that, although 
opinion in one sense is directed at things or states of affairs that could be otherwise (unlike the 
universal propositions that are the concern of epistêmê), in another sense, opinion and epistêmê 
can be directed at the same things, but represent different cognitive attitudes towards those same 
things. Knowing the fact marks an advance over opining the fact, but still falls short of epistêmê, 
or knowing the reason why. 
 
3.2.2 APo. II.1-2: hoti/dioti, ei esit/ti esti 
The hoti/dioti distinction is discussed again at the beginning of APo. II. There Aristotle 
introduces four interrelated questions concerning scientific knowledge and investigation. APo 
II.1 begins thus: 
                                                 
96 See for example the APr. I.30 passage that similarly states that the historia provides the 
“raw materials,” as it were, to construct deductions, but says nothing about which 
deductions will produce epistêmê. But note the connection, there noted, between emperiria 
and the grasp of first principles. If it is by experience that we come to grasp first principles 
(perhaps as first principles), and if it is the case that the historia reports the accumulated 
experience of a researcher in a given field, then there may be a connection between the 
historia and the recognition of first principles as such. See ch. 6 below. 
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[2] The things sought are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four 
things: the fact, the reason why, if something is, and what something is. (trans. 
Barnes, adapted) 
 
89b23  Τὰ ζητούμενά ἐστιν ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅσαπερ ἐπιστά- 
μεθα. ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί 
25  ἐστιν. 
  
“The things sought” (ta zêtoumena) are the objects of any investigation whatever: all 
inquiry is directed towards one or more of the four items listed.
97
 The emphasis here on inquiry 
(zêtêsis, zêtein) is important to note, since it is often argued that the APo. is primarily concerned 
not with inquiry but with the form in which knowledge that has already been obtained should be 
organized and/or presented.
98
 While this is a primary aim of book one, book two focuses more on 
definitions, what they are, what role they play in demonstrations, and, importantly, how we come 
to know them. Since definitions are perhaps the most important kind of first principle employed 
in apodeixis, the question of how we come to know definitions is of primary concern to scientific 
investigation. 
The first of the zêtoumena, to hoti, is characterized as an expression of “whether this or 
that is the case” (poteron tode ê tode, 89b25). Based on the example provided (whether the sun is 
eclipsed or not), to hoti is typically construed as a statement of fact, where a given attribute is 
                                                 
97 But are these the only things that can be asked? See Barnes’s note to the passage (p. 203).  
98 See Lennox 1991, pg. 41; Barnes 1993, introduction; Golden 1996, ch. 1. 
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predicated of a subject (e.g. whether being-eclipsed belongs to the sun). But the requirement that 
epistêmê is always of the universal indicates that an investigation of to hoti is not into whether 
this or that particular subject exhibits a predicate, but rather whether the kind of thing the subject 
is exhibits the attribute in question.
99
 Cast in a form amenable to syllogistic analysis, to hoti 
expresses the fact that AaB, and to investigate to hoti is to inquire whether it is the case that AaB. 
Once to hoti is known, Aristotle states that investigation can then proceed to to dioti: once we 
know that a certain fact of the form AaB holds, we can then ask why it holds.  
Is Aristotle here recommending a method of investigation, a method that he feels will 
best lead to positive results, or is he simply analyzing what actually takes place in an 
investigation? Are there instances in which one might investigate why a certain fact obtains prior 
to establishing that it does? Or is the emphasis meant only to highlight the importance of 
establishing the facts prior to investigating their causes, as if some investigators proceed too 
hastily in their search for causal explanation without first properly establishing the facts they 
seek to explain?
100
 Although Aristotle will go on to emphasize the importance, in seeking 
explanations, of establishing facts related to the hoti-level fact that is to be explained, the point 
here, in APo. II.1-2, is the epistemic truth that it is impossible to know the reason why a fact 
holds without knowing that it does. Aristotle allows that, in some instances, one might come to 
know both that a fact holds and why it does simultaneously,
 101
 but for Aristotle it is simply not 
                                                 
99 This demand for universality puts astronomy in an awkward position, since its subject 
matter is not just the kind “celestial body”, but rather this particular planet or these 
particular stars and their corresponding motions. However, due to the eternality of these 
particulars (in Aristotle’s view), a sort of universality is thereby achieved. See APo. I.8 on 
the demonstration of propositions involving perishable vs. non-perishable things. 
100 Such concerns motivate many of the criticisms Aristotle levies against his predecessors. 
See e.g. Resp. 2-7, especially 471a6ff., a20ff. 
101 E.g. APo. I.1, 71a16ff. 
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possible to know why a fact holds without knowing that it does. One might know the premises 
that imply a conclusion without making the inferential step to the conclusion, and in that, limited, 
sense might know the reason why, but in that case one would not know that the middle term is 
the cause of the conclusion, and thus would not know that it is “the reason why” of the 
conclusion. Once the inferential step is made, then both the fact and the reason why are 
grasped.
102
 
Aristotle proceeds in APo II.1 by presenting a second pair of linked inquiries that bears 
important similarities to the first. He states: 
 
[3] These things (i.e. to hoti and to dioti) we seek in this way; but certain items we 
seek in another way – e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not. (I mean if one is or is 
not simpliciter and not if one is white or not.) And having come to know that it is, 
we seek what it is (e.g.: Then what is a god? Or What is a man?) 
 
89b31      ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως, ἔνια δ’ ἄλ- 
λον τρόπον ζητοῦμεν, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι κένταυρος ἢ θεός· 
τὸ δ’ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς λέγω, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰ λευκὸς ἢ μή. 
γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν, οἷον τί οὖν ἐστι θεός, ἢ 
35  τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;  
 
The investigations into to hoti and to dioti are now compared with a new pair of linked 
inquiries, identified as to ei esti and to ti esti – “the if it is” and “the what it is.” According to 
                                                 
102 See APo. I.1, 71a17-24. 
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Aristotle we seek the answers to these questions “in another way” (allon tropon), but as we shall 
see presently, the two pairs of investigations are closely related. 
In seeking to ei esti, Aristotle states we seek to know whether something is or is not 
simply (haplôs). This is contrasted with seeking whether that thing “is white or not,” in other 
words whether it is tode ê tode, which is the investigation of the fact (to hoti). Both to ei esti and 
to hoti investigate existential claims, but while to hoti asks whether a predication holds (whether 
a subject is this or that) to ei esti seeks only whether a subject is (whether it exists) without 
asking whether any attribute holds of it. Once we know that a given subject exists, Aristotle 
states that we then proceed to investigate to ti esti and ask what it is.  
Aristotle’s pronouncement here may cause some confusion, in so far as it may not 
initially be clear how one could establish that a subject-kind exists without first knowing what it 
is. Something like the Meno paradox lurks in the background: how can I seek out and establish 
the existence of something of which I am ignorant? The difficulty is greater still when we 
remember that the thing whose existence is being established is not some particular thing (which 
one could e.g. point to), but rather a universal kind. How can we come to know that a certain 
distinct kind exists without knowing what that kind is? The solution, as in the Meno, is that one 
can know in more than one sense. In particular, one can know something about a subject, indeed 
enough to establish its existence as a kind, without knowing what it is essentially.
103
 In order to 
                                                 
103 Is this view expressed in the Meno? One formulation of Meno’s Paradox has it that one 
cannot inquire into what one knows, because one already knows it; and one cannot inquire 
into what one does not know, because one has no knowledge of the object to guide the 
inquiry. One way of resolving this paradox is posit that one may know something about the 
object of inquiry without knowing everything about it. This partial knowledge may fall 
short of knowing what the object of inquiry is, in the fullest sense of knowing ti esti, but still 
may suffice to guide inquiry. My suggestion here is that Aristotle is making a similar point, 
namely that one may have knowledge sufficient to establish that a kind exists without 
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confirm that a subject-kind exists, it is necessary to know something about that kind—i.e. some 
feature or characteristic that can be used to reliably identify instances of the kind. However this 
need not necessitate knowing of the kind “what it is,” in the sense of ti esti, especially if the 
answer to the ti esti question is the definition of the kind, i.e. an identification of the essential 
feature(s). 
The introduction of the second pair of inquiries (ei esti/ti esti) begins the transition from a 
consideration of demonstrative knowledge of propositions, to the knowledge of definitions. In 
APo. II.2, Aristotle argues that a definition (or at least one kind of definition)
104
 has a sort of 
syllogistic structure that is comparable to an apodictic demonstration. Much of APo. II is devoted 
to definitions, what they are and how we come to know them. The introduction of the hoti/dioti 
distinction in II.1 arguably serves the purpose of introducing the ei esti/ti esti distinction and its 
relationship with definition. Readers of Plato are of course well-familiar with the ti esti question, 
but Aristotle’s discussion in II.1 effectively connects the syllogistic theory of apodeictic 
demonstration of book I with the concerns of coming to know definitions in book II.  
In APo II.2 Aristotle claims that all four modes of inquiry introduced in II.1 are in effect 
searches for middle terms. They may be laid out as follows:
105
 
 
to hoti  Is it the case that AaB? Is there a middle term? 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowing what the kind is, in the fullest sense of the term. See Lennox 2004, pp. 87*90, 
Charles 2010, Ferejohn 2014. 
104 In APo. II. Aristotle discusses either three or four forms of defintion: (1) an account of 
what a name means; (2) an immediate, indemonstrable account of what something is; (3) 
an account that is similar to a deduction with the terms rearranged (i.e. A is B because of 
C); and (4) an account that is similar to the conclusion of a demonstration (i.e. just the 
conclusion of the demonstration in (3)). Commentators disagree on whether Aristotle 
actually views (1) as a legitimate form of definition. 
105 See the presentation of these questions in Lennox 1991 and Barnes 1993. 
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to ei esti Does A (or B) exist?    
 
to dioti  Why is it that AaB?  What is the middle term? 
to ti esti What is A (or B)?    
 
It is difficult to discern Aristotle’s meaning in each case. Perhaps the most 
straightforward is to dioti: when we seek the explanation of why a fact of the form AaB holds, 
we are seeking a middle term that connects A with B and that meets the requirements of an 
apodeixis. But in what sense is to hoti also a search for a middle term?  
If a hoti investigation is a search for whether there is a middle term that can connect the 
major and minor terms (as opposed to identifying what that middle term is), then the kinds of 
facts that are established in a hoti investigation are mediated and not immediate / primitive. That 
is, they are not the kind of facts that can serve as first principles in a demonstration. As discussed 
above, the process by which we come to know hoti-level facts is similar to the process by which 
we come to know first principles, and seems best characterized as epagogê. However, in the case 
of hoti-level facts, we somehow come to recognize that the proposition so established is open to 
further explanation. 
How is it that inquiring whether a fact obtains is the same as inquiring whether there is a 
middle term that explains why it obtains? On Aristotle’s view, all true universal predications that 
are not essential predications (i.e. are not predications of un-mediated, defining attributes) have 
causal explanations: if an attribute truly and universally belongs to a subject-kind but does not 
figure into that kind’s definition, then that attribute necessarily follows from some essential 
attribute that belongs to the kind. Therefore, by inquiring into whether some attribute does 
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universally belong to a subject kind, one is simultaneously inquiring into whether there is some 
defining feature of the subject kind that is the cause of that attribute, and thus whether there is 
some middle term that explains its presence. The challenge is to identify the correct subject-kind 
to which the attribute in question belongs, not just universally, but per se. That is, it is necessary 
to identify the subject-kind whose very nature is responsible for the presence of the attribute in 
question. Since any particular thing may be correctly characterized as belonging to more than 
one kind (e.g. this thing here is a bronze, scalene triangle), it is necessary to determine which 
characterization of the thing in question identifies the kind to which the feature in question 
belongs per se.  
The above considerations show that, for Aristotle, establishing that a proposition holds 
implies that there is some cause that explains why it holds, and thus some middle term that 
mediates the subject and predicate of the proposition. In order for the relation between the hoti 
and dioti questions to parallel that of the ei esti / ti esti, it must be the case that that an affirmative 
answer to the ei esti question implies the existence of a middle term that answers the ti esti 
question. In other words, the hoti/dioti relation suggests that one establishes that a certain kind 
exists (i.e. affirmatively answers the ei esti question) when one confirms that a certain attribute 
belongs to a certain subject, and that confirmation implies that there is some explanation as to 
why the subject possess the attribute. Aristotle here endorses a form of definition, discussed in 
more detail in APo. II.8-10, that mirrors a syllogistic demonstration with the terms rearranged. 
The demonstration: 
 
AaB 
BaC 
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AaC 
 
now becomes the definition: 
 
A is C because of B 
 
Here the parallel to the hoti-level proposition that is initially established at the ei esti stage is 
“AaC.”  
Aristotle accomplishes this by making the answer to the ei esti question take the form of a 
proposition, similar to the hoti case. One comes to know that a certain kind exists when one can 
confirm that a certain attribute belongs to a subject. For example, one establishes that birds exist 
when one determines that, e.g., there is a kind of feathered animal with wings. In this case we 
give the name “bird” to “feathered animal with wings,” and we proceed to search for why this 
kind of animal has feathers and wings. The answer to that question provides the essence of the 
kind (i.e. to ti esti). Thus the recognition of the existence of the kind in question (i.e. an 
affirmative answer to the ei esti question) does not require one to know the essence of the kind. 
Indeed, if these represents stages that one must (or should) proceed through when investigating, 
then the essence of things will generally not be known prior to establishing the existence of those 
things. This is perhaps not surprising, that the essence of a thing is not revealed initially. Rather 
the identification of a thing as the kind of thing that is in question (e.g. the identification of that 
animal there as a bird) does not immediately reveal what it is to be a bird in the most strict and 
primary sense. Instead we are provided with some other, perhaps more rudimentary way of 
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identifying a kind, which, though sufficient for mere identification, does not reveal just what that 
kind is, and in fact is explained by what it is to be the thing. 
3.2.3 APo. II.8-10: discovering causes 
Aristotle’s discussions in APo. II.8-10 confirm that knowing whether/if a kind exists (i.e. 
answering the ei esti question) involves establishing that a certain attribute belongs to a subject.  
Aristotle describes a process whereby an investigator moves from “grasping something of what a 
thing is” (echontes ti autou tou pragmatos, 93a22 ) to knowing fully what it is by first 
recognizing that the subject-kind in question is a member of a higher-level kind, and that it 
exhibits a differentia that uniquely distinguishes it from other members of the higher-level kind. 
The possession of that differentia is then explained by reference to some other, more 
fundamental attribute, which answers the ti esti question. Four examples are provided: 
 
(i) Thunder is a sort of noise in the clouds (psophos tis nephôn) 
(ii) Eclipse is a sort of privation of light (sterêsis tis phôtos) 
(iii) Man is a sort of animal (zôon ti) 
(iv) Soul is something that moves itself (auoto hauto kinoun) 
 
The examples do not make the subject-attribute form of the predication obvious in each case, 
but if the indefinite article tis in the first three examples is interpreted as having some specific, 
though unspecified, meaning or value, then the predications would be: 
 
(i) Thunder = Sub(clouds), Attrbt(noise of this sort) 
 80 
(ii) Eclipse = Sub(Moon ), Attrbt(privation of light of this sort) 
(iii) Human = Sub(animal), Attrbt(of this sort) 
 
For example (i), the explanation that is subsequently offered (that it is the extinction of 
fire in the clouds that causes the noise we call thunder) allows for the following syllogism: 
 
(this sort of noise) is produced by (extinction of fire) 
(extinction of fire) occasionally occurs (in the clouds) 
(this sort of noise) occasionally occurs (in the clouds) 
 
And this, Aristotle says, is what thunder is: the occasional certain sort of noise in the 
clouds due to the extinction of fire in the clouds. 
Aristotle elaborates on example (ii) in the context of knowing the fact versus the reason 
why (APo. II.8, 93a35ff.).
106
 He describes the sort of privation of light that is the eclipse (i.e. the 
precise meaning of the indefinite article tis) in the following way: “not being able to produce a 
shadow during full moon although nothing visible is between us and it.” The “it” here is 
understood as the moon. The example is contrived,
107
 but what’s clear is that he is describing the 
                                                 
106 See also Metaph. H.4, 1044b10ff. 
107 I initially thought that Aristotle favors this example because it involves a “middle term” 
in two senses (as Sachs points out in his 1999, p. 162 n11), Lennox notes that the example 
has other, more serious merits, that make it valuable.  In APo. I.8 it serves the purpose of 
showing how demonstration as he defines it can deal with “occasional occurrences”; in 
Metaph. H.4 it is an example of a natural occurrence that does not have a final cause; in APo. 
II.8-10 it serves as a case where you can have explanatory middles that are more and less 
primary; he can use it as an example where, if you were situated differently than we are, 
you could actually SEE the cause, and so on.  Plus it, like thunder, displays easily the idea 
that a definition is a reworded demonstration. 
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precise sort of privation of light he is referring to for the definition of an eclipse: when just this 
sort of privation of light belongs to the moon, we have an eclipse (i.e. we call it an eclipse). The 
explanatory syllogism is as follows: 
  
(Moon) (Earth between Moon and Sun) 
(Earth between Moon and Sun) produces (this sort of privation of light) 
(Moon) undergoes (this sort of privation of light) 
 
Regarding example (iii), the discussions in II.8-10 do not specify precisely what sort of 
animal Aristotle believes a human is (e.g. featherless biped), nor what the explanatory middle 
term would be, thus we cannot reconstruct what the explanatory syllogism Aristotle has in mind 
would look like.
108
 What is clear, however, as in the other cases, is that the process of defining 
what a human is begins with identifying some unique feature that only human animals possess. 
When we can confirm that there is in fact a kind of animal of this sort (whatever this sort may 
be), then we are secure in the knowledge that the kind human exists, because by convention we 
have agreed to call this sort of animal “human,” just as we call this sort of noise in the clouds 
“thunder,” and this sort of privation of light of the Moon “eclipse.” 
The final example (iv) regarding soul is more difficult to analyze in this way. Presumably 
soul is a form of the higher kind that embraces “things that move themselves,” but we are not 
                                                 
108 Metaph. Z.17 discusses this very issue and argues that asking what a human being is is 
the same as asking “why a human being is a certain sort of animal” (dia ti anthropos esti 
zôon toiondi, 1041a21), though there too Aristotle does not put forward a possible middle 
term. 
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told what kind of thing that moves itself soul is, nor is there even an indefinite article provided, 
such that we would have this sort of thing that moves itself.  
 The importance of this discussion, relative to our interest in historia, is the relationship 
between to hoti and to ei esti questions: both involve establishing a predication. The difference is 
that, in the case of to ei esti, the predication so established is taken to be the definition (or a part 
of the definition) of a third term. The definition is “completed” (or a different form of definition 
is achieved) when the cause of the predication established in to ei esti is discovered. This 
parallels the movement from to hoti to to dioti. Aristotle provides no real guidance in these 
chapters regarding how one should go about discovering such causes, nor does he indicate how 
the initial ei esti predications are themselves secured (the sense is that they are derived from 
repeated perceptions, as discussed above in reference to I.13). Rather his interest in these 
chapters is more in setting forth the notion of a quasi-syllogistic (and apodeictic) form of 
definition. 
3.2.4 APo. II.13: “hunting” for essential attributes 
A question one might ask, following the discussions of II.8-10, is how one comes to 
recognize the predication established at the ei esti stage is one that can serve as a definition.
109
 
There may be predicates that uniquely pick out forms of a higher kind that do not figure into the 
definition of those forms (but rather follow from them). In short, how does the investigator come 
                                                 
109 That is, if one subscribes to the model of definition that is like a demonstration with its 
terms rearranged, then the attribute predicated of the subject in the “conclusion” (i.e. what 
the is shown to hold of the subject) figures into the definition of the subject. Presumably 
not all attributes that can be demonstrated to hold of the subject figure into the subject’s 
definition. Rather (on one reading at least) only certain attributes properly differentiate a 
higher kind (i.e. the subject) into lower forms.  
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to recognize a differentia as being a truly definitional one, one that differentiates a kind into 
proper forms? This question appears to motivate the discussion in II.13. Aristotle begins that 
chapter with the following passage: 
 
[4] So then, how the ti esti is displayed in the terms, and in what manner there is or is 
not demonstration or definition of it has been said earlier; but how one must hunt 
for the predicates/items (ta katêgoroumena) in the ti esti, we must now speak. 
 
96a20  Πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰς τοὺς ὅρους ἀποδίδοται, καὶ  
τίνα τρόπον ἀπόδειξις ἢ ὁρισμὸς ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴρη- 
ται πρότερον· πῶς δὲ δεῖ θηρεύειν τὰ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατη- 
γορούμενα, νῦν λέγωμεν. (96a20-3) 
 
The first part of the passage makes reference to the discussions of definition and demonstration 
in II.1-10. The second clause states that the following discussion in II.13 will focus on how one 
determines, or “hunts out” (thêreuein), the actual items that appear in a given definition.  
The chapter that follows, which, broadly speaking, focuses on division, is exceedingly 
difficult, and it is not always clear how the various subsections pertain to the whole. The first 
procedure discussed (96a24-b15) involves identifying a number of attributes that belong to the 
subject that is to be defined, but “extend further than it without going outside of its kind” 
(96a25), i.e. belong to other subjects that are different in form than the subject in question, but 
the same in kind. The goal is to determine a set of such attributes that uniquely picks out the 
subject in question, such that each individual attribute of the set extends further than the subject, 
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but the set taken as a whole does not extend further. This, Aristotle claims, will be the essence 
(ousia) of the subject in question. 
On the face of it, this procedure does seem relevant to the question we were left with 
from II.8-10. It involves identifying the higher kind to which the subject in question belongs, and 
then picking out attributes that uniquely differentiate the subject in question from other forms of 
the kind. But commentators have been quick to recognize the difficulty with this procedure, 
especially with the claim that the set of attributes so identified figures into the ousia of the kind 
in question.
110
 Nothing in the procedure appears to justify the claim. The key, according to some 
commentators, is in the ordering procedure that Aristotle appears to emphasize in the selection of 
the attributes. In selecting the attributes that extend beyond the subject in question but not 
beyond the kind, Aristotle states: 
 
[5] We should take items of this type up to the point at which we have first taken just 
so many that, while each extends further, all of them together do not extend 
further: this must be the essence of the object. (APo. II.13, 96a32-5) 
 
96a32    τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ληπτέον μέχρι τούτου, ἕως 
τοσαῦτα ληφθῇ πρῶτον ὧν ἕκαστον μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον ὑπάρξει, 
                                                 
110 For example Barnes (p. 241) notes that there may be more than one set of such 
attributes, in which case it would not be clear which identifies the ousia of the kind (or 
indeed whether both or neither do). McKirihan (1992, 99. 113-5) describes the method 
discussed in the passage as “an aberration of Aristotle’s usual view” and sets it aside. 
Charles points out (2000, p. 225) that the definition so arrived at will not necessarily 
correspond to the explanation invoking form of definition discussed in II.8-10. That II.13 
discusses a different form of definition than II.8-10 is defended by Ross, Barnes, and 
McKirihan.  
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ἅπαντα δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον· ταύτην γὰρ ἀνάγκη οὐσίαν εἶναι 
a35  τοῦ πράγματος. 
 
Both Barnes and Charles interpret the passage as suggesting that there is an order 
according to which the attributes must be selected. Barnes ventures that the ordering procedure is 
based on subsumption,
111
 but cannot see how this helps Aristotle’s case, while Charles sees 
something more sophisticated at work.
112
 He notes that in the example Aristotle provides—that a 
triple is a number that is odd, prime, and prime in this sense
113—the order of the attributes listed 
corresponds to the order found in Euclid’s definitions of the attributes of numbers. This is 
relevant, Charles argues, because the first attribute listed (odd) is used in the procedure to 
determine the later attribute (prime in one sense), which in turn can be used to determine the next 
(prime in the other sense). That is, beyond mere subsumption, the order of attributes listed in the 
example corresponds to a procedure for deriving the later attributes from the earlier. This, 
Charles argues, constitutes a “non-ad hoc” procedure for selecting differentiae that generate 
genus-species divisions that capture essential features of the kinds in question, without 
necessarily revealing the causal features that explain the possession of the differentiae. In other 
words, such a non-ad hoc procedure provides a means for grasping the attributes that correctly 
mark-off forms from higher level kinds in just the manner desiderated by the discussions of 
definition in II.8-10, and produce the genus-species divisions that will later be made us of in 
                                                 
111 And with some reason, as Aristotle goes on to discuss (96b25-97a6) the importance of 
ordering the attributes selected in a branching tree of divisions such that each “cut” 
embraces all the forms of the kind and leaves none out. 
112 See Charles 2000, pp. 222-230 for his difficult discussion of the equally difficult passage. 
113 That is, neither the sum nor the product of two integers, where 1 is not an integer. There 
is some ambiguity whether Aristotle intends to refer to two forms of being prime, or 
whether he is specifying “prime in this sense” as a gloss on “prime.” 
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II.14 (as will be discussed below). Since such procedures are derived from the very practices of 
definition and explanation that are unique to the various sciences, little can be said regarding the 
specifics of how such procedures operate, given the level of generality at which APo operates. 
Each science will present its own unique procedures for generating genus-species divisions, but 
the generation of such divisions will not be random or “ad hoc.” 
The importance of Charles’s interpretation of this chapter will be explored in more detail 
later. In short, Charles sees such a procedure for marking-off kinds at work in the HA (especially 
in HA I.1-5), and thus he sees as an important aim of HA the correct identification of animal 
kinds by means of identifying differentiae which correctly divide kinds into forms.  
Before leaving II.13, it will be important for the considerations below to discuss a 
passage that appears near the end of the chapter (97b7-25). Here Aristotle provides advice 
regarding how to zero-in on the definition of a kind given a number of different members of the 
kind. The advice is as follows: 
 
[6] You should look at items which are similar and undifferentiated, and first seek 
what they all have in common. Then do the same again for other items which are 
in the same kind as the first group and are of the same form as one another but of 
a different form from the first group. When you have got what all these have in 
common, you must do the same for remaining groups (inquiring next whether the 
items you have taken have anything in common) until you come to a single 
account: this will be the definition of the object. If you arrive not at a single 
account but at two or more, then plainly what you are seeking is not one item but 
several. 
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96b7  Ζητεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀδιά-  
φορα, πρῶτον τί ἅπαντα ταὐτὸν ἔχουσιν, εἶτα πάλιν ἐφ’ 
ἑτέροις, ἃ ἐν ταὐτῷ μὲν γένει ἐκείνοις, εἰσὶ δὲ αὑτοῖς μὲν 
b10  ταὐτὰ τῷ εἴδει, ἐκείνων δ’ ἕτερα. ὅταν δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων λη-  
φθῇ τί πάντα ταὐτόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, ἐπὶ τῶν 
εἰλημμένων πάλιν σκοπεῖν εἰ ταὐτόν, ἕως ἂν εἰς ἕνα ἔλθῃ 
λόγον· οὗτος γὰρ ἔσται τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμός. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ 
βαδίζῃ εἰς ἕνα ἀλλ’ εἰς δύο ἢ πλείους, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη 
b15  ἕν τι εἶναι τὸ ζητούμενον, ἀλλὰ πλείω. 
 
The advice appears to amount to grouping instances of the kind into like groups (i.e. forms of the 
kind) and seeking common attributes amongst these groups, until a single set of attributes is 
identified that is shared by all members of the kind. This, Aristotle claims, will be the definition 
of the kind. And, importantly, if no such set of common attributes is found, then he claims that 
one is actually not dealing with a single kind, but more than one kind. 
Aristotle provides an example of a case where no common attribute is found, and thus 
more than one kind is at issue. The example is of pride (megalopsuchia): 
 
[7] I mean, e.g., that if we were seeking what pride is, we should inquire, in the case 
of some prideful men we know, what one feature they have in common as such. 
E.g. if Alcibiades, Achilles, and Ajax are proud men, what one feature do they all 
have in common? Intolerance to insult—one made war, one waxed wroth, one 
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killed himself. Next, take some others, e.g. Lysander and Socrates. If their 
common feature is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, I take these two 
items and inquire what indifference to fortune and not brooking dishonor have in 
common. If they have nothing in common, then there will be two forms of pride. 
 
97b15        οἷον λέγω, εἰ τί  
ἐστι μεγαλοψυχία ζητοῖμεν, σκεπτέον ἐπί τινων μεγαλο- 
ψύχων, οὓς ἴσμεν, τί ἔχουσιν ἓν πάντες ᾗ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον εἰ 
Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλόψυχος ἢ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ ὁ Αἴας, τί 
ἓν ἅπαντες; τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπο- 
b20  λέμησεν, ὁ δ’ ἐμήνισεν, ὁ δ’ ἀπέκτεινεν ἑαυτόν. πάλιν ἐφ’  
ἑτέρων, οἷον Λυσάνδρου ἢ Σωκράτους. εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀδιάφοροι εἶ- 
ναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, ταῦτα δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ 
τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἥ τε ἀπάθεια ἡ περὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ 
ἡ μὴ ὑπομονὴ ἀτιμαζομένων. εἰ δὲ μηδέν, δύο εἴδη ἂν εἴη 
τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας. 
 
These comments introduce an important wrinkle to Aristotle’s preferred method of investigation. 
Generally, when seeking the cause of a given attribute, he will recommend grouping together the 
various subjects that exhibit the attribute, and searching for other shared features that may either 
serve as the cause of the attribute in question, or help point to an underlying common cause. 
However, the above considerations suggest that what we commonly perceive as similar instances 
of a given attribute (e.g. instances of pride) may in fact have different underlying causes (e.g. 
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intolerance to insult, indifference to fortune), causes that themselves share no common cause.
114
 
In these cases, Aristotle here says that the attribute that was initially perceived to be the same in 
all cases is actually different in form, as revealed by the different causal basis. This brings into 
question whether grouping instances of a given attribute as a guide to causal research will be 
fruitful, as the instances so grouped may in fact not have the same causal basis. It also brings into 
question whether such attributes that are differently caused are in fact the same or different,
115
 a 
question that is addressed explicitly in II.15-18, and discussed further below. 
 
3.2.5 APo. II.14: coming to grips with problems 
In II.14 Aristotle considers how we “come to grips with problems” (to echein ta 
problêmata). Following Lennox
116
 and others, I understand a “problem” as a hoti-level 
proposition whose causal demonstration is sought.
117
   
                                                 
114 Are the features picked out here meant to be causes of pride, or simply attributes that 
these various prideful men share? Passage [7] beings by asking what pride is, and the 
apparently favored model of definition arising from II.2, 8-10 is one that includes the cause. 
Thus I take in the example Aristotle is claiming that the various men are prideful because 
they do not tolerate insult, or they are indifferent to fortune. 
115 One might argue that such differently caused attributes are themselves different, since 
what appears to be Aristotle’s favored model of definition includes the cause of the 
differentiating feature. Note however, in passage [7] above on pride, Aristotle states that 
the failure to find a common cause in all cases indicates that the are two “forms” (eidê) of 
pride, which might suggest that pride is a kind of attribute, which itself admits of different 
forms. In that case one might ask whether all the prideful men identified in the passage do 
in fact share some higher-level feature that causes them to be proud, and whether it is the 
differentiation of that higher level feature that brings about the specific, different forms of 
pride.  
116 See especially Lennox 1994. 
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The first procedure outlined in chapter 14 (98a1-13) involves using a preexisting set of 
divisions and listing the attributes that belong universally at each cut. For example, if one is 
studying animals, first list all the attributes shared by all animals, then, following the divisions, 
list all the attributes shared by each kind falling into the first cut/division (e.g. bird, fish, etc.), 
and continue in this manner through the divisions. In this way a preliminary sort of 
explanation
118
 can be given for why any lower level kind possesses an attribute located at a 
higher level of division: namely, because the lower level kind is a form of the higher level kind. 
In short, this first procedure involves identifying the subject in question as a member of a kind 
that possesses the attribute in question universally. As Lennox outlines in his 1987a and 1991, 
this procedure in effect locates the correct level of generality at which the explanation for a given 
attribute should be sought. The “data” provided by the problem is used to determine the subject-
kind that possesses the attribute in question, and thus prepares for “demonstration.” 
However, if the procedure is to truly provide one with “the reason why” the attribute 
belongs to the subject, as the passage indicates it does (to dia ti, 98a7), even if only in the 
limited, “A-type” form of demonstration, then the attribute in question must not only be 
universally correlated with the given cut in the divisions, but must be associated with the cut per 
se, i.e. must follow from the nature of whatever is identified at the cut. Otherwise one will not 
truly know why the attribute belongs to the subject. If the division does not capture the subject-
kind to which the attribute in question belongs per se, then it will not result in identifying the 
right level of generality for apodictic demonstration. There may be other ways of forming 
                                                                                                                                                             
117 The problems found in the Problêmata are typically presented in the form “dia ti . . . ê 
hoti . . .”, which emphasizes that from the beginning problems are essentially bound up with 
finding causes.   
118 What Lennox (in his 1987a) calls an “A type” explanation, and Ferejohn (1991) and 
McKirihan (1992) call “application explanations.” See also Ferejohn 2014, ch. 5. 
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divisions such that an attribute is universally associated with a given cut, but not related per se. 
In that case the divisions would not identify the subject kind whose nature is responsible for the 
attribute, and thus not reveal the reason why. 
There are at least two ways to respond to this. First, one might simply assume that the 
divisions provided at the beginning of the procedure do in fact capture the essential nature of the 
subject in question, and the attributes correlated with the divisions do belong at each cut per 
se.
119
 This would naturally raise the question of how one comes upon such divisions and 
correlations, and would give the impression, shared by many scholars, that the APo. is focused 
more on formalizing the presentation of knowledge already acquired, rather than on the 
discovery of new knowledge. Or, one might read the dia ti in 98a7 in a more deflationary 
manner, such that the sort of explanation provided by the divisions does not guarantee that the 
result is a problem now prepared for apodeixis, but rather is a step along the way towards that 
goal. In this case the divisions provide one with a way of locating the subject in question in a 
higher kind which may be the kind that exhibits the attribute per se, or may not be, but in any 
event provides one with a universal correlation that can guide causal research.  
Aristotle proceeds by outlining a second, related procedure for dealing with problems. 
These are cases where “common names” have not yet been suitably assigned to the subject 
matter under investigation, such that a set of divisions, as used in the first procedure, is not 
readily at hand. Instead one begins with the attribute in question and asks what it follows and 
what follows it: 
 
                                                 
119 If I read him correctly, Charles claims that the divisions produced in II.13 answer this 
need. 
 92 
[8] At present we argue in terms of the common names which have been handed 
down to us. But we should inquire not only in these cases—rather, if any other 
common feature has been observed to hold, we should extract it and then inquire 
what it follows and what follows it. E.g. having a third stomach and not having 
upper incisors follows having horns. Next ask what items having horns follows. It 
is plain why the feature in question will hold of these items: it will hold because 
they have horns. 
 
98a13  Νῦν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὰ παραδεδομένα κοινὰ ὀνόματα 
λέγομεν, δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον ἐπὶ τούτων σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
a15  ἂν ἄλλο τι ὀφθῇ ὑπάρχον κοινόν, ἐκλαμβάνοντα, εἶτα τίσι  
τοῦτ’ ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ποῖα τούτῳ ἕπεται, οἷον τοῖς κέρατα 
ἔχουσι τὸ ἔχειν ἐχῖνον, τὸ μὴ ἀμφώδοντ’ εἶναι· πάλιν τὸ 
κέρατ’ ἔχειν τίσιν ἕπεται. δῆλον γὰρ διὰ τί ἐκείνοις ὑπάρ- 
ξει τὸ εἰρημένον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ κέρατ’ ἔχειν ὑπάρξει. 
 
The example in the passage states that having a third stomach and not having upper 
incisors “follows” having horns, or in other words, all animals that have horns also have a third 
stomach and lack upper incisors. Aristotle next asks: from what feature does having horns 
follow? If we call that feature “X”, then he states it will be clear from this why (dia ti, 98a18) all 
animals that have feature X also possess a third stomach and lack upper incisors, namely because 
all such animals have horns. The procedure recommended is to find “common features” i.e. 
 93 
features that are always correlated with a given feature under study, and to attempt to arrange 
them in such a manner as to show “what it follows and what follows it.”120 
But note that here too, just as in the case of the divisions in the first procedure, this 
second procedure will only provide causal explanations if the investigator arranges the features 
in such a manner that the “following” relation tracks causal responsibility. To use the example 
from the text, lacking upper incisors must not only follow having horns, but must in some sense 
be explained by having horns.
121
 It is because such animals have horns that they lack upper 
incisors. If in fact the investigator knows that having horns is in some sense responsible for the 
lack of upper incisors, then he may go on to ask why it is that having horns causes the animal to 
lack upper incisors,
122
 but that causal relationship must be established first if it is to provide the 
“reason why.” Similar to the first procedure, one may respond to this problem by reading the dia 
ti at 98a18 in a deflationary manner, as not indicating to dioti in the strict sense, but rather 
providing grounds for believing that the indicated predication holds (i.e. to hoti), which can act 
as a preliminary guide to one’s causal research.  
The third example Aristotle gives in the chapter is a sub-species of the second procedure, 
where an analogical unity is recognized between things that are not normally grouped together 
(and thus do not have a common name). Here “pounce”, “spine” and “bone” are recognized as 
                                                 
120 See Lennox 1991, pp. 49-50. 
121 That is, explained according either to Lennox’s A or B forms of explanation. Recall that 
the “A” form of explanation locates the kind to which the attribute in question belongs per 
se, while the “B” form identifies the causally relevant feature. Thus if having a third stomach 
is to be explained by having horns, either the kind of animal marked-off by the possession 
of horns must have a third stomach per se, or having horns is in some sense causally 
responsible for having a third stomach. Note that if it is the “B” form of explanation that 
Aristotle has in mind here, the causal relevance of having horns to having a third stomach 
may be further explicable (i.e. their may be a chain of causally relevant features connecting 
having horns with having a third stomach).  
122 See PA III.2, 663b35ff.; III.14, 674a21ff. 
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being related in such a manner that they all share certain common attributes. By grouping them 
together as if they shared a common nature, the investigator may then look for other shared 
attributes and attempt to arrange these attributes to reveal causal relations, a suggested by the 
procedures above.  
In summary, the method for “coming to grips with problems” that Aristotle recommends 
in II.14 involves establishing “follows/followed by” extensional relationships between attributes 
(either by using existing divisions or not) as a guide to causal research. The problem with this 
method, as discussed above, is that it is not clear how one comes to recognize these causal 
dependencies, since extension alone cannot reveal them. If it can be shown that two properties 
are coextensive, then there is no question that a deduction can be formed showing that, given one 
attribute, the other follows. But this deduction will lack the force of apodeixis unless it is 
recognized that the first attribute is the cause of the second. Based on various comments in APo. 
it’s clear that Aristotle recognizes this problem, and given his evident concern with the 
relationship between extension and causation (as evinced in the following chapters of APo. II, 
16-18), I believe it’s best to read Aristotle here as describing a procedure for coming to know 
causes, rather than one aimed at formalizing preexistent causal knowledge, even if the procedure 
so described is unable, on its own, to produce the causal knowledge it aims at. That is, the 
method of extensional correlation will aim research in the right direction, but final judgments 
regarding causal relationships will ultimately rely on extra-extensional features, ones that are 
largely dependent upon the field of study under investigation.
123
 
                                                 
123 Thus Lennox (2011 and in his forthcoming book) argues for “domain specific norms” of 
investigation. I argue for something similar in ch. 6 below, where I discuss the manner in 
which empeiria of a given subject area plays into the identification of first principles.   
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Charles claims that the procedure outlined in II.13 is the one Aristotle has in mind for 
laying out the genus-species divisions used in II.14. In other words, the “non-ad hoc” procedure 
for differentiating genera into species will allow us to identify differentiating attributes that 
correctly mark off forms of given kinds. Additional observation will then allow us to correlate 
other attributes with the forms so differentiated, thus identifying the kinds/forms to which the 
attributes belong per se. Charles argues, in summary, that this is the goal of the historia: 
 
Historiai are, thus, essential first steps towards causal explanation, and ones 
which involve determining which genera and species, in reality, differ from each 
other . . . and which properties genuinely belong to each kind or sub-kind.
124
 
3.2.6 APo. II.16-17: coextension of cause and effect 
In these chapters Aristotle grapples with the question whether cause and effect are, in all 
cases, coextensive, such that the presence of a cause always implies its effect, and vice versa.
125
 
II.16 begins as follows: 
 
[9]  Of the cause and what is caused, one might wonder whether when that which is 
caused is the case, the cause also holds (just as if [a plant] sheds its leaves or if 
there is an eclipse, the cause of the eclipse or of the shedding also will be; for 
example if this is having broad leaves or (for the eclipse) the earth’s being in the 
middle. For if it does not hold, then something else will be the cause of them). 
                                                 
124 Charles 2000, p. 316. 
125 On these chapters, see Lennox 2013. 
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And if the cause holds, does that which is caused also hold at the same time? E.g. 
if the earth is in the middle, there is an eclipse; or if [a plant] is broad-leaved, it 
sheds its leaves. 
 
98a35  Περὶ δ’ αἰτίου καὶ οὗ αἴτιον ἀπορήσειε μὲν ἄν τις, 
ἆρα ὅτε ὑπάρχει τὸ αἰτιατόν, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρχει (ὥσ- 
περ εἰ φυλλορροεῖ ἢ ἐκλείπει, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἐκλείπειν 
ἢ φυλλορροεῖν ἔσται· οἷον εἰ τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ πλατέα ἔχειν τὰ 
98b1  φύλλα, τοῦ δ’ ἐκλείπειν τὸ τὴν γῆν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ 
μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἄλλο τι ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῶν), εἴ τε τὸ αἴτιον 
ὑπάρχει, ἅμα καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν (οἷον εἰ ἐν μέσῳ ἡ γῆ, ἐκ- 
λείπει, ἢ εἰ πλατύφυλλον, φυλλορροεῖ). 
 
The question is of particular importance for Aristotle, since the method of investigation 
he recommends involves looking to coextensive correlations between attributes as a guide to 
causal research. This method would appear to be fruitful only if coextension of cause and effect 
holds. Aristotle points out (at II.16, 96b16ff.), as he did in I.13, that if cause and effect are 
coextensive, then one can construct deductions using either the cause or the effect as a middle 
term, such that one can be deduced from the other. But only deductions through the cause are 
productive of epistêmê (at least in the unqualified sense), providing the reason why rather than 
the fact. He thus recognizes, and emphasizes, that coextension alone cannot reveal causal 
priority, but nonetheless it may act as a guide to causal research. 
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II.16 ends aporetically with the question whether the same effect can have different 
causes, such that the possession of an attribute by one subject-kind is explained by one cause, 
and the possession of the same attribute by a different subject-kind is explained by a different 
cause. He suggests two options: (i) the same thing may be caused by different things, such that 
the presence of the effect need not imply the presence of a particular cause, but only of some 
cause (98b25ff.), or (ii) an attribute is possessed universally and per se by only one subject-kind, 
such that if more than one kind of thing appears to possess the attribute, then they are necessarily 
forms of the same kind, such that one cause explains the presence of the attribute for both 
(98b32ff.). 
The aporia is taken up in II.17, where Aristotle’s conclusion appears to be that an 
attribute can have only one cause relative to a given kind, such that all forms of the kind that 
exhibit the attribute do so for the same reason. He illustrates the point with the leaf-shedding 
example: the shedding of leaves may extend beyond e.g. vines and figs, but if we take the group 
of plants marked off by the feature of shedding leaves and treat it as a single kind, then a single 
cause (e.g. coagulation of sap) will apply to this “kind,” and thus to each of the individual forms 
of the kind. If this is Aristotle’s view, then he does hold that cause and effect are coextensive, 
when considered at the right level of generality.  
However Aristotle appears to make an allowance that the same attribute may be present 
in different kinds, and may be due to different causes in the different kinds. He concludes II.17
126
 
with the following comments: 
                                                 
126 The passage that immediately precedes this conclusion (99a30-b2) offers a “schematic” 
example that is meant to illustrate Aristotle’s view, however its interpretation has been 
debated, and it is unclear whether the example is meant to illustrate the view that cause 
and effect are always coextensive, or whether they may not be when the effect appears in 
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[10] Then it is possible that many things are the cause of the same thing, but not for 
things the same in form, for example, [the cause] of long-life with respect to 
quadrupeds is not having bile, but for birds is the dry or something else.  
 
99b4  ἐνδέχεται δὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείω αἴτια εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῖς αὐ- 
τοῖς τῷ εἴδει, οἷον τοῦ μακρόβια εἶναι τὰ μὲν τετράποδα 
τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χολήν, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ τὸ ξηρὰ εἶναι ἢ ἕτερόν 
τι. 
 
The suggestion here is that the same attribute (long-life) is present in four-footed animals and 
birds due to different causes, and this is explained by the fact that four-footed animals and birds 
are different in form, and thus may possess differently caused attributes. 
This is problematic, in so far as Aristotle’s recommended method of investigation is to 
group together the different subjects that exhibit a given feature and search for other common 
attributes that might act as a guide to causal research. If the same attribute may be due to 
different causes in different subjects, then this method may very well lead one astray, or at least 
to a dead end. The stipulation that the same forms of things will exhibit the same causes is itself 
problematic, as the form/kind distinction, at least as it is used in the biology, does not indicate a 
fixed classification system, such that two animals may be the same in form in one sense but 
different in another. Using the example Aristotle gives, bird and four-footed may indicate 
                                                                                                                                                             
different kinds/forms of things. See Appendix B for (the beginning) of my analysis of this 
passage. 
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different forms of the higher kind animal, but both are e.g. blooded, and thus the same in form in 
that respect. The discussion of pride in passage [7] is relevant here. In that passage Aristotle 
recommended looking for common features amongst all prideful men in order to discover the 
cause of pride and, upon finding none, suggested that perhaps two separate, differently caused, 
forms of pride were at work. Here the suggestion is not that the birds and the four-footed animals 
exhibit different forms of long-life, but rather that the same attribute is differently caused among 
the different kinds of animals. However the method of procedure is the same: if no common 
cause can be isolated among the group of animals that exhibit long-life, then one should attempt 
to divide the larger group into sub-groups that do share relevant features that may differently 
explain their long-life. The take-away from the example, then, is that co-extension can still be 
used as a tool for causal research, even in cases where the initially isolated group fails to share a 
feature that is coextensional with the attribute under investigation. 
3.2.7 Reflection 
The picture of scientific investigation that emerges from these chapters of the Analytics 
involves first establishing that certain regularities exist among a set of subjects and attributes, 
typically by means of induction via perception; second identifying correlations among the 
predications established in the first set, with the aim of establishing “follows/followed by” 
relations among the subjects and attributes; and third using those correlations as a guide to 
determining causes by either examining the deductions that the established predications allow for 
in an attempt to determine whether the middle terms so identified meet the criteria for apodeixis, 
or by using the correlations as a clue to a possible underlying common cause. In either case, the 
extensional correlations formed in the first steps will not alone reveal causal dependencies, but 
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rather additional considerations regarding what it means to be a cause in the given field of study 
will need to be brought to bear on the problems at hand. As these additional considerations will 
likely be domain-specific, little can be said in APo. regarding just how the causes will be 
determined in the various fields, given the level of generality at which the APo. operates.  
For the field of zoology/biology, Aristotle provides as extended reflection of just these 
sort of causal considerations in the first book of Parts of Animals. In the following sections I 
briefly review the main questions that structure the discussion of PA I, and consider their 
relevance to the project of a historia. 
3.3 PA I: ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY/ZOOLOGY 
The first book of PA, sometimes referred to as Aristotle’s “philosophy of biology,” 
consists in an extended reflection on the manner of investigation and demonstration proper to the 
study of animals. Aristotle begins PA I.1 with a brief discussion of the difference between being 
knowledgeable in a specific field or area of knowledge, and possessing a sort of “educatedness” 
(paideian, 639a5) such that one may judge whether a given argument is well-formed, without 
having detailed knowledge of the specifics of the argument.   
The structure of PA I is built around three guiding questions, introduced early in the first 
chapter. These questions are: 
 
(1) Should the investigation of animals begin with the study of individual ousiai, 
or with a study of the attributes common to many animals? 
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(2) Should one being by studying the phenomena associated with animals prior 
to searching for their causes? 
(3) Which/what sort of cause is primary in natural things? 
 
Each question is relevant to the present consideration of historia, especially the first two. 
In what follows I shall discuss Aristotle’s response to each question and how it pertains to the 
project of a historia of animals. 
3.3.1 Individual ousiai or attributes? 
The first question regarding the “inquiry about nature” (tês peri phusin historias, 639a13) 
that Aristotle considers is presented as follows: 
 
[11] I mean, for example, should one take each substantial being singly and define it 
independently, e.g. taking up one by one the nature of mankind, lion, ox, and any 
other animal as well; or should one first establish, according to something 
common, the attributes common to all? For many of the same attributes are 
present in many different kinds of animals, e.g. sleep, respiration, growth, 
deterioration, death, and in addition any remaining affections and dispositions 
such as these. (I add this because at the moment it is permissible to speak 
unclearly and indefinitely about these things.) It is apparent that, especially when 
speaking one by one, we shall repeatedly say the same things about many kinds; 
for instance, each of the attributes just mentioned belong to horses, dogs, and 
human beings. So if one speaks of their attributes one by one, it will be necessary 
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to speak repeatedly about the same things—whenever, that is, the same things are 
present in different forms of animal, yet themselves have no difference.   
 
639a15 Λέγω δ’ οἷον πότερον δεῖ λαμβάνοντας 
μίαν ἑκάστην οὐσίαν περὶ ταύτης διορίζειν καθ’ αὑτήν, οἷον 
περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως ἢ λέοντος ἢ βοὸς ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου 
καθ’ ἕκαστον προχειριζομένους, ἢ τὰ κοινῇ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι 
κατά τι κοινὸν ὑποθεμένους. Πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταὐτὰ 
a20  πολλοῖς γένεσιν ἑτέροις οὖσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ὕπνος, ἀναπνοή,  
αὔξησις, φθίσις, θάνατος, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅσα τοιαῦτα τῶν 
λειπομένων παθῶν τε καὶ διαθέσεων· ἄδηλον γὰρ καὶ ἀδιό- 
ριστόν ἐστι λέγειν νῦν περὶ τούτων. Φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι καὶ κατὰ 
μέρος μὲν λέγοντες περὶ πολλῶν ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις ταὐτά· 
a25  καὶ γὰρ ἵπποις καὶ κυσὶ καὶ ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει τῶν εἰ- 
ρημένων ἕκαστον, ὥστε ἐὰν καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν συμβεβηκότων 
λέγῃ τις, πολλάκις ἀναγκασθήσεται περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέ- 
γειν, ὅσα ταὐτὰ μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς εἴδει διαφέρουσι τῶν 
ζῴων, αὐτὰ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχει διαφοράν.  
 
At issue for Aristotle here is whether one should focus study on individual kinds/forms of 
animals (the examples offered are mankind, lion, ox) or on the attributes exhibited by such 
animals in common, i.e. on shared attributes. The way Aristotle forms the question makes it clear 
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that, in either case, the focus of study is on the attributes exhibited by animals: whether one 
begins by studying individual forms or not, what one studies are attributes.  
Although not argued for here, the answer hinted at is that one should begin study at the 
level of commonly held attributes, rather than with individual kinds/forms of animals. The 
reason hinted at is that there would be needless repetitive discussion of the commonly held 
attributes, if these attributes are in fact the same across kinds of animals (the examples offered 
are sleep, respiration, growth, deterioration, death). The sameness of the attributes, Aristotle here 
seems to assume, implies the sameness of their explanations.
127
 If the goal of investigation is to 
explain why an animal possesses a given feature, and we assume that the same feature will have 
the same explanation, regardless of the kind of animal that exhibits it, then it would seem 
unnecessarily repetitive to cite the explanation again and again for each animal, rather than just 
once for all. 
The upshot of the question for the historia of animals is clear: if the explanation of an 
attribute applies to all animals that exhibit it, then one should find some way of grouping animals 
that share common attributes such that the explanation can be offered once for all. 
Aristotle continues by recognizing that attributes that, at one level of generality, may be 
considered different, may be thought of as the same at another. He states: 
 
[12] Yet there are probably other attributes which turn out to have the same predicate, 
but to differ by a difference in form, e.g. the locomotion of animals; it is apparent 
that locomotion is not one in form, because, flying, swimming, walking, and 
                                                 
127 But note that APo. II.17 appears to argue that this assumption is not warranted. 
Interestingly, though the example in II.17 is a biological one (i.e. long-life), I do not find 
concern with this issue expressed in PA I.  
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crawling differ. Accordingly, the following question about how one is to carry out 
an examination should not be overlooked—I mean the question of whether one 
should study things in common according to kind first, and then later the 
distinctive characteristics, or whether one should study them one by one straight 
away. 
 
639a29       Ἕτερα δὲ ἴσως ἐστὶν 
οἷς συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν κατηγορίαν ἔχειν τὴν αὐτήν, διαφέρειν 
b1  δὲ τῇ κατ’ εἶδος διαφορᾷ, οἷον ἡ τῶν ζῴων πορεία· οὐ γὰρ 
φαίνεται μία τῷ εἴδει· διαφέρει γὰρ πτῆσις καὶ νεῦσις 
καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἕρψις. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ διαλεληθέναι πῶς ἐπι- 
σκεπτέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον κοινῇ κατὰ γένος πρῶτον, εἶτα 
b5  ὕστερον περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρητέον, ἢ καθ’ ἕκαστον εὐθύς. 
 
The attribute “locomotion” has different forms, such that any animal that “locomotes” 
does so in a certain manner: fish swim, birds fly, etc., but all locomote. The recognition of a 
kind/form organization of attributes raises the question of the level of generalization or 
characterization at which the study of the attributes of animals should begin.  
Again, if it is assumed that the same attribute (at whatever level of generality it is 
considered) has the same explanation, regardless of the kind of animal that exhibits it, then a 
sensible method of procedure would be to begin by studying attributes at the highest level of 
generality possible, and then proceeding by attempting to determine why an attribute that is 
common at one level of generality is differentiated at another.  
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These considerations point to two important methodological points for the historia. First, 
grouping animals according to common attributes will be a useful stage of investigation, since 
the same explanation will apply to all animals that exhibit the common attribute; and second, 
formulating a kind/form organization of the attributes themselves will aid in their explanation.
128
 
3.3.2 Phenomena and causes 
The second question Aristotle considers is presented thusly: 
 
[13] At present this matter has not been determined, nor has the question that will now 
be stated, namely, whether just as the mathematician explains the phenomena in 
the case of astronomy, so the natural philosopher too, having first studied the 
phenomena regarding the animals and the parts of each, should then sate the 
reason why and the causes, or whether he should proceed in some other way 
 
 
639b5          Νῦν 
γὰρ οὐ διώρισται περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐδέ γε τὸ νῦν ῥηθησόμενον, οἷον 
πότερον καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν 
δεικνύουσιν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τὰ φαινόμενα πρῶτον 
τὰ περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρήσαντα καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, 
b10  ἔπειθ’ οὕτω λέγειν τὸ διὰ τί καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, ἢ ἄλλως πως. 
                                                 
128 On these points, see Lennox 2010c, pp. 66-9. 
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The methodological distinction made here between studying the “phenomena” (ta 
phainomena) and then proceeding to state the reason why (to dioti) maps directly onto the 
hoti/dioti distinction discussed above, and referenced in the methodological passage in HA I.6. 
Although not argued for here, the answer Aristotle endorses is clear: the phenomena should be 
studied prior to the reason why and the cause. 
The reference to astronomy and mathematicians here is similar to that in APr. I.30.
129
 The 
claim in that passage is that the mathematicians were able to discover the causes of the various 
motions of the heavenly bodies (i.e the mathematical regularities that underlie the apparently 
irregular motions of the planets) only after “the phenomena” regarding these bodies (i.e. the 
precise details of these motions) were properly documented. Similarly for the study of animals, 
the question suggests that the precise details regarding the attributes exhibited by animals must 
first be documented prior to searching for their causes.
130
 That this is accomplished in the 
historia is consistent with the understanding of historia developed thus far. 
It is interesting to ask, though, what exactly would it mean to proceed otherwise? Would 
it mean attempting to formulate explanations prior to grasping all the phenomena, i.e. when only 
some of the phenomena were grasped? Is it a word of caution against beginning with general 
principles and attempting to deduce various conclusions without first being familiar with the 
facts of the world? Aristotle does not here explain what this alternative procedure might look 
like, but, given the extensive criticism he levies against his predecessors due to their lack of 
experience with natural things, it seems probable that Aristotle is here advising against 
                                                 
129 See ch. 6, passage [3], and passage [12], ch. 2. 
130 See Lennox 2010c, pp. 69-70. 
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attempting to formulate explanations of natural phenomena prior to a comprehensive grasp of the 
great variety offered by nature.
131
 
 
3.3.3 The priority of final causation 
The final question posed in PA I.1 pertains to the kind of causation that is primary in 
natural things.  Aristotle introduces the question as follows: 
 
[14] And in addition to these question, since we seek more than one cause of natural 
generation, e.g. both the cause for the sake of which and the cause from which 
comes the origin of motion, we need also to determine, about these causes, which 
sort is naturally first and which second. 
 
 
639b11 Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ πλείους ὁρῶμεν αἰτίας περὶ τὴν γένεσιν 
τὴν φυσικήν, οἷον τήν τε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς 
κινήσεως, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ποία πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα 
πέφυκεν. 
 
                                                 
131 The problem here, of course, is determining what constitutes a properly 
“comprehensive” grasp of the phenomena? Given that Aristotle himself sometimes warns 
his readers that the facts pertaining to the subjects he is attempting to explain are not yet 
well grasped (e.g. his discussion of the reproduction of bees, GA III.10; celestial phenomena, 
DC II.12, PA I.5, etc.), it appears that meeting the standard of “grasping the phenomena” will 
vary depending upon the phenomena in question. 
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Aristotle’s answer to this question is unambiguous: the cause for the sake of which is 
primary. Much of PA I.1 is dedicated to arguing for the priority of an animal’s form, or the 
account of its being and essence, over the generative process that causes the animal to come to be 
(an explanatory alternative that was on the table in Aristotle’s day, as it is today). As Aristotle 
states explicitly: “generation is for the sake of substantial being (ousia), rather than substantial 
being for the sake of generation” (640a18). In fact, Aristotle argues that a proper understanding 
of an animal’s generation (i.e. why the steps in its generation take place in the order that they do) 
is achievable only through a thorough understanding of the way an animal is. Ultimately, near 
the end of PA I,
132
 Aristotle argues for the priority of function and activity over the material and 
formal structures of the parts of an animal’s body, and even suggests that a sort of priority exists 
among these very functions and activities, such that some are for the sake of others, and these 
last form the explanatory foundation for understanding an animal’s life, body, generation, etc. 
The picture that emerges indicates that what an animal is, in the most fundamental sense, is 
defined by a way of being in the world (i.e. a way of performing certain vital functions in 
relation to a specified environment), and this way of being requires (i.e. “conditionally 
necessitates”) the animal to perform certain activities, which in turn require the presence of 
certain parts. Aristotle identifies this “way of being in the world” with the animal’s soul. Thus 
the generative process by which the parts of an animal’s body come to be is ultimately governed 
by the soul. There will, nonetheless, be many attributes that are possessed by animals due 
“material necessity,” (i.e. attributes that necessarily follow, not from the animals way of being, 
but from the material from which the animal is “constructed”), however even these can 
                                                 
132 See PA I.5, 645b15ff. 
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ultimately be traced back to the animal’s soul, which itself conditionally necessitates the material 
make-up of the animal’s body.133 
The upshot for the historia of animals is clear: since this “way of being in the world,” as 
I’ve called it, has explanatory priority in the understanding of animals, therefore a rich account 
of these activities and manners of life will be the necessary foundation of the explanatory science 
of animals. In order to understand why an animal has the particular parts that it does, one must 
first grasp what roles the parts plays in an animal’s life, and this in turn requires a grasp of the 
characteristic activities an animal performs in support of the vital needs shared by all living 
things (primarily nutrition, reproduction, and cooling of natural heat).  
In summary, the priority relations Aristotle identifies in PA I are: 
 
Parts 
 For the sake of . . . 
Activities 
 For the sake of . . .  
Activities 
  For the sake of . . . 
 Distinctive way of life 
 
                                                 
133 The material make-up of an animal’s body (its krasis) is constrained by the environment 
in which the animal lives. In fact it seems that some reference to the particular 
environment in which an animal characteristically lives is included in the account of the 
animal’s substantial being, i.e. its soul. 
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What I’ve described as a “distinctive way of life” cannot necessarily be reduced to a set of 
activities. Rather, as we shall see in the next chapter’s analysis of the four primary forms of 
differentia introduced in HA I, some aspects of an animal’s bios (manner of life) are not activities 
themselves, but are rather characteristics of an animal that affect the manner in which certain 
activities are performed. The most prominent form of this type of characteristic in HA is that of 
being a water animal (enudros) or land animal (chersaia/pezon). What e.g. being a water animal 
entails is not a set of vital activities; rather it entails performing vital actives in particular ways: 
feeding, reproducing, and cooling natural heat in specific ways. These priority relations dictate 
the explanatory relations between different forms of differentiae. In the most obvious case, the 
attributes related to the parts of animals will generally be explained by the functions performed 
by those parts, and differences in these parts will typically be explained either by the slightly 
different functions they fulfill in a given animal’s life, or by some other necessary feature of the 
animal that requires the part in question to be differentiated as it is.
134
 
3.3.4 Reflection 
The three questions that structure the discussion of PA I suggest that the historia of 
animals should (i) look primarily to the attributes exhibited by animals, rather than the different 
kinds of animals, and should organize the attributes in kind/form divisions that isolate general 
and more particular instantiations of the attributes in question. The extension of these attributes 
(at each level of generality) to the kinds of animals that exhibit them should be noted, even, and 
                                                 
134 For example, the legs of birds are all for the sake of locomotion, but the extremely long 
legs of some kinds of swamp dwelling birds are explained by the environment in which 
those birds must locomote. 
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perhaps especially, when the extension overlaps with many different kinds; (ii) provide a detailed 
and comprehensive survey of the actual differences exhibited by animals prior to any attempt at 
causal explanation; and (iii) should focus on the fully developed animal, as the way of being of 
the adult animal will form the ultimate explanatory foundation for the science of animals. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Both APo. and PA I provide important considerations relevant to the understanding of a 
historia. The above discussions of the relevant passages in APo. (especially book II) show that 
Aristotle’s preferred method of investigation begins with a stage of establishing facts regarding 
the subject matter at hand, and proceeds by organizing those facts into “problems”—hoti-level 
propositions whose causes can now be sought. The search for these causes begins with a stage of 
identifying correlations between the various attributes included in the field of study. These 
correlations must be identified at varying levels of generality in order that the coextensive 
relationships may be identified. Such coextensive correlations provide the investigator with the 
first candidates for causal explanation, however they must remain as mere candidates until 
additional considerations may be brought to bear on the question of how causes operate within 
the specific domain of study under consideration. The collection and correlation of these facts 
takes place during the historia stage. 
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4.0  INTRODUCTION TO THE TREATISE: HA I.1-6 (486A5-491A14) 
The first six chapters of HA (to 491a14) serve as an introduction to the rest of the treatise. 
Twice Aristotle describes the discussion as a tupos (487a12, 491a7) – a “sketch” or “outline” – 
designed to provide a “taste” of what will be described with precision later. This suggests that a 
proper understanding of exactly what is accomplished in this stretch of text should shed light on 
the rest of the treatise. In what sense is it a tupos? Is it simply an outline of the subject matter that 
is to be treated in the rest of the work, a framework of sorts upon which the rest of the treatise 
will be built? Or does it provide an example of the methodology that will be used, showing the 
manner according to which the investigation will proceed? Does Aristotle present any sort of 
philosophical reflection on this methodology, any justification for proceeding in the way that he 
does? Is he presenting an argument of some sort, which will serve as the basis for the remainder 
of treatise? 
Balme writes of this and similar introductions in Aristotle: “Such generalities are neither 
formal postulates required to prove the details nor mere samples of what is to come, but 
something between: they are guidelines which express the real structure but are still 
universalized and await the more precise definition which is available only in particulars.”135 
Elsewhere he states that the purpose of the introduction to HA is not simply to summarize or 
                                                 
135 Balme 1991, p. 18. 
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preview, but rather “to extract the main points for the reader’s guidance.”136 In this chapter I will 
test these claims about this introductory passage by offering a careful reading and analysis of the 
text. I will argue that the long passage does provide a useful introduction to the entire treatise, 
and that it accomplishes this both by providing an outline of the contents that follow, and by 
offering a more theoretical reflection on important concepts and points of method that are 
integral to a proper understanding of the treatise as a whole, though not always taken up 
thematically elsewhere in the treatise. 
The long passage divides into seven fairly distinct sections: 
(i) 486a5-487a10: sameness and difference of parts 
(ii) 487a11-488b28  manners of life, characters, and activities 
a. 487a11-b32:   manners of life, characters, and activities 
b. 487b33-488b11:  manners of life and activities 
c. 488b12-28:   characters 
(iii) 488b29-489a34:  “most necessary” parts of animals 
(iv) 489a34-b18:  modes of reproduction  
(v) 489b19-490b6: parts related to locomotion 
(vi) 490b7-491a6:  discussion of megista genê 
(vii) 491a7-14:   methodological reflection 
 
In what follows I provide a summary of each of these major sections followed by an 
analysis of their contents in which I consider their relationship with the other sections of the 
                                                 
136 Balme (forthcoming). 
 114 
introduction and with the rest of the treatise. Following this, I consider in what sense this 
discussion is a tupos of the entire treatise.  
4.1 SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE OF THE PARTS OF ANIMALS (486A5-487A10) 
This first section actually serves two distinct purposes. First Aristotle introduces a basic 
division of the parts of animals – that of being compounded or uncompounded – and provides a 
brief analysis of these terms (486a5-14, 487a1-10). Second, he introduces a typology of 
sameness and difference that he uses as the basis for comparing the parts of animals, as well as 
the other main differentiae (486a14-487a1). I have grouped these two discussions together 
because the typology of sameness and difference interrupts, as it were, the discussion of the parts 
of animals with which the treatise begins (and with which it continues after the discussion of the 
typology), and it thus seems more sensible to include them together in one longer stretch of text 
rather than break them up. 
4.1.1 Summary 
The treatise begins immediately with a discussion of the parts of animals, focusing on a 
single broad division among them: that of being compounded (sunthetos) or uncompounded 
(asunthetos). As Aristotle explains, compounded parts are those that may be divided or separated 
into non-uniform parts (anomoiomerês), while uncompounded parts are those that, when divided, 
result in uniform parts (homoiomerês), i.e. parts that are alike to one another and the whole. The 
notion of a limb (melê) is also introduced, presumably due to its relation to compounded parts: a 
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limb is a kind of part that is itself regarded as whole, but has other recognizable parts within it, 
such as the head (which has within it the face and its parts, the ears, the brain, etc.). 
Following this is an extended discussion of the manners of sameness and difference 
exhibited by the parts of animals – what I’ve labeled a “typology of sameness and difference.” 
Three primary modes of similarity are discussed: sameness in form (eidei), sameness in kind 
(genei), and sameness by analogy (kata analogian). Examples are provided for each: one man’s 
nose or eyes are the same in form with another man’s nose or eyes; the beaks of two different 
forms of bird are different in form but the same in kind; fish scales are different in kind to bird 
feathers, but are the same by analogy, since “that which is feather in bird, in fish this is the scale” 
(486b21). Parts that are the same in kind differ by “excess and defect” (huperochê, elleipsis) or 
“the more and the less” (to mallon kai êtton). Such differences are typically found in contrary 
properties (para tas tôn pathêmatôn enantiôseis), such as color and shape. Examples include 
harder or softer flesh, longer or shorter beaks, and more or fewer feathers. Other forms of 
difference include the possession or absence of a part (e.g. some birds possess spurs or crests 
while others do not), and the placement of a part (e.g. the teat of female animals is sometimes on 
the breast, sometimes near the thigh).  
The section concludes with a few additional remarks regarding uniform parts. Two pairs 
of contrasting differentiae are introduced: soft and fluid (malaka kai hugra) and hard and firm 
(xêra kai sterea),
137
 and examples of each are given: e.g. soft and fluid are blood, marrow, 
semen, and milk; hard and firm are sinew, skin, blood-vessel, hair, and bone. 
                                                 
137 These same pairs of differentiae are introduced at PA II.2, 647b10-19. 
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4.1.2 Analysis  
4.1.2.1 The peculiarity of HA’s introduction 
It is noteworthy that the treatise begins by immediately entering into a discussion of the 
sameness and difference of parts. It is not until 487a10 (about a Bekker page) that Aristotle 
provides a fuller picture of his project (i.e. a discussion of the differences exhibited by animals), 
and not until 491a7 (about five Bekker pages) that this project is more clearly explained. 
Aristotle’s purposes come to be clearer as the reader progresses, but this hasty beginning—
lacking any methodological introduction—has suggested to some scholars that HA is not a 
“polished” treatise, and perhaps was not meant for a wide reading audience.138 However, this 
lack of literary polish need not suggest that the treatise is poorly arranged or structured; on the 
contrary, it is a goal of this chapter to argue for much the opposite. Although this introductory 
section begins with little fanfare, it does serve as an introduction, and thus reflects a plan and 
organization of thought, as we shall see more clearly as we proceed.  
Nonetheless it must be emphasized that HA differs considerably in its opening passages 
from most of Aristotle’s other treatises. It is typical for Aristotle, in the opening lines of a 
treatise, to identify the primary subject matter under discussion, and to locate that subject matter 
within a broader field of study. Often he will also discuss the methodology that should be used in 
the investigation and why it is fitting for the subject matter at hand. To take the main biological 
treatises as examples, PA
139
, GA
140
, IA, MA, and Sens. (the first treatise of the Parva Naturalia) 
                                                 
138 See Louis 1964, xi-xiv. 
139 PA I, a reflection on method and explanation in biology, is appended to PA II-IV as it is 
relevant to the explanatory project undertaken there. This has led some scholars to 
conjecture that PA I began its life as an independent treatise. Even if one were to consider 
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all include such introductory passages that serve to situate the reader. While HA does include 
such a reflection on subject matter and methodology, it appears much later in the work, and not 
“front and center,” as it were, in the beginning. Why does HA lack such an introduction?  
It may reflect the purpose of the treatise: for whom is the treatise written? What is the 
reader expected to learn from it? If the primary goals of the treatise are centered around 
gathering facts about the differences exhibited by animals in order that they may be explained 
later, then methodological discussions of explanation and investigation perhaps need not be 
included, since such explanations form no part of the goals of the present work. However, as the 
methodological reflection in HA I.6 indicates, as well as our earlier discussions of APo. II, 
considerations of cause and explanation do come into play, even at the early stage of 
investigation of collecting and organizing facts. Why then do we not find a more lengthy 
discussion of these issues, and why not here at the beginning of the treatise? 
A complete answer to this question will have to wait for a more detailed study, not just of 
these introductory passages, but of the whole HA. At this point we may conjecture that the lack 
of a typical Aristotelian introduction may reflect the differing purpose of the HA as compared to 
most other treatises in the corpus. As we saw in the introduction to this dissertation, Louis has 
suggested that HA was not meant to be a widely circulated or read treatise, but rather served as a 
repository of sorts, a record of facts that were to be used in later, explanatory treatises. If this 
were the case, then an introduction of the style typical to other Aristotelian works would not be 
necessary, since the reader of the treatise would presumably be the very researcher endeavoring 
                                                                                                                                                             
PA I as a separate treatise, the bulk of the PA itself begins, in PA II.1, with a general 
statement on what is to be accomplished in the treatise.   
140 Balme brackets the opening salvo of GA I.1, calling it a “stylized preamble” that may be 
“post-Aristotelian” (Balme 1972, p. 127). If he’s right, then, like HA, GA too begins rather 
abruptly, launching immediately into a discussion of the male and the female.   
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to explain the phenomena collected therein. The HA would be little more than a notebook of 
facts and observations of animals, needing no further introduction for the intended reader. 
However, this picture of the HA does not square with the rather more complicated 
organization we find in the work. As Lennox and Gotthelf have argued, the HA is not merely a 
notebook of observations, but stands somewhere in between the researcher’s field notebook and 
the sort of explanatory work we find elsewhere in the corpus.
141
 Its focus is not just on data, but 
also on “data organization” – it occupies a place “between data and demonstration.” This 
suggests that the treatise has a purpose beyond the mere recording of data, and that this purpose 
could profitably be explained (and defended) in an introduction of a sort similar to other treatises 
in the corpus. As mentioned above, the HA does contain such an introduction, only it is not 
structured in the typical way. As we shall see, it begins by immediately offering examples of the 
sort of data is to be collected, and only later discusses and defends the methodology to be used. 
This suggests that the intended reader is, on the one hand, not entirely unfamiliar with the 
investigation and subject matter at hand, since Aristotle apparently felt no need to immediately 
situate this reader in the discussion. But, on the other hand, it also suggests that an introduction 
of some sort was in fact necessary to guide the reader’s further progress through the treatise. It 
may be that even the reader familiar with Aristotle’s investigation into nature and/or animals 
would benefit from an introduction that looks forward to the rest of the treatise, sets expectations 
regarding the material that is to be covered, and provides examples and discussions of the 
methodology that will be employed throughout the work. Such an introduction would not need to 
locate the present investigation within the broader perspective of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. 
                                                 
141 Lennox 1991, Gotthelf 1988, 2012b. 
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This suggests that the purpose of the treatise is primarily a pedagogical one, aimed not at 
the general reader, or even the more sophisticated reader familiar with the main themes of natural 
philosophy. Rather it is aimed more at the specialist; it is intended to educate the budding 
investigator of the animal world in such a manner as to prepare him to carry out the sort of 
explanatory work we find in treatises like PA and GA.
142
 If this is the intended reader, then no 
extended introduction situating the study of animals within the broader study of nature is 
necessary, for the reader would already be familiar with the relationship between these studies. 
However an introduction of a different sort would be necessary in order to aid the student in 
using the treatise to master the vast amount of information contained in the work.  
4.1.2.2 Differences in the parts of animals 
Returning to the text, Aristotle does not employ the distinction he introduces first, that of 
being sunthetos/asunthetos, in the rest of the treatise, but instead favors anomoiomerês (or 
occasionally organikos) over sunthetos, and homoiomerês over asunthetos.
143
 The distinctions 
Aristotle draws here, however, do not allow us simply to equate asunthetos with homoiomerês 
and sunthetos with anomoiomerês. As the etymologies suggest, the distinction 
sunthetos/asunthetos refers to whether a part is made up of or put together out of other 
recognizable parts, while homoiomerês/anomoiomerês refers to whether the part is made up of 
like parts, i.e. parts similar to the whole, though not necessarily distinguishable from the whole. 
The distinction homoiomerês/anomoiomerês, together with that of parts being internal or external 
                                                 
142 Lennox points out that a third option is available, namely that the treatise is aimed not 
at the specialist per se, nor at a general reader, but rather at anyone interested in learning 
about how to properly gather and organize data for scientific explication, regardless of the 
field. This reader would fall somewhere inbetween the general reader and the specialist.   
143 For anomoiomerês/organikos over sunthetos see e.g. HA I.6, 491a26, III.1, 511a35, IV.1 
523a32; for homoiomerês over asunthetos see HA III.2, 511b2, IV.1 523a32. 
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(entos/ektos), forms the basic division of the parts of animals that Aristotle uses to structure his 
discussion in books I-IV.
144
  
PA II.1 begins with a similar discussion of the sunthesis of animal parts. But there, in 
addition to homoiomerês and anomoiomerês Aristotle includes a third, lower level of 
composition: the “so-called elements” (tôn kaloumenôn . . . stoicheiôn), earth, air, fire, water, 
which he identifies with the four primary capacities or powers (dunameis), hot, cold, wet, dry, 
that define/underlie the elements (646a12ff). This suggests a three-fold composition of animal 
parts (dunameis/stoicheioi, homoiomerês, anomoiomerês). This same lower-level division of the 
elements into their primary dunameis is also discussed in GC 
145
. Balme has stressed that these 
passages need to be considered in context, and that any discrepancies between them can be 
accounted for based on “the limits of the argument” presently under consideration.146 This might 
suggest that the discussion in HA, with its focus on the dual-level composition 
homoiomerês/anomoiomerês, is concerned primarily with the observable composition of animal 
parts.
147
 Any understanding of the further composition of homoiomerê parts requires a rather 
sophisticated theoretical analysis that takes us many steps beyond what is simply observable.
148
 
149
 This accords well with the avowed pre-causal, pre-explanatory nature of HA. The more 
complex analysis of composition that appears in PA fits well with the explanatory project of that 
                                                 
144 See chapter 5, section 2.2 for an outline of the discussion of parts of animals in HA. 
145 GC II, 329a35 
146 Balme (forthcoming). 
147 Balme (forthcoming) cites Galen as expressing a similar view. 
148 While we can observe certain of the dunameis present in the homoiomerê parts (e.g. 
some are hugros while others are xêros, 487a2), Aristotle holds that the perceptible 
presence of a dunamis is not necessarily indicative of the role of that dunamis in the part’s 
composition. See PA II.2. 
149 Meteo. IV offers just such an analysis. 
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treatise, as many of the features of a given part will be explained by the part’s material 
composition and the corresponding capacities of that composition.  
As with the compounded/uncompounded distinction, Aristotle does not use the notion of 
melos, or limb, elsewhere in the HA.  If a limb is a part that possesses a sort of unity and 
wholeness of its own while also being comprised of other parts, then is a limb simply a 
compounded part? Perhaps so, as hand is explicitly mentioned in both categories.
150
 But the 
popular extension of the term melos may not have referred to some parts that Aristotle considers 
sunthetos, such as the face, so Aristotle may have thought it best to keep the concepts separate. 
That these distinctions are here introduced but not subsequently used may suggest that 
Aristotle composed this introduction prior to writing the rest of the treatise, and never returned to 
update the terms used.
151
  Alternatively, their use here may simply serve the purposes of the 
introduction without there being any need of repeating them later.
152
 For instance, clarifying the 
relationship between moria and melos at the beginning of the treatise may clear the way for 
leaving aside the concept of melos as the treatise proceeds. Similarly, familiarizing the reader 
with the concepts of compounded and uncompounded parts may clarify that by “part” Aristotle 
means both the complex parts of animals that have a distinctive form of their own, and the 
“materials” of which such parts are composed. 
Aristotle twice states that it is primarily by their parts that animal kinds are 
differentiated,
153
 and it is presumably by their parts that we are first acquainted with them and 
                                                 
150 At 486a7 and a11. 
151 As discussed further below, other such differentiae are introduced in the long 
introductory passage and not subsequently used. 
152 To what extent are these “technical” terms, already in use in the anatomic writings that 
are contemporary to Aristotle? 
153 HA I.6, 491a16; PA I.4, 644b8. 
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the differences between them, as these are most obvious to perception. So beginning HA with a 
discussion of parts is appropriate. The organization of HA reflects this as well: the first four 
books are dedicated to parts. And while the discussion of the forms of sameness and difference is 
keyed to the parts of animals, the same typology also applies to the other categories of 
differentia, as is made explicit later in the treatise,
154
 and implied in the proceeding discussion.  
In this opening section Aristotle introduces certain differentiae relating to parts (i.e. 
compounded, uncompounded, etc.), and provides examples of parts that exhibit these 
differentiae, but he does not go into any detail regarding exactly what parts are found in animals, 
which are most common, which are most distinctive, etc. Instead this introductory section is 
aimed at providing the reader with the basic concepts needed to begin such a survey of the parts 
of animals. And indeed this is what we find later, though not immediately following this section. 
4.1.2.3 Typology of sameness and difference 
The modes of similarity and difference Aristotle introduces – in form, in kind, and by 
analogy – provide the basic framework that is used to compare the parts of animals. The passage 
has been of particular interest to scholars due to the conspicuous use of the terms eidos and 
genos. It is now generally recognized that for Aristotle, at least within the biological works, these 
terms do not indicate fixed levels of taxonomic classification.
155
 Rather a genos may comprise 
any grouping of eidê that exhibit some similarity that is relevant to the investigation at hand. The 
relationship is typically “one of inclusion”156, with many eidê organized beneath a single genos. 
However genos is sometimes used to refer to a kind without any recognized lower forms, and 
                                                 
154 HA VII.1 588a20ff. 
155 See Pelligrin 1986, Balme 1987b, p. 72. 
156 Balme (forthcoming). 
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eidos is sometimes used to refer to a higher level form that embraces lower level forms, like a 
kind.
157
 The terms are used both for whole animals as well as their parts (i.e. forms/kinds of 
animals, forms/kinds of parts). Aristotle’s rather loose usage of the terms can cause confusion if 
one hews to closely to strict demarcations, but their use in any given passage can typically be 
defended.  
This relativity in the use of the terms eidos and genos raises the question of whether the 
modes of similarity and difference same/different in eidos/genos also exhibit the same relativity. 
In this passage, Aristotle states that the relation of samness that holds between two animals 
considered as wholes holds as well with their parts (“as the wholes are to the wholes, so also are 
each of the parts to each” (486a20)), such that if two whole animals are the same in eidos, then 
so are their parts. But if two whole animals are considered to be the same in eidos in some 
contexts, but not in others, than the relation same in form would also hold in some contexts, but 
not others. The examples he gives (nose, eye, flesh, bone of one human compared to another 
human; same parts of one horse compared to another horse) render it ambiguous whether the 
animals in question here (humans, horses) are lowest-level forms, having no further 
differentiation (this is certainly true of human, but less clear with horse).
158
 If this were the case 
it would fix the reference of same in form to those lowest level forms, and provide a more firm 
sense to the relation. However it is uncertain whether the present passage gives it this sense. He 
                                                 
157 See e.g. HA I.6, 490b17, and my discussion of the passage in Appendix C. 
158 Lennox points out that it is not entirely clear that Aristotle recognizes a “lowest-level” 
kind/form above that of the individual. At PA I.4, 644a23ff. Aristotle writes: “Since, 
however, it is the last forms (eskata eidê) that are substantial beings, and these, e.g. 
Socrates and Coriscus, are undifferentiated with respect to form (ta to eidos adiaphora) . . .” 
This suggests that the true eskata eidê belong to concrete individuals, but since these are 
“undifferentiated with respect to form”, a higher-level eidos may be abstracted from the 
individuals. It seems that it is this first higher-level eidos that Aristotle has in mind in his 
discussions of “same in form” in HA. See Lennox 1987b. 
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does state that the relation holds for “as many animals as are said to be the same in form” 
(486a19), but this does nothing to settle the question. 
A similar statement regarding the sameness and difference of the parts of animals appears 
at the beginning of HA II.1: 
 
[1] Regarding the parts of animals, some are common to all, just as was said earlier, 
while others [are common] to certain kinds [of animals]. And these are the same 
or different from one another in the manner already repeatedly stated. For 
practically all animals that are different in kind also have the majority of their 
parts different by form, and some [parts] do not differ (i.e. are the same) by 
analogy alone, being different by kind, and still others are the same by kind but 
differ by form. And many belong to some, but not to others.  
 
 497b6  Τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ζῴων τὰ μόρια τὰ μὲν κοινὰ πάντων 
ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, τὰ δὲ γενῶν τινων. Ταὐτὰ δὲ 
καὶ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων τὸν ἤδη πολλάκις εἰρημένον τρό- 
πον. Σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅσα γ’ ἐστὶ γένει ἕτερα τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τὰ 
b10  πλεῖστα τῶν μερῶν ἔχει ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατ’ 
ἀναλογίαν ἀδιάφορα μόνον, τῷ γένει δ’ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ τῷ 
γένει μὲν ταὐτὰ τῷ εἴδει δ’ ἕτερα· πολλὰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν 
ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δ’ οὐχ ὑπάρχει. 
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Here, beginning with the gar clause in 497b9, Aristotle lays out the following 
relationships between animals and their parts: 
 
Animals  Parts 
Different in kind Different in form 
Different in kind Same by analogy, different in kind 
Different in kind Same by kind, different by form 
Different in kind Present in some but not others
159
 
 
The sense of the passage is as follows. Some parts are common to (that is, present or 
possessed by) all animals, while other parts are present only in certain kinds of animals. And 
these common parts, as they appear in different kinds of animals, are similar and different in the 
ways sketched out earlier. For, most animals that differ in kind have parts that differ in form. It 
may be that these parts that differ in form are the same in kind (that is, differ only by the more or 
the less), or it may be that these parts that differ in form are the same only by analogy (and thus 
differ also by kind). It may also be that some parts are not common, but present only in some 
kinds of animals, and absent in the others. 
Again, the usage of these terms does not seem to designate rigid divisions or 
classifications, but the general sense, gleaned from the passages in I.1 and II.1 above, is clear: 
animals that are the same in form have parts that are the same in form; animals that are the same 
in kind but different in form will have parts that are largely similar, differing only by the more or 
                                                 
159 This is sometimes the case for animals that belong to the same kind, e.g. some birds 
have a crest, spurs, etc., while other birds do not. 
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less; animals that are of different kinds may have some parts that are broadly similar, differing 
by the more or less, but will likely have other parts that are only analogously the same. Finally, 
animals that differ in kind may have parts that are present in some kinds but not others.  
An important question that Aristotle leaves largely unanswered in these passages is 
exactly what the basis is for sameness by analogy. It is tempting to read in something like 
sameness of function, but Aristotle’s stock examples do not always support this. In HA I.1 he 
offers the following examples of sameness by analogy: bone to fish-spine, nail to hoof, hand to 
claw, and bird feather to fish scale. What these examples seem to have in common more than 
function is location or placement on the animal’s body: nail and hoof are both hard uniform parts 
located at the end of the extremities; similarly with hands and claws, though the first are uniform 
and the second non-uniform parts; feathers and fish scales form the outer covering of the 
respective animals, but seem to serve rather different purposes. There are perhaps some functions 
that these parts share, but it seems that function is not the sole basis of sameness by analogy in 
all cases.
160
 
To what extent does Aristotle make use of these notions of sameness and difference in 
the rest of the treatise? Implicitly, the notions are put to use quite frequently, especially those of 
sameness by form and sameness by kind. Often, when discussing differences in a feature 
belonging to animals of the same kind, he will describe the differences in terms equivalent to 
“more or less” or “excess and defect” without specifically calling out these as being differences 
in eidos and similarities in genos. It is more common for sameness by analogy to be explicitly 
                                                 
160 See Wilson 2000, ch. 2, especially pp. 69-72; Lennox 2001a, pp. 168-9, 175.  
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called out, but again, the looseness
161
 with which these terms are sometimes used renders it 
difficult to draw hard and fast lines of demarcation between them.  
4.1.2.4 Differences in uniform parts 
The final comments in this section on uniform parts are meant, first, to present the reader 
with basic differences found among these parts and to provide examples of uniform parts that 
embody these differences. But, second, these final comments also extend the typology of 
sameness and difference explicitly to the uniform parts. The examples of uniform parts that are 
either soft and fluid or hard and dry include explicit reference to parts analogous to these. In 
other words, the uniform parts specified have analogues present in some animals, and thus the 
notion of analogical similarity applies even to the uniform parts.
162
 Thus Aristotle can use 
uniform parts to exemplify the different modes of similarity and difference: e.g. the blood of two 
horses is the same in form; the blood of two different forms of bird is the same in kind but 
different in form; the blood of a blooded animal is the same by analogy to the fluid substance in 
bloodless animals. 
4.1.2.5 Concluding thoughts on 486a5-487a10 
In this long introductory passage Aristotle both introduces the first, and perhaps primary, 
form of differentia to be studied in the treatise – the parts of animals – and he begins to develop 
the framework within which differentia may be collected and compared – the typology of 
sameness and difference. Beginning as he does with parts is sensible if he is correct in claiming 
                                                 
161 Lennox suggests “abstractness” rather than “looseness.” 
162 As is noted in the comparison of bone vs. fish-spine and nail vs. hoof at 486b19.  
 128 
that it is primarily by their parts that we first come to be familiar with animals.
163
 The transition 
to the other forms of animal differentia, discussed in the next section, is thereby rendered less 
abrupt, since the reader is led from a form of differentia that is more familiar to one that is, 
presumably, less so. The development of the typology of sameness and difference with reference 
to parts also serves the same purpose – it provides the reader with concrete examples that are 
perhaps more easily grasped, compared to e.g. manners of life or activities. The rather abrupt 
beginning to the treatise perhaps reflects the intended audience or reader, one who perhaps did 
not require a more thorough introduction to the subject matter at hand, and the use they seek to 
make of the information provided. 
4.2 BIOS, PRAXIS, ÊTHOS (487A11-488B28) 
In this long passage Aristotle discusses differences of animals that are in some sense 
related to the three major forms of differentia other than parts: manners of life, activities, and 
characters. The section begins by announcing that the discussion will be given in outline first, 
while attention will be paid to “each kind” later: 
 
[4] The differences of animals are with respect to manners of life, activities, 
characters, and parts, regarding which we shall speak first in outline, and later we 
shall speak focusing on each kind. (487a11-12) 
 
                                                 
163 A claim I explore in more detail below. See ch. 5, sec. 5.1.11. 
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487a11 Αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ζῴων εἰσὶ κατά τε τοὺς βίους καὶ 
τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ μόρια, περὶ ὧν τύπῳ μὲν 
εἴπωμεν πρῶτον, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐπιστήσαντες 
ἐροῦμεν.  
 
To what does “each kind” (a13) refer? The options seem to be either each kind of animal 
(picking up on zôôn in a11) or each kind of diaphora (also in a11). The latter seems more likely, 
as diaphorai is the grammatical subject of the sentence, and the remark is immediately preceded 
by an enumeration of the different kinds of diaphora. Further, although the major kinds of 
animals are used as organizing principles throughout the treatise, the different kinds of diaphora 
act as higher organizing principles, with each discussion of a kind of diaphora subdivided in 
various ways, sometimes by the major kinds (megista genê) of animals, but sometimes by other 
divisions. Thus the discussions in the rest of the treatise are focused on each kind of differentia 
more so then on each kind of animal.
164
 This statement is paralleled by a later one at the end of 
the introductory section (491a7), repeating that the discussion is offered as a tupos.  
 Aristotle does not proceed by addressing each of the three remaining kinds of differentia 
separately, e.g. treating manners of life first, activities second, and characters third. Instead, he 
begins by considering differences under the heading of manners of life, characters, and activities 
(487a11-b32), then proceeds to differences related to manners of life and activities (487b33-
488b11), and concludes with differences related to characters alone (488b12-28). The entire 
section concludes with a statement that explicitly mentions characters and manners of life, but 
                                                 
164 In his edition of HA, Peck did not fully appreciate this fact, and instead often uses animal 
kinds in his marginal notes. Further, the Renaissance-era chapter divisions often reflect this 
misundertanding. 
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leaves out activities (488b27).
165
 Thus it is not clear whether the actual differences discussed in 
each subsection (e.g. water animal, land animal, etc.) are examples/instances of one of the 
categories of differentia, or whether such features fall under more than one category, or whether 
the features somehow affect the specified forms of differentiae, without themselves falling neatly 
under a single category (e.g. being a water animal is not itself a manner of life, an activity, or a 
character, but affects the manner of life, activities, and character of the animal).  That activities is 
left out of the concluding statement at 488b27, while it is specifically mentioned in the 
introductory statements of the first two subsections, may suggest that we should not read too 
deeply into the terms’ appearance or absence in these statements. But it seems unlikely that 
Aristotle should introduce these three forms of differentia here, only to immediately blur their 
distinctions.
166
 We shall return to this question below. 
In what follows I provide a brief summary of each of the three major subsections of the 
long passage, followed by an analysis and interpretation of their contents and their relationship to 
one another. 
                                                 
165 In each of the statements, the differentiae are connected with a kai. If this is a typical 
conjunctional use of kai, then the features discussed in the first subsection would pertain to 
manners of life and activities and characters, with each feature pertaining to all three forms 
of differentia. But kai can also be used to indicate a disjunction (Smyth 2877), so that the 
features introduced in each subsection pertain to one or the other of the differentiae 
mentioned, though not both.  
166 My thanks to Allan Gotthelf for helping me think through this passage (as with so many 
others). 
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4.2.1 Manners of life, characters, and activities (487a11-488b28) 
4.2.1.1 Summary 
Aristotle introduces the first subsection by stating: “Such differences are according to 
manners of life, characters, and activities” (eisi de diaphora kata men tous bious kai ta êthê kai 
tas praxeis hai taoiaide) (487a14-15). Two main divisions, with four corresponding differentiae, 
are considered: water animal vs. land animal (enudra/chersaia, 487a15-487b6) and stationary vs. 
capable of movement (monima/metablêtika, 487b6-487b33). First, several senses in which an 
animal may be considered a water animal are distinguished,
167
 and examples of specific animals 
that fall under each sense are provided. The emphasis is on where these animals live, what they 
eat, what they take in and expel, and where they procreate. Similar distinctions are made for land 
animals, and further examples are given. The discussion then turns to the difference of being 
stationary versus capable of movement, with particular attention paid to the unusual cases of 
water-dwelling animals that are immobile and live attached to things. This leads to a discussion 
of the different ways in which an animal can be metablêtika or capable of moving about – 
swimming, walking, flying, etc. The section closes with an aside about animals with “bad feet” 
(kakopodes) and the so-called “footless” (apodes) bird. 
4.2.1.2 Analysis 
enudros/chersaia 
That Aristotle begins the discussion with the difference water animal/land animal 
suggests that he places great importance on these differentiae. This is reflected later in the 
                                                 
167 See Peck, 1965, pp. lxxvi-lxxxvi for an exhaustive survey. 
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treatise, as the difference is often used as an organizing principle of discussion (e.g. begin by 
discussing differentia X as it is exhibited by water animals, then land animals), and many 
features and characteristics of animals vary with this difference (e.g. parts associated with 
locomotion, cooling of natural heat, modes of reproduction, etc.).
168
 
The discussion of water animals brings to light an important point that is perhaps not 
immediately obvious to the casual observer of the animal world: not all water animals take in and 
expel water in the manner that most land animals take in and expel air (though not even all of 
these do this). Rather, there are a great many animals that by Aristotle’s lights are rightly 
identified as water animals, though they do not take in water. At 487a16ff Aristotle distinguishes 
three different senses in which an animal may be water-dwelling: 
water-dwelling I (e.g. fish) 
 live in water (ton bion/tên diatribên poieitai en tô hugrô) 
 feed in water (tên trophên poieitai en tô hugrô) 
 take in/expel water (dechetai kai aphiêsi to hugron) 
 unable to live deprived of water ([tou hugrou] steriskomena ou  
dunatai zên) 
 (breed in water)169 
 
water-dwelling II (e.g. beaver, crocodile, plunger, water-snake) 
 live in water  
 feed in water 
                                                 
168 Examples include gills vs. lungs, fins vs. legs, swimming vs. walking, etc.  
169 I have included in parentheses features that are probably assumed present though 
unstated by Aristotle. 
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 take in/expel air 
 (able to live deprived of water) 
 breed on land  
 
water-dwelling III (sea-anemone, certain shellfish) 
 (live in water) 
 feed in water 
 take in/expel neither air nor water 
 unable to live deprived of water 
 (breed in water)170 
  
What is it that these animals share, that qualifies them all as water animals? Based on the 
lists above, living and feeding in the water are the features shared by all such creatures. They 
differ in regards to what they take in and expel (water, air, nothing), where they breed (in water, 
on land), and whether they are capable of living without water.
171
 The point of the analysis is to 
immediately remove the misconception that all water animals take in and expel water. What it is 
                                                 
170 All of these animals are, according to Aristotle, spontaneously generated in water. 
171 Presumably by being able or unable to live deprived of water, Aristotle is referring to 
whether the animal can live even for a relatively brief period of time away from the water. 
For example, the beaver and the crocodile, and even the dolphin, can live for sometime 
outside of the water, though ultimately their survival necessitates their return to the water, 
some sooner, others later. For Aristotle this feature cannot be reduced to taking in and 
expelling water, even though such animals cannot live deprived of it. This is because 
according to Aristotle some animals do not take in or expel anything and yet still cannot 
live for long deprived of water. Thus for them it is not the taking in and expelling of water 
that is key. Ultimately, however, the reason why both sorts of animals cannot live deprived 
of water is the same: they need water to cool their natural heat. Some animals accomplish 
this by taking in and expelling water, while others affect the cooling of their natural heat 
simply by being in contact with the water in their environments.  
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to be a water animal, in the most strict or governing sense, must not rely on this feature. 
Nonetheless here, as in the more detailed analysis in VII.2, Aristotle is keen to preserve the sense 
of enudros that includes taking in and expelling water. The reason, we learn in VII.2, is that 
taking in water for cooling seems to be the more natural condition of water animals. Aristotle 
describes those water animals that take in air as having a nature that has been “distorted” 
(589b29). In these cases some small change in a “source-like” part (archoeides, 590a4) causes 
the animal’s development to change from one side of the division to the other. In the case of 
these water animals that respire air, it is as if the creature begins as a land animal, but early in its 
development takes in matter from a watery environment. Since its feeding must ultimately 
correspond to the matter out of which it is formed (589a6), the animal develops into a “water” 
animal, in the sense that it must feed in the water, and thus live and spend most of its time in the 
water. However, its early beginnings as a land animal cause it to continue to respire air, as most 
land animals do. Thus these animals “tend to both sides” and are not easily categorized as solely 
land or water animals. What these water animals share with those that take in and expel water for 
cooling is that their bodily constitution or “blend” (krasis) is watery in nature, and requires that 
they feed and spend most of their time in the water. Aristotle will use the term enudros to refer to 
both types of water animals, admitting that a distinction needs to be recognized, but he refuses to 
restrict the term’s use. 
Aristotle notes that water animals that take in and expel air may be footed, winged, or 
footless (487a21ff.). Why? It may be simply to show the great variety in modes of locomotion 
exhibited by such animals, but it may also be to state firmly that there is no correlation between 
being a water animal in this sense and mode of locomotion. The casual observer may hold that 
being a water animal in the first sense (i.e. taking in and expelling water) is correlated with 
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swimming as a mode of locomotion. After all, this holds of all fishes, which are perhaps the 
prime example of such water animals. Aristotle may be intending to dispel the assumption that a 
single mode of locomotion always correlates with being a water animal. Whatever Aristotle’s 
point in doing so, it is of note that he makes explicit this lack of correlation, as identifying such 
instances of correlation (or lack thereof) is sometimes put forward as an important aim of HA. 
Here we find perhaps the first important instance of it; we will return to discuss the importance 
of this aim as we proceed. 
The brief analysis of land animal (chersaia) is geared towards making a similar point: not 
all land animals take in and expel air: some take in air and others take in nothing (though no land 
animal takes in water). Aristotle specifies that all land animals with lungs take in air, and though 
he does not elaborate the point here, this comment is fitting with an insight Aristotle is often at 
pains to emphasize. That is, in order to perform a given function, an animal needs the appropriate 
part or parts. Since the lung is the part by which animals take in and expel air, only animals that 
possess the lung do so. Thus any animal that does not possess the lung does not take in air, and 
the presence of a lung implies that the animal does take in air. 
While this point may seem obvious, Aristotle repeatedly invokes the principle when 
criticizing his predecessors’ accounts of animal parts and activities. For example, at GA III.5, 
756b4ff. he criticizes the view that female fish become impregnated by swallowing the milt from 
the male on the grounds that the anatomy of the fish is such that anything passing through the 
mouth arrives immediately in the stomach. How, Aristotle wonders, can the milt make its way to 
the female fish’s womb from the stomach? Similarly in Resp. 3 Aristotle dismisses the view that 
fish somehow take in air from the water through the mouth, and his argument is again based in 
part on the anatomy of the fish. In fact, Aristotle there asserts that his predecessors’ failure to 
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give a correct account of respiration (or its analogue in fish) is due to their inexperienced with or 
ignorance of (apeirous, 471b25) the fish’s internal parts, and their failure to ask what respiration 
is for when examining the parts.
172
  
 
monima/metablêtika 
The analysis of water animal and land animal is immediately followed by a discussion of 
the differences stationary (monima) and capable of movement (metablêtika). Aristotle 
immediately draws a connection between these differentiae: all stationary animals are water 
animals – none are land animals. But is there another reason why he turns to this set of 
differentiae next? It might be that the capacity for movement is a characteristic typically 
associated with animals, so that there may be some confusion regarding whether a living thing 
could be an animal and stationary.
173
 Aristotle himself expresses many reservations regarding 
whether such stationary living things are indeed animals (as opposed to plants), but that at least 
some of them are correctly so considered is, to Aristotle, clear, and thus treating this differentia 
first, or at least among the first, settles the question and clear the way for further investigation.
174
  
 Further, it is easy to see how many other features of an animal will depend upon its 
ability (or inability) to move about. This holds especially for the two classes of activity Aristotle 
later states to be the most prominent in animals: feeding and reproduction.
175
 A living thing that 
is unable to move about will be seriously constrained in the ways in which it can perform these 
activities. 
                                                 
172 On this see Lennox  
173 See HA VII.1, 588b12ff.; An. I.2, 403b26, 405b11; II.2, 413a24; III.3, 427a17.  
174 On this topic see Lloyd’s “Fuzzy Natures” in his 1996, ch. 3. 
175 See HA VII.1, 589a2ff. 
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We may now ask, in which category of differentia do these characteristics fall? Are they 
bioi, praxeis, or êthê? Or do they fall under more than one category? Or do they not fall neatly 
under any single category, but somehow affect all three? Prior to a more detailed examination of 
the books of HA that are devoted to these differentiae, it may be too soon to answer this question 
with great confidence. However, we may venture this much. It seems that the difference water 
animal vs. land animal is not itself a difference of activity, but rather one that plays a role in 
determining how certain activities are performed. If an animal lives and spends most of its time 
in the water, then its feeding, breeding, and cooling of natural heat will have to be adapted to that 
environment, even if living in the water does not alone determine how these activities are 
performed. Later, in VII.2, we are given a more detailed account of the relationship between an 
animal’s environment, material composition, and feeding habits, and thus a fuller picture of how 
being a water animal or land animal is related to the many activities an animal performs. Absent 
any fuller account of what Aristotle means by manner of life (and we find no such fuller account 
here in HA I.1-6), we may propose that by bios Aristotle does not intend any definite activity or 
set of activities. Rather an animal’s bios specifies some feature of the animal that plays a role in 
determining how its activities are performed.
176
 In the case of being a water animal, this feature 
is “living and spending one’s time in the water.” We might say the same thing about the 
difference of being stationary vs capable of motion: this difference will have an enormous impact 
on how an animal performs whatever activities are natural to it, but the characteristic does not 
itself seem to constitute an activity.   
                                                 
176 See Lennox 2010b, where he argues that bios is an “inherently relational” feature that 
ties “a variety of particular modes of activity of an animal to its overall way of interacting 
with its environment, organic and inorganic” (p. 243).  
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It should be noted that nowhere in this subsection does Aristotle explicitly relate the 
differentiae water/land animal or stationary/capable of movement to the characters exhibited by 
such animals, though character is included in the introductory sentence. Do we have any reason 
for thinking that e.g. being a water animal plays a decisive role in determining the characters 
exhibited by the animal? At this point, we must answer no: nothing in the preceding remarks 
suggests how being a water animal or being capable of movement might affect an animal’s 
character traits. One might speculate that the differentia monima, belonging as it does to 
relatively “incomplete” animals that show little in the way of cognitive capacity, is correlated 
with the near total absence of ethos, but little in the preceding passage leads the reader to make 
such a correlation, so that the appearance of the term ethos in the opening line of this section 
remains mysterious. As we shall see immediately below, the next subsection specifically leaves 
character out of the introductory statement, but many of the features discussed there do seem 
intimately connected to êthos. The import of this will be discussed below. 
4.2.2 Manner of life and activities (487b33-488b11) 
4.2.2.1 Summary 
The next set of differences discussed are “according to manners of life and activities.” 
Unlike the previous section these differences are not explicitly associated with character.  
First, Aristotle considers the different manners in which animals can live with and relate 
to one another – their social and political organization. Animals may live together, like herd-
animals (agelaia), or they may be solitary and live largely alone (monadika). Or, as a third 
option, they may “tend to both sides” (epamphoterizei), i.e. be herd-animals in certain aspects of 
their lives, but solitary in others. Further, animals may be political (politika), sharing some 
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common activity, or they may live scattered about (sporadika), largely unrelated to one another. 
Some political animals live under a leader (hêgemona), while others are ruler-less (anarcha). 
Among both animals that live with one another and those that live alone, some live in a single 
location/remain in one place (epidêmêtike), others change their location/are migratory 
(ektopistika).  
Next is a consideration of the feeding habits of animals, focused specifically on what 
kinds of food different animals eat.  Some are “flesh-eaters” (sarkophaga), others are “fruit-
eaters” (karpophaga), and others are “all-eaters” (pamphaga – “omnivorous”). Some animals 
have a diet that is unique or peculiar (idiotropha); for example bees primarily feed on honey, 
spiders on flies, and some animals on fish. The discussion then briefly turns from what different 
kinds of animals eat, to how they procure their food, and whether they store it or not. Some 
animals primarily hunt for their food (thêreutika); some keep food in store or reserve 
(thêsauristika), while others do not. 
Some animals live in a fixed dwelling or “house” (oikêtika), while others do not (aoika). 
Animals also differ according to the place (topos) where they typically live: some live in 
underground holes (trôglodutika), others live above ground (hupergeia). Some burrow holes 
themselves (trêmatôdê), others do not (atrêta). 
 The remaining differences discussed in this passage include: nocturnal vs. living in 
daylight (nukterobia/en tôi phôti zêi); tame vs. wild (hêmera/agria); capable of producing sound 
vs. mute (psophêtika/aphôna), and amongst these, having a voice (phônêenta) that is capable of 
articulate speech (dialekton echei) or inarticulate (agrammata); babbling or silent (kôtila/sigêla); 
musical/tuneful or not (ôidika/anôida); living in the country or mountains or near humans 
(agroika/oreia/sunanthrôrizei); libidinous vs. chaste (aphrodisiastika/agneutika); of animals that 
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live in the sea, living far out to sea vs. near the shore vs. on the rocks (pelagia/aigialôdê/petraia); 
quick to attack as a means of defense vs. cautiously defensive (amuntika/phulaktika). 
4.2.2.2 Analysis 
More so than the previous section, which focused on two sets of differentiae, this section 
is characterized by the introduction of a multitude of differentiae, some more closely related than 
others. The focus is on presenting a number of alternative differentiae (often divided 
dichotomously) and providing examples of animals that possess them. A few instances of 
correlations among differentiae are noted, and in a few instances additional attention is paid to 
explicating the meaning of the terms. As in the first section, the differentiae are offered as 
divisions of some higher genus, but the higher genus is often not named explicitly, and the 
dividing of any given genus typically does not continue beyond a single level of division. 
 For example, the first set of differentiae all have to do with what we might call the 
political or social organization of animals. Aristotle presents the following divisions:
177
 
 
Figure 1: Political and social organization of animals 
                                                 
177 Discuss emendation to text regarding agelaia kai monadika. 
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Aristotle provides a number of examples of animals that exhibit each differentia,
178
 but 
provides few correlations among them beyond those expressed in the divisions. As an exception, 
he notes that the distinction agelaia/monadika applies equally to footed, winged, and swimming 
animals. The mention of modes of locomotion here may be to emphasize that these differences in 
social organization apply throughout the animal world (“air, land, and sea”, as it were), a point 
that may not be appreciated by someone relatively unfamiliar with the animal world. 
The discussion turns immediately from social/political organization to differences in diet 
and acquisition of food. The relationship between these two discussions is not expounded upon 
here in HA, but a discussion in Pol. does expound upon the connection:  
 
[5] But in fact there are many forms of food, which is why there are also many ways 
of life that belong to animals as well as human beings. For it is not possible to live 
without food, so that the differences among foods have produced differences 
among animals. for some of the beasts are in herds, and others scattered, 
whichever way gives an advantage for their food, since some of them are 
carnivorous, others herbivorous, and others omnivorous. So it is for convenience 
and selectivity that nature has made their ways of life distinct, and since the same 
things are not pleasing to each but different things to different kinds, ways of life 
among carnivorous and herbivorous animals themselves are divergent from one 
another.  (Pol. I.8, 1256a19-29, tr. Sachs) 
                                                 
178 E.g. agelaia: pigeons, cranes, many kinds of fish; politika: humans, bees, cranes; huph’ 
hegemona: cranes, bees; anarcha: ants 
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1256a19     ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τρο- 
φῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ 
τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. 
τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν, 
ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν 
a25  ζῳοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, 
ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥᾳστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς  
βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐ ταὐτὸ ἑκάστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζῳοφάγων καὶ τῶν 
καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν· 
 
In this passage we find many of the differentiae discussed in the HA passage,
179
 but their 
relationship is here, in Pol., explicitly laid out in causal terms:
180
 the social and political 
organizations of animals (which Aristotle here associates with their bios) vary based on their 
diets and their ability to obtain their food, and in fact, these social and political organizations 
                                                 
179
 In the HA passage, agelaia is contrasted with monadika, and politika and sporadika are 
offered as further divisions of agelaia, while in the Pol. passage, agelaia is immediately 
contrasted with sporadika. This suggests that the divisions in the HA passage are more precise or 
better informed, recognizing that herd animals (agelaia) may nonetheless live “spread-out” 
(sporadika). See Balme (forthcoming). 
180 It is important to keep in mind that Pol. is a treatise aimed at providing the causes of 
political phenomena, while the HA carefully avoids presenting information couched in 
causal language. That is not to say that such causal knowledge was unknown at the time of 
HA’s composition, but that if it was known, it was purposefully withheld. But the 
correlation in HA of attributes that are causally related elsewhere suggests that such causal 
knowledge is not far in the background. 
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appear to be for the sake of obtaining food more easily. It is the animal’s distinctive diet that is 
explanatory (or at least partially so) of the aspects of the animal’s bios relating to social and 
political organization. While the discussion of water and land animals above suggested that an 
animal’s bios is in some sense explanatory of the various activities performed by the animal, here 
diet is explanatory of bios. But under which category of differentia does diet fall? As with 
water/land animal, it seems that being a fruit-eater or an all-eater does not designate a particular 
activity, but rather specifies an aspect of the animal’s manner of life that will be determinative of 
at least some of the animal’s activities and, as the Pol. passage has it, some other aspects of the 
animal’s manner of life. Thus diet would fall under bios and, in this case, affect other aspects of 
bios as well. 
A passage from Pol. may also help explain why differentiae related to voice appear in the 
HA passage under consideration. At Pol. I.2, 1253a7-18 Aristotle states: 
 
[6] Why a human being is a political animal, more than every sort of bee and every 
sort of herd animal, is clear. For nature, as we claim, does nothing in vain, and a 
human being, alone among the animals, has speech. And while the voice is a sign 
of pain and pleasure, and belongs also to the other animals on that account (since 
their nature goes this far, to have a perception of pain and pleasure and 
communicating these to one another), speech is for disclosing what is 
advantageous and what is harmful, and so too what is just and what is unjust. For 
this is distinctive of human beings in relation to the other animals, to be alone in 
having a perception of good and bad, just and unjust, and the rest, and it is an 
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association involving there things that makes a household a city (Pol. I.2, 1253a7-
18, tr. Sachs, modified) 
 
1253a7    διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, 
δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον 
a10  δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ  
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπ- 
άρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ @1 
ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν 
ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ 
a15  τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ 
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ 
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν 
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. 
 
However, in this case the relation between the differentiae is less clear. While voice is 
useful for humans because they possess logos, and are thus able to communicate with one 
another in the service of creating political communities grounded in the good and the just, 
animals, due to their more limited cognitive abilities, are capable of using their voice only to 
express pain and pleasure. Thus it is not clear whether or how possessing a voice might 
significantly affect an animal’s social or political organization. Later in HA, Aristotle states that 
the social/ political organization of the family (found, to one degree or another, in many animals) 
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is grounded in the increased cognitive abilities found in those animals (namely, their increased 
power of memory).
181
 Thus the introduction of the differentiae pertaining to social and political 
organization may presage those of voice, but the relation seems weak. 
Of the remaining differentiae in this section, one may speculate regarding similar 
connections between them (environment of habitation, frequency of copulation, tendencies to 
attack in defense), but the emphasis of the passage does not seems to be on identifying such 
connections, but rather on simply offering a number of examples of different, related features 
exhibited by animals. Recall that the introductory sentence of this subsection explicitly 
mentioned manner of life and activity, but did not mention character. Can we detect anything in 
this discussion that suggests that the differentiae discussed here are less related to character than 
those in the first subsection? Again, we are hampered in answering this question by the unclarity 
surrounding these terms, whose meanings, at a higher or more general level, seem clear enough, 
but whose differences are not obvious. It must be admitted that the many differentiae discussed 
in this subsection seem to be just as related to an animal’s character as those in the first 
subsection, and, if anything, many appear more related. For example, the differentiae related to 
social and political organization would seem to bear directly on animals’ characters (as different 
social organizations would seem to demand certain character traits). Some of the differentiae 
discussed in this section, such as tame and wild, are specifically mentioned both in the next 
subsection and in book VIII (both of which are explicitly related to character). Even though 
questions remain, it appears more and more likely that we should not read too deeply into the 
absence of êthos in the introductory sentence to this subsection (nor, for that matter, into the 
presence of ethos in the preceding section, nor the absence of praxis from the concluding 
                                                 
181 VII.1, 588b30ff. 
 146 
sentence of the entire section). That being said, it does appear that the absence of bios and praxis 
from the introductory sentence of the next subsection is meaningful, in so far as the differentiae 
there described all seem especially relevant to êthos. 
4.2.3 Character (488b12-28) 
4.2.3.1 Summary 
According to the introductory sentence to this subsection, the final set of differences 
pertains to character alone. Typically two or three character traits are presented in a group, 
together with an example of an animal that exhibits the traits. Often the groups of character traits 
are presented as if they are opposed to one another, with the first group in some sense opposed to 
the next. The groups of character traits, with the example animals, are: 
 
Character trait      Animals   
gentle, melancholy, and not adversarial   ox 
(praa, dusthuma, ouk enstatika,) 
 
fierce, adversarial, and stubborn/ignorant   wild boar 
(thumôdê, enstatika, amathê) 
 
prudent and cowardly     deer and hare 
(phronima, deila) 
 
mean and scheming      serpents 
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(analeuthera, epiboula) 
 
noble, brave, and well-born     lion 
(eleutheria, andreia, eugenê) 
 
thoroughbred, wild, and scheming    wolf 
(gennaia, agria, epiboula) 
 
villainous and wicked     fox 
(panourga, kakourga); 
 
spirited, loving, and fawning     dog 
(thumika, philêtika, thôpeutika); 
 
gentle and easily-tamed     elephant 
(praa, tithasseutika); 
 
bashful and cautious      goose 
(aischuntêla, phulaktika) 
 
jealous and vain      peacock 
(phthonera, philokaka). 
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It is specified that humans are the only deliberative (bouleutikon) animals and that many 
other animals exhibit memory (mnêmê) and teaching (didachê), but only humans have the ability 
to recollect (anamimnêskesthai).
182
 
The section ends with a concluding statement that the characters and manners of life of 
each kind (of animal?) will be discussed in more detail later. 
4.2.3.2 Analysis 
More so than the previous subsections, this discussion of character is very sparse, limited 
almost exclusively to offering examples of character traits and animals that exhibit them. 
Nevertheless certain questions may be raised. 
Does Aristotle suggest that these groups of character traits always appear together? Or, 
more generally, what is the relation between the character traits that are presented together? Most 
of these traits seem to be of a piece with one another, but presumably the various traits are not 
offered as synonyms but rather as distinct aspects of character. Is it that the animals offered as 
examples just happen to exhibit the group of traits? Or is there some underlying common cause 
that renders it more likely that an animal exhibiting one trait also exhibits the other? 
Presumably most of the traits mentioned apply to humans as well as animals, but 
Aristotle’s presentation suggests that the character traits are indicative of the animal kinds listed, 
such that all animals of the kind exhibit the traits. And indeed, Aristotle’s discussion, in NE 
VI.13 (1044b1-16), of the “natural virtues” suggests that in both humans and many animals183 
                                                 
182 See DA II.3, 415a1ff, III.11, 434a4; Mem. 1, 450a14ff., 2, 453a6; Metaph. A.1, 980a29; NE 
I.7, 1098a3ff., VI.13, 1144b1-16. 
183 I say “many animals” rather than “all animals” since the extremely limited cognitive 
capacities of some animals render the appearance of such natural virtues either 
indiscernible or totally absent. See HA VII.1, 588a16-b3.  
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there exist certain dispositions to act, react, and feel in characteristic ways by nature, i.e. in ways 
that are not learned or habituated.
184
 In humans, these dispositions can become virtues (or 
vices!), based on the development and proper use of practical judgment, a characteristically 
human cognitive capacity, which is lacking in other animals.
185
 Thus in other animals they 
cannot be “perfected” (or ruined!), and remain (at least for the most part)186 as they are. This 
being the case, different kids of animals reliably exhibit these different traits of character, thus 
allowing for a scientific study of êthos in animals. Aristotle’s intention here is to show that 
animals do indeed exhibit a great variety of character traits, perhaps more so than the 
inexperienced observer of animals would expect, and in such a manner as to render them viable 
subjects of scientific study. 
4.3 MOST NECESSARY PARTS OF ANIMALS (488B29-489A34) 
4.3.1 Summary 
The treatise now turns from the discussion of bios, praxis, and êthos back to the parts of 
animals. The focus, as Aristotle later summarizes, is on the “most necessary” parts (anagkaiotata 
moria, 489a15). 
                                                 
184 See Lennox 1999, Leunissen 2013. 
185 Though practical judgment too has its analog in the animal world: cleverness (deinotês). 
See NE VI.13, 1044b15, Lennox 1999, pp. 12-6.  
186 Aristotle does allow that some kinds of animals may be habituated in certain limited 
ways, but lacking any notion of “the good,” and the related cognitive capacities that allow 
one to direct one’s actions towards the good, such habituation does not result in virtue.  
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The first group of parts, which all animals have in common, include that part by which 
food is taken in (mouth, stoma), and the part into which food is taken (stomach/belly/gut, koilia). 
Next are parts that most animals possess. These include the parts by which residue is discharged 
(unnamed), and those into which residue is received. Fluid residue is received by the bladder 
(kustis), solid residue by the stomach/gut/belly (koilia). Finally, most animals have parts by 
which sperma is emitted. These parts go unnamed here, but Aristotle draws the distinction 
between animals that emit sperma into themselves (females) and those that emit into another 
(male).
187
  
The discussion of “most necessary” parts continues with a discussion of the parts related 
to the faculty of touch – the single faculty of sensation shared by all animals. After stating that 
the part in which the faculty is located has no single name common to all animals, and that in 
some animals the part is the same while in others it is analogous, Aristotle turns to a discussion 
of the fluids present in animals (e.g. blood) and the associated parts that act as containers for the 
fluid (e.g. blood vessel). The connection between the discussions follows immediately: touch 
comes about in a uniform part that is well-supplied with whatever fluid is present in the animal. 
In blooded animals this is the flesh (sarx); in others it is the analogous uniform part. This leads to 
the distinction between blooded (enaima) and bloodless (anaima) animals. 
4.3.2 Analysis 
Although Aristotle ultimately refers to the parts in question in this section as the “most 
necessary parts,” he begins by merely noting which parts are “common” (koina) to all or most 
                                                 
187 On which see GA I.2, 716a17-24. 
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animals. He isolates these parts by identifying the functions or activities they perform, and 
indeed the activities discussed (nutrition, generation, sensation) are among the most vital 
performed by animals.
188
 This suggests that the commonality of these parts is grounded in their 
corresponding vital functions, as is their status as “most necessary. 
What is interesting about this manner of presentation is that the subsequent treatment of 
the parts of animals in books I-IV does not use commonality, strictly speaking, as a principle of 
organization, nor vital function. Rather Aristotle uses the human body
189
 to develop a basic 
framework of parts (for the external parts, these include the head, neck, torso, are limbs) that are 
then used to analyze the bodies and parts of other animals (e.g. other animals share these parts, 
lack some of these parts, have analogous parts, etc.). Mention is not made regarding how just 
these parts are identified for use in this framework, but the sense is that, for the external parts at 
least, the ones identified stand out to perception as being unified wholes in humans, without 
reference to the functions they perform being necessary.  
The issue is of significance given the explanatory relationship that holds between a part 
and its corresponding function. As discussed at length in PA I, a part is generally present in an 
animal for the sake of the function it performs, such that the function explains the presence of the 
part.
190
 Descriptions of parts that make reference to the functions they perform would therefore, 
at the least, gesture towards the explanations of why such parts are differentiated as they are (i.e. 
due to difference in function). To a large extent, the discussions of parts in HA are not centered 
                                                 
188 VII.1 on nutrition and generation; sensation as common to all animals.  
189 And indeed moves from top to bottom, beginning with the head. A similar order is found 
in the treatment of parts in PA. 
190 However, some of the attributes associated with parts may not be for the sake of 
anything, e.g. color of eyes, hair, etc. See GA V for a discussion of such pathêma (GA V.1, 
778a16).  
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around the functions they perform,
191
 nor is reference often made to these functions, such that 
most of these discussions do not carry with them this sort of hint at explanation. Why then does 
the tupos proceed in this manner?  
At issue is whether the introduction to the discussion of parts should proceed in a 
different manner than the main body of that discussion, and if so, why. As discussed above, the 
goal of this section is to introduce the reader to the most common parts shared by animals (either 
all or most), and these are the parts that fulfill the most common (indeed most necessary) 
functions in an animal’s life. The alternate method of presentation, the one followed by the body 
of the treatise, is to set up a model, as it were, of the parts of animals, and compare various kinds 
of animals to this model, noting where they are similar and where different. The power of this 
alternate method lies in either the familiarity the reader/student has of the model, or in the 
model’s broad applicability to a wide range of animals. In the first case, the familiarity with the 
model serves to lead the reader/student from what is well-known, to what is less well-known, a 
common and effective means of teaching; while in the second case, the wide applicability of the 
model renders it a good example of how animal bodies are generally structured, and thus serves 
to indicate which parts they generally have. The method followed here in the tupos (viz. 
beginning with vital activities/functions) in effect provides a sort of justification of explanation 
of why the model used in the alternate method is structured as it is, or includes the parts that it 
does.  
Similar lists of the most necessary or common parts of animals appear elsewhere in the 
corpus.  At PA II.10 Aristotle states: 
                                                 
191 And indeed Aristotle often seems to consciously avoid references to function, e.g. 
avoiding words like “respiration” that might imply function, and preferring instead 
locutions such as “taking in and expelling.” 
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[7] Two most necessary (anagkaiotata) parts possessed by all complete animals are, 
first, that by which they take in nutriment and, second, that by which residue is 
emitted; for it is not possible to exist or to grow without nutriment . . . A third part 
in all [animals] is the part between those two, in which is the source of life (archê 
. . . tês zôês). (PA II.10, 655b29-32, 36-7) 
 
655b29      Πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις τοῖς τε- 
λείοις δύο τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα μόριά ἐστιν, ᾗ τε δέχονται  
τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ᾗ τὸ περίττωμα ἀφήσουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ εἶναι 
οὔτε αὐξάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τροφῆς . . . 
b36   . . . Τρίτον δὲ μέρος ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι τὸ τούτων μέσον, 
ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀρχή ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς. 
 
And in Juv. 2 we find: 
 
[8] There being three parts into which all complete animals are divided, one is that by 
which nutriment is taken in, another is that by which residue is excreted, and the 
third is between these. In the largest animals this is called the chest, in the others 
it is the analogue, being better distinguished in some rather than others. (Juv. 2, 
468a13-7) 
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468a13 Τριῶν δὲ μερῶν ὄντων εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται πάντα τὰ τέ- 
λεια τῶν ζῴων, ἑνὸς μὲν ᾗ δέχεται τὴν τροφήν, ἑνὸς δ’ ᾗ 
a15  τὸ περίττωμα προΐεται, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ μέσου τούτων, τοῦτο ἐν  
μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν ζῴων καλεῖται στῆθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλ- 
λοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, διήρθρωται δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέροις ἑτέρων. 
 
The HA passage differs from these in so far as (1) it specifies not only the part by which 
nutriment is taken in, but also the part into which it is taken; (2) it points out that not all animals 
possess a part by which residue is expelled; and (3) it fails to list the part between these two parts 
as a most necessary part. Regarding (1), HA is more precise in specifying that all animals have 
both a part by which nutriment is taken in (mouth) and into which it is taken (stomach), but the 
sense from passages [7] and [8] is that the parts are being identified in order to provide a basic 
division of the animal body, and thus are not meant to be exhaustive. Regarding (2), the fact that 
some animals do not emit residue is mentioned also in PA (e.g. 681a32), and thus was not 
unknown to Aristotle at the time of its composition. Rather, the emphasis in [7] (as well as [8]), 
is on complete animals, something that the animals lacking a part to emit residue definitively are 
not.
192
 Regarding (3), it is curious that the HA passage does not include a reference to the main 
body of the animal or, more precisely, the region containing the heart (which is the “source of 
life” referred to in the PA passage). Balme suggests that this is in keeping with HA’s avowed pre-
causal, pre-explanatory aims,
193
 however it seems more likely that, in [7] and [8], Aristotle is in 
effect dividing the entire bulk of an animal’s body into three parts (i.e. the end in which food is 
                                                 
192 In fact, the animal in question at 681a32, the ascidian, is called “plant-like” (phutô 
paraplêsion) by Aristotle there, such that there is some doubt whether it is an animal at all. 
193 Balme (forthcoming). 
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taken in, the end in which residue is expelled, and that which comes in between), while in the HA 
passage he is picking out certain, distinct parts that are most common. This would also explain 
the absence of reference to the generative parts in [7] and [8], which are mentioned in the HA 
passage. These parts are clearly present in all “complete” animals, but do not occupy a 
significant portion of the animal body. 
Following the brief discussion of generative parts, Aristotle appears to conclude the 
discussion of the most necessary parts with the summarizing statement: “Thus as many of the 
parts that are most necessary for animals, those that all (animals) happen to have, and those that 
most do, are these” (489a16). However, immediately following is a discussion of touch – the 
faculty of sensation that is common to all animals – and the statement that the part in which the 
faculty of touch resides is unnamed, being the same part in some animals, but analogous in 
others. Since the faculty is present in all animals, there must be a part in which the faculty 
resides,
194
 and that part, named or not, would appear to be a most necessary part. Similarly for 
the discussion of fluid and the parts associated with fluid that immediately comes nest: all 
animals contain fluid, and thus, according to Aristotle, all animals have parts to contain the fluid, 
whether it is blood and blood vessels or their analogues. These too seem to be most necessary 
parts. We immediately see the relationship between the discussions of the faculty of touch and 
the fluid parts: touch, Aristotle states, resides in a uniform part that is typically well-supplied 
with fluid (e.g. flesh, which is well-supplied with blood).  
The discussion of fluid leads to the final observation regarding most necessary parts, 
namely that some animals are blooded while others are bloodless. Being “bloodless” according 
                                                 
194 Though, infamously, Aristotle holds that nous does not reside in a part. See DA III.4, 
429a25.  
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to Aristotle means possessing a fluid part that is other than, though analogous to, blood. Thus we 
need not take the differentia bloodless as merely a privation. This distinction is perhaps the most 
important for Aristotle’s biology, and typically is used as a high-level organizing principle in 
discussions of animals. Aristotle specifies that all footless, two-footed, of four-footed animals are 
blooded, while all many-footed animals are bloodless. This correlation, which suggests an 
underlying causal relationship, is expounded upon elsewhere in the corpus.
195
 
4.4 MODES OF REPRODUCTION (489A34-B18) 
4.4.1 Summary 
The discussion now turns to the differences animals exhibit with regard to generation and 
reproduction. The primary divisions introduced are live-bearing (zôotoka), egg-bearing (ôotoka), 
and larva-bearing (skôlêkotoka). It is noted that some live-bearing animals are internally egg-
bearing, while others are internally live-bearing. The differences between an egg (ôon) and a 
larva (skôlêx) are discussed, as well as differences between eggs of different kinds of animals. 
The stretch of text ends with the following passage: “But about these things we shall speak later 
with precision in the writings on generation (en tois peri geneseôs)” (489b18). Examples of 
animals that exhibit each of the characteristics discussed are provided. 
                                                 
195 IA 1, 5, 16, etc.  
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4.4.2 Analysis 
Of the three primary modes of reproduction (live-bearing, egg-bearing, and larva-
bearing) live-bearing and egg-bearing take on the greatest significance, both in HA and 
elsewhere in the biology. (This is perhaps because relatively few animals are larva-bearing).  
The examples Aristotle provides of animals that are live-bearing animals are interesting. 
First, he divides the examples between land-dwelling and water-dwelling animals, and second 
the land-dwelling examples include not only certain specific animal kinds (e.g. human, horse, 
seal), but also animals marked off by possessing a certain trait – in this case, possessing hair. 
This correlation is perhaps meant to suggest a causal relationship, or perhaps an underlying 
common cause. 
 In addition to describing them, Aristotle also provides certain differentia applicable to 
egg or larva: eggs are potshard-skinned (ostrakoderma) or may have soft skin (malakoderma),
196
 
and their contents may be of one color or two; some larva are able to move (kinêtikos) straight 
away, others are not. 
The concluding statement in this section – that these matters will be discussed later with 
precision in the works on generation – does not make clear whether the reference is to the further 
discussions of reproduction in HA or to the explanatory treatise GA.
197
 This brief discussion of 
the modes of reproduction in animals does not do justice to the especially rich discussions of 
reproduction and generation in books V, VI, and IX. In those books we find extended discussions 
                                                 
196 Note that these adjectives are closely related to the descriptive names Aristotle gives to 
two of the bloodless megista genê of animals, namely the ostrakoderma and the malakia. 
197 Generally the discussion is related more closely to GA I.1-15. 
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of mating habits, seasons of breeding, brood care, modes of copulation, etc., as well as much 
more detailed discussions of eggs and the formation of embryos in eggs. 
4.5 PARTS RELATED TO LOCOMOTION (489B19-490B6) 
4.5.1 Summary 
The discussion next turns to the different parts associated with differing modes of animal 
locomotion. The information is presented as if derived from a set of divisions. The broad 
organization is around three primary modes of locomotion: moving on land, swimming, and 
flying, and each of these is then divided according to the parts that the corresponding animals 
possess: 
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Figure 2: Parts associated with locomotion 
 
Again, specific kinds of animals that exhibit the features discussed are offered as 
examples. Some additional correlations are provided, e.g. all blooded fliers have either feather or 
skin wings, only bloodless fliers have membrane wings; skin-winged bloodless fliers with four 
wings either are large or have a sting at the rear, those with two wings either are small or have a 
sting in the front. The end of the passage offers some general remarks on animal locomotion, 
namely that all animals move with four or more points of motion, and that all move “diagonally” 
(kata diametron). 
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4.5.2 Analysis 
This section, focused as it is on the parts associated with a function or activity that is 
“vital” for most animals (though, as the earlier discussion of monima exhibited, not all), fits well 
with the earlier discussion of the “most necessary” parts, and continues the pattern of using a 
vital function to introduce certain parts. The emphasis is on the kinds and number of parts 
animals use in the service of locomotion, and how for each mode of locomotion, the number of 
such parts can differ among animals kinds. Certain key features of animal locomotion that are 
expounded upon in IA are offered here (all animals, regardless of the number of limbs or parts 
associated with locomotion they possess, move with at least four points of motion, blooded with 
four, bloodless with more; all footed animals move diagonally). The purpose is perhaps to show 
that even animals that share a common mode of locomotion may possess different parts(or at 
least, different numbers of parts) to do so. 
4.6 MEGISTA GENÊ (490B7-491A6) 
In this important chapter Aristotle discusses the “very large kinds” (megista genê) into 
which most animals may be classified. The argument presented in the passage is difficult to 
follow, and its conclusion is debated.
 198
 I have included my own close analysis of the passage in 
appendix 3 below. In summary, I argue that the passage (1) introduces the megista genê and 
provides examples to help the reader identify just which animals are being referred to; (2) argues 
                                                 
198 See Gotthelf 2012c, Stoyles 2012. 
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that there are no further very large kinds, and explicitly excludes four-footed live-bearing 
animals, a group commonly identified by scholars as an Aristotelian megiston genos. The 
argument is meant to show that the animals that would be grouped into the putative very large 
kind would exhibit differences that are too divergent, failing a standard (laid out in PA I.4, of 
forms of a kind being not too far apart. This in turn points to the purpose of discussing the 
megista genê here in the tupos, namely that the commonality exhibited by the differing forms of 
animals under a single megiston genos allows us to speak of those forms of animals at that 
higher, genos-level, and thus to avoid being unnecessarily repetitious in the presentation. 
4.7 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION (491A7-14)  
Following the discussion of the megista gene, Aristotle concludes the introductory tupos 
with a reflection on the methodology that is to be used in the rest of the treatise. It is perhaps the 
most important such passage in the entire work. In the first chapter of the dissertation I briefly 
discussed this passage in order to bring to light certain “clues” it provides regarding the purpose 
and methodology of a historia that were then used to develop the notion of historia based on 
passages from other treatises in the corpus.  In what follows below, I provide a closer 
interpretation of the passage itself. 
In its entirety, the passage reads as follows:  
 
[9] (1) These things have now been said in this way as an outline, for the sake of a 
taste of what sort and how many things must be studied; (2) we shall speak with 
precision later, in order that we should first grasp the existing differences and 
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attributes for all. (3) After this we must attempt to discover the causes of these; 
(4) for this is the natural way to conduct the investigation, there being a historia 
regarding each thing. (5) For both the about-which-things and the from-which-
things that demonstration must be comes to be clear from these things. 
 
491a7  (1) Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· δι’ 
ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, (2) ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας   
a10  διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν. (3) Μετὰ δὲ 
τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. (4) Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς 
περὶ ἕκαστον· (5) περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπό-    
δειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. 
 
A number of points are made in this passage, some of which are obscured by the use of 
pronouns whose antecedents are not immediately clear. I have divided the passage into five parts, 
each of which I analyze below. 
 
(1) These things have now been said in this way as an outline, for the sake of a 
taste of what sort and how many things must be studied; 
 
491a7  Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· 
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The sense in which the preceding discussion acts as a tupos of the treatise that follows, 
and the precise sense we can associate with touton ton tropon, is the subject of this chapter, and 
concluding reflections on this matter are offered below. The use of the genitive hosôn and 
accusative hosa with peri in a8 indicates that the preceding discussion has touched on both the 
number of different topics and the kinds of things to be discussed,
199
 and is probably meant to 
convey the completeness of the tupos.  
 
(2) we shall speak with precision later, in order that we should first grasp the 
existing differences and attributes for all. 
 
δι’ 
491a9  ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας   
  διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν.  
 
The reference to speaking with “precision” (akribeia) later indicates that, in any event, 
the foregoing discussion has been less precise than what will follow. This may include providing 
greater detail, making fine-grain distinctions, treating a wider range of subjects, etc. The goal of 
these later, more precise discussions will be to “grasp the existing differences and attributes for 
all”, but “all” what? Presumably all animals: the goal (or perhaps a goal) of the historia is to 
                                                 
199 Smyth, 1693.1.b, 3.b. 
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catalogue, as it were, all the attributes and differences exhibited by animals.
200
 The explicit 
mention of both diaphora and sumbebêkota may be to emphasize that the historia is not only 
concerned with the differences between animals, but also, more generally, with the features that 
animals exhibit. This may especially be the case if, by diaphora, Aristotle means (or “hears”) 
something like specific difference, i.e. the difference that marks off an eidos from a genos. While 
such differences may be of interest, they are not the sole focus of the enterprise. Indeed, if the 
line of interpretation that holds that Aristotle is not interested in forming a classification of 
animals in HA (one that I traced back to Balme in ch. 1, and that I seek to align myself with) then 
this technical sense of diaphora is not at work here.  
What’s the force of the participle huparchousas in the phrase tas huparchousas 
diaphoras? The emphasis seems to be on the actual differences that animals are observed to 
exhibit. For example, not only should we note that birds possess beaks, but also that beaks 
themselves are differentiated in many ways (long, short, straight, curved, etc.) since the actual 
beaks that birds possess come in these varieties. The later, more detailed discussion should 
provide us with a grasp of the full range and variety of differences exhibited in the animal world. 
What sort of cognitive state is implied by “grasping” (lambanein)? Given that in (3) there 
is mention of attempting to discover causes later, Aristotle presumably means by “grasping” a 
“knowing that” rather than a “knowing why”, but exactly what does this amount to? Further, 
what is it that is “grasped”? Is it the fact that certain animals possess certain attributes? Or, does 
a full survey of the range of differences exhibited by e.g. a certain kind of part provide us with a 
                                                 
200 Is there a difference between grasping (i) all the attributes and differences of animals 
and (ii) the attributes and differences of all animals? Reading (i) puts the emphasis on the 
attributes and differences, while (ii) puts the emphasis on the animals (i.e. the different 
kinds of animals). As such I favor (i), but beyond a difference in emphasis, I’m not sure 
there is a real difference in extension.  
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fuller, better, “grasp” of the part itself, i.e. an understanding of just what each part is, apart from 
knowing which animal’s possess the part? The latter seems to be correct, since, as Balme 
memorably stated, the animals appear to be “called in as witnesses” to the differentiae. The 
predication of the difference to the animal appears to be of secondary concern compared to the 
elucidation of just what the difference is, and mention of the animal seems to be in the service of 
this latter concern. 
 
(3) After this we must attempt to discover the causes of these;  
 
491a10      Μετὰ δὲ  
τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. 
 
This methodological recommendation – first establish the facts, then discover the causes 
– is repeated in various forms throughout the corpus , and is discussed at some length in the first 
chapter of the dissertation. The antecedent of toutôn at 491a11 is presumably the differences and 
attributes, such that the investigation is into the causes of these differences and attributes. Again, 
the emphasis of the historia is on the differentiae, not the animals that exhibit them. 
 
(4) for this is the natural way to conduct the investigation, there being a historia 
regarding each thing.  
 
491a11      Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς 
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περὶ ἕκαστον· 
 
The point here is not that this method of investigation is specific to the study of nature, 
but rather that it is the proper or fitting way to conduct an investigation, whether it is about 
nature or not. 
The sense of the genitive absolute clause with huparchousês is this: “when” or “in the 
case that” a historia about each is completed (i.e. is there before us), then and only then is it 
fitting to attempt to seek out the causes. But what is the antecedent of hekaston in a13 – a 
historia about each what? One is tempted to supply “animal” here. Afterall the treatise is a 
historia peri zôôn, but of course the word “animal” does not appear anywhere in the passage. 
The emphasis on attributes earlier in the passage may indicate that the antecedent should be ta 
diaphora kai ta sumbebêkota. But, as I discussed earlier, the differences between a historia of 
animals, and one of their attributes, begins to break down when we consider that when one 
studies animals, what one is primarily concerned with is the attributes exhibited by those 
animals. 
 
(5) For both the about-which-things and the from-which-things that demonstration 
must be comes to be clear from these things. 
 
491a13  περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπό- 
δειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. 
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The language here, as has been often pointed out,
201
 is that of the Analytics. Apodeixis is 
of course Aristotle’s term for “demonstration” or “scientific demonstration”. The peri hôn or 
“about which things” are the conclusions of demonstration, and the ex hôn, or “from which 
things” are the premises. Both “come to be clear from these things” – that is, from our grasp of 
the attributes belonging to animals, or in other words, from the historia. In order to explain why 
a given animal possesses a given attribute (a fact that is established in the historia), we must 
identify the causal feature belonging to that animal that is responsible for the presence of that 
attribute. But, according to this passage, establishing the presence of that causal feature itself will 
be accomplished in the historia, in so far as the historia provides us with the premises. But as is 
well known, the premises of an apodeictic demonstration are themselves indemonstrable; they 
are the “unmiddled” propositions that form the archai of a science. The most important of these 
are the definitional propositions that state the essence of a subject or predicate: in this sense 
apodeixis is “essence invoking”. 
Readers of the Analytics are well-familiar with the many difficulties involved in 
Aristotle’s discussions of exactly how we come to know the archai of a science. What’s 
interesting here is that Aristotle draws no distinction between our coming to know the fact that a 
given conclusion holds prior to knowing the reason why (the hoti before the dioti) and our 
coming to know the archai or premises of a demonstration. Perhaps we come to know that such a 
fact holds prior to knowing that it is an archê – we grasp the fact of the premise without knowing 
that it functions as a premise or a conclusion. 
                                                 
201 See e.g. Kullmann 1974, p. 261ff., 2007, p. 197; Lennox 1991, p. 45. See also Barnes 
1993, pp. xix-xx for a more cautious view.  
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4.8 CONCLUSION 
We are now in a better position to understand just what Aristotle means when he writes, 
in the methodological passage in I.6, that “these things have been said in this way as an outline.” 
The forgoing has shown that the tupos does provide an outline of sorts of the material that 
follows in the rest of the treatise. This is especially true of I.1, which discussed all four major 
forms of differentia to be treated, and to a degree tracks the discussions in the ensuing books. 
Further, the examples of actual differentiae that are given in each category match up well with 
those discussed in the main body of the treatise. Occasionally Aristotle mentions differences that 
are not subsequently discussed, but this is more the exception than the rule. More often we find 
simply a briefer treatment of topics that are expounded upon “with precision” later, as with e.g. 
the corresponding discussions of water and land animals in I.1 and VII.2. 
The discussion of the “most necessary parts” that follows the survey of differentiae in I.1 
serves to introduce the reader to those parts that are most commonly found across the animal 
world, and the use of vital function or activity to introduce these parts gestures towards the 
explanatory relationship that holds between parts and activities. In this way the reader is 
provided with a sense not only of which parts are typically found, but also why these parts are 
shared by so many different kinds of animals. Though this does not strictly serve the purposes of 
the historia, in so far as it goes beyond collecting, organizing, and elucidating the data pertaining 
to the parts of animals, as a method of introduction it better situates and prepares the reader for 
the many details that follow.  
The brief discussion of the differentia associated with generation and reproduction 
interrupts, as it were, the discussion of parts that are commonly found in animals, as immediately 
following it is the discussion of the parts resumes with those associated with locomotion – 
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another vital activity that is shared by most animals. One might have expected here a discussion 
of the parts associated with reproduction, but what we get instead is only the briefest of 
summaries of the primary differentia associated with reproduction (e.g. live-bearing, egg-
bearing, larva-bearing).  The importance, however, of generation and reproductive activities in 
an animal’s life requires that the introductory tupos at the very least touch on these matters. That 
this discussion does not appear anywhere in the long discussion of bios, praxis, and êthos in I.1 
is odd, since, as Aristotle states later, the activities surrounding reproduction, along with those 
associated with the gathering of food and nutrition, occupy almost all of an animal’s time and 
energy.  
The rather puzzling discussion of the megista genê in I.6, with its confusing argument 
regarding the precise number of genê that are megista, serves nonetheless to introduce the reader 
to the very large kinds of animals that will be used throughout the treatise as organizing 
principles, responsible (in part) for structuring the discussions of the various kinds of 
differentiae. These kinds can operate in this manner due to the similarities that exist between the 
forms of animals falling under them, since such forms differ only by “the more and the less,” as 
is specified in the typology of sameness and difference.  
Finally, the methodological passage with which the introductory tupos ends situates the 
project of the historia within the broader explanatory project embodied by the epistêmê of 
animals.  
In effect, Aristotle has provided an introduction that both outlines the rest of the treatise, 
and provides a more theoretical discussion of concepts and points of method that will play 
crucial roles in what follows. The focus is not so much on identifying which animals exhibit the 
differentiae under consideration, as it is on the differentiae themselves – laying out the various 
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kinds and sub-kinds of features, identifying important forms of these kinds, describing and 
clarifying the meanings of the terms used, and providing examples of animals that exhibit them. 
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5.0  EXAMINATION OF SELECT PASSAGES FROM HA 
In this chapter I analyze select passages from the HA itself. The goals of this chapter are 
to provide a brief overview of the contents of each of the three main sections of the HA, and to 
analyze select passages from each of these sections in order to illustrate the manner in which the 
content is presented and to make connections with the more theoretical discussions of historia 
presented above. 
In section (2) I focus on the discussions of the parts of animals in HA (I.7-IV.7). Section 
(3) is devoted to the discussions of generation and reproductive practiced in HA V-VI and IX, 
and section (4) focuses on HA VII-VIII, which, broadly speaking, discusses differences in 
feeding, constitutional health, and character.  
5.1 HA I.7-IV.7: ON THE PARTS OF ANIMALS 
Aristotle begins his study of the similarities and differences among animals by looking at 
their parts, the first of the four major differentiae discussed in the introductory tupos. The four 
books dedicated to this pursuit are organized as follows: 
 
 Book I.7-17: external and internal non-uniform parts of humans 
 Book II: external and internal non-uniform parts of other blooded animals 
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 Book III.1: generative parts of blooded animals (sometimes external,  
sometimes internal) 
 Book III.2-22: uniform parts of blooded animals 
 Book IV.1-7: parts of bloodless animals 
 
Each of these discussions are structured around certain organizing principles. I will focus my 
discussion on Aristotle’s treatment of the non-uniform parts of animals, with emphasis on the 
external parts. In section (2.1) I discuss the reasons Aristotle gives for beginning with parts, and 
specifically human parts. This discussion leads to a more general reflection on the aim of a 
historia as providing a detailed, precise account in words of the differences exhibited by animals. 
In section (2.2) I consider the organizing principles that structure these discussions, and the 
reasoning behind them. Specifically I focus on the discussion of the external parts of blooded 
animals, using the discussion of the parts of birds as an example. Finally in section (2.3) I 
provide a reflection on the discussion of parts in HA. 
5.1.1 Preliminary considerations 
5.1.1.1 Why begin with the parts of animals? 
What justification does Aristotle offer for beginning the historia with the parts of 
animals, as opposed to one of the other differentiae? By way of introducing this section, Aristotle 
states: 
 
[1] We must first consider the parts of animals from which they have been composed.  
For according to these, first and most, the wholes differ also, either in so far as 
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some have [a part] and some do not, or by position or arrangement, or also 
according to the differences mentioned earlier, by form and excess and analogy 
and opposition of affections. (HA I.6, 491a14-a19) 
 
Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τὰ 
491a15 μέρη τῶν ζῴων ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν. Κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα  
καὶ πρῶτα διαφέρει καὶ τὰ ὅλα, ἢ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν τὰ 
δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἢ τῇ θέσει καὶ τῇ τάξει, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὰς 
εἰρημένας πρότερον διαφοράς, εἴδει καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἀνα- 
λογίᾳ καὶ τῶν παθημάτων ἐναντιότητι. 
 
Aristotle claims that the historia should begin with the differences exhibited by the parts 
of animals because “the wholes” (i.e. whole animals) also differ mainly by the parts out of which 
they are composed. The point seems to be that not only do the parts of one kind of animal differ 
from another, but also the whole bodies of different kinds of animals differ in recognizable 
ways.
202
 And while these whole body differences are primarily a product of differences among 
the external parts, an important distinction is made. On the one hand, the same part, as it appears 
in two different kinds of animals, may exhibit certain differences (e.g. the wings of two different 
                                                 
202
 This same relation between the parts of animals and their whole bodies is used in the 
introductory tupos in the discussion of the manners of sameness and difference that exist 
between animals. There, at 486a20, Aristotle states that animals that are the same in form have 
their parts the same in form as well, since “just as the whole is to the whole, similarly each of the 
parts is to each” (homoiôs gar hôsper to holon echei pros to holon, kai tôn moriôn echei 
hekaston pros hekaston). The point there was that we recognize certain whole animals as being 
the same in form, and for those animals, their parts are also the same in form, due to the 
proportional relationship of the whole to the part.  
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kinds of birds may be longer or shorter, have more or fewer feathers, etc.). Such differences 
clearly reside in the part. But, on the other hand, certain kinds of animals may simply possess 
different parts (e.g. birds have wings while fish have fins). These parts may be broadly 
analogous, but the possession of these different parts leads to a recognizable difference in the 
whole bodies of the animals, and these whole body differences are recognized prior to the 
specific differences in the parts themselves. 
A similar statement appears in Parts of Animals I.4, where the context regards the 
grouping of animals into kinds: 
 
[2] Roughly speaking, it is by the figures of the parts and of the whole body that 
kinds have been defined,
203
 when they bear a likeness – e.g. members of the bird 
kind are so related to each other, as are those of the fish kind, the soft-bodied 
animals, and the hard-shelled animals. For their parts differ not by analogous 
likeness, as bone in mankind is related to fish-spine in fish, but rather by bodily 
affections, e.g. by large/small, soft/hard, smooth/rough, and the like – speaking 
generally, by more and less. (PA I.4, 644b7-16)
204
 
 
644b7       Σχεδὸν δὲ τοῖς σχήμασι 
τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου, ἐὰν ὁμοιότητα ἔχωσιν, 
ὥρισται τὰ γένη, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέ- 
b10  πονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄ-  
                                                 
203 See Appendix C for a discussion of the megista genê of animals. 
204 Tr. Lennox 2001a. 
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στρεια. Τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοι- 
ότητι, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἰχθύϊ πέπονθεν ὀστοῦν πρὸς ἄκαν- 
θαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει 
μικρότητι, μαλακότητι σκληρότητι, λειότητι τραχύτητι 
b15  καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.205 
 
Here again Aristotle makes the distinction between the parts of an animal and its whole body. 
We recognize similarities and differences between animals at both levels, but our initial grasp of 
the animal is through our perception of the whole body and its general shape and form.
206
 
However the shape and form of an animal’s whole body is the product of the shape and form of 
the external parts making up the body: differences in these parts can lead to differences in the 
whole.
207
 When we recognize differences between animals at this more general level, we may 
“look closer,” as it were, and see that these differences are due to differences among the parts 
making up the animals’ bodies. The historia begins by studying the parts of animals because it is 
through our grasp of these parts that we first come to identify the differences perceived in the 
whole animal.
208
 The remaining categories of difference – manners of life, activities, and 
                                                 
205 The Greek text is from Louis (1956).  
206 See, e.g. the discussion in Phys. I.1 on the manner in which our initial perception is of a 
poorly differentiated whole that is later analyzed into parts. 
207 Certain part differences are unlikely to lead to dramatic differences in the whole body. 
As Aristotle notes in passage [2], animals whose parts are similar to one another by 
analogy only (such as the wings of a bird and the fins of a fish) have been divided into 
different kinds, presumably because these differences lead to recognizable whole body 
differences.  
208 As Balme points out (forthcoming, ad loc.) Aristotle does not state here that animals 
differ solely by their parts, but the sense is that the differences most present and observable 
by us reside in the parts. Our first access to animals, as it were, is by means of our 
perception both of their bodies as wholes, and of the parts making up their bodies. 
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characters – will ultimately play an important role in the study of animals, especially in so far as 
the parts will be explained primarily by the functions they perform, and these functions will be 
grasped by observing the activities and, in general, the different manners of life exhibited by 
animals. However, our first grasp or understanding of animals comes through our perception of 
their bodies and the parts out of which their bodies are composed, and thus it is here, Aristotle 
argues, that the investigation should begin. 
5.1.1.2 Why begin with the parts of humans? 
Having argued that the study of the differences between animals should begin with their 
parts, Aristotle next claims that the study of the parts should begin with those of humans: 
 
[3] But first the parts of humans must be considered; for just as each
209
 reckons 
currency with reference to that which is most familiar to itself, clearly also the 
same holds in other matters; but among animals man is of necessity the most 
familiar to us.  (HA I.6, 491a19-a23) 
 
Πρῶτον δὲ τὰ τοῦ 
491a20 ἀνθρώπου μέρη ληπτέον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ νομίσματα πρὸς  
τὸ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι γνωριμώτατον δοκιμάζουσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ 
ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων γνωριμώτατον ἡμῖν 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν.  
                                                 
209 The antecedent of “each” here is unnamed. It may be “nation” (as Peck (1965) 
translates), or “city-state” (as I suggest below), or it may simply be a reference to the one 
responsible for reckoning currency – the dokimastês. See Buttrey’s article in Thomson 
1979, pp. 33-45. 
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The reference to reckoning currency implies that we come to know or better understand 
something new or “foreign” by comparison with something familiar. Just as in Greek city-states 
an official would determine the value of foreign currency in terms of the local one, so also the 
parts of other animals come to be better known by means of a comparison with the parts of 
humans: we begin with what is most familiar and best known (gnôrimôtaton) to us, and the parts 
of humans are, as Aristotle says, “of necessity” best known to us,210 presumably because we are 
human, and thus we are most intimately familiar with the human body.
211
   
The methodological prescription of beginning an investigation with what is more familiar 
or better known is a common one in Aristotle.
 212
 What is better known to us is typically 
contrasted with what is better known, or more familiar, or first by nature. In these contexts the 
opposition is used for reasoning that proceeds either from or to first principles. Aristotle argues 
that we know something, in the fullest sense of the term, when we can demonstrate why it is the 
case by tracing it back to indemonstrable first principles. These first principles are often 
described as first, or prior, or more knowable by nature, in the sense that premises are prior to 
the conclusions drawn from them: our knowledge of the conclusions is no “better” or “stronger” 
                                                 
210 See also PA II.10, 656a10ff, where Aristotle again notes that the shape/form (morphê) of 
the external parts of humans are most familiar to us (to gnôrimon einai malista). 
Interestingly, Aristotle argues there that the explanatory account of the parts of animals 
given in PA should begin with humans not only because they are most familiar, but also 
because mankind “partakes of the divine” (metechei tou theiou). An indication of this divine 
nature, Aristotle claims, is that the orientation of the parts of the human body align with 
the cosmic directions up, down, left, right (i.e. “up” for humans corresponds with “up” for 
the cosmos, etc.). Thus an aspect of the divine nature of humans corresponds to the 
shape/form of the human body. 
211 Note, however, that this holds only for the external parts of humans. Regarding the 
internal parts, Aristotle claims that these are least well known to us. See 494b21ff. 
212 See e.g. APo. I.2, 72a1ff.; Phys. I.1; Metaph. Z.3, 1029b3ff.; EN I.4, 1095b1ff.   
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than that of the premises, and indeed is in a sense less so. Aristotle often makes the case that 
those things that are better know to us are the conclusions that follow from such first principles, 
rather than the principles themselves. This is reflected in the methodological passage from HA 
I.6 discussed above, where Aristotle states that “the natural way to conduct an investigation” is 
to first establish that something exists or holds true (in this case, “to grasp the existing 
differences and attributes” of all animals), and then to search for the causes. Similarly, Aristotle 
will refer to those things that are “nearer to perception” as being more familiar to us, while the 
first principles, which are grasped by a sort of induction (epagogê) from the particulars provided 
by perception, are “further from perception” and more familiar by nature.213 
Is this the same methodological prescription that is raised in passage [3]? Aristotle does 
argue that the parts of humans are more familiar to us, and that they are clear to perception, 
however it is not clear that the parts of humans are somehow first to us and not first by nature, or 
that the parts of other animals, being less familiar to us, are thereby more familiar by nature. 
Rather, the point of method at issue in [3] focuses on using the knowledge we do have in order to 
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge we do not.
214
 Just as the money-changer in [3] determines 
the value of foreign coins based on the local one, so also we will be better able to learn things 
about the parts of other animals if we study them in terms of or in light of the parts of humans. 
Many parts of animals are shared by different kinds, but they exhibit differences that may render 
them less recognizable. Aristotle’s claim in [3] is that by beginning with the parts of humans, we 
will be better able to recognize and learn about the similar parts in other animals. And in fact this 
                                                 
213 See APo. I.2, 72a1ff.; APr. II.23, 68b30ff. Aristotle’s infamously difficult account of how 
we come to know first principles by means of epagogê is in APo. II.19. 
214 See e.g. the opening lines of APo. I.1: “All teaching and learning of an intellectual kind 
proceed from pre-existent knowledge” (tr. Barnes 1975).  
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method of procedure is followed in the historia. Not only does Aristotle begin, in HA  I.7, by 
discussing the external parts of humans, but he then applies the same basic analysis he develops 
there of the human body to other kinds of animals later in the historia. He recognizes five 
primary parts of the human body: the head, neck, torso, arms, and legs, and he uses these primary 
parts to guide his discussion of the human body, beginning with the parts of the head (e.g. skull, 
face, eyes, ears), and continuing through the others.
215
 These same divisions are then applied, in 
book II, to four-footed live-bearing animals, four-footed egg-bearing animals, birds, and fish, 
with relevant differences noted.
216
 Thus by beginning the historia with what is best known to us, 
Aristotle is then able more easily to introduce and analyze the parts of other animals, which are 
less known to us.  
Further, one might argue that the aim of the historia is not simply to grasp the differences 
and attributes as they severally appear in different animals, but rather, in the case of the parts, to 
provide a sense or understanding of what each part is as the kind of part it is, that is, in its full 
generality and universality. In this sense, what is most familiar to us – the parts of humans – are 
particular instances of these parts understood as universals, and the historia will either provide us 
with a grasp of these universals, or act as a step on the way to the universals. In this sense, the 
parts of humans will be first to us, while these universal part-concepts will be first by nature, and 
the methodological prescription of beginning with what is first to us and proceeding to what is 
first by nature will align with the procedure of the historia.
217
 
                                                 
215 See HA I.7, 491a27ff.; PA II.10, which follows the same order, and argues that “up” 
relative to the human body is the same as “up” for the cosmos. 
216 Four footed live bearing: HA II.1, 497b13; four footed egg bearing: II.10, 502b28; birds: 
II.12, 503b29; fish: II.13, 504b13. 
217 This is a more controversial claim, and would require a fuller argument to properly 
support it than is appropriate here. My sense is that, when Aristotle defends beginning the 
 180 
5.1.1.3 Ephexês and logos 
Aristotle recognizes that someone may criticize his proposed way into the study of the 
parts of animals as being unnecessarily pedantic, since the parts of humans are sufficiently well 
known and obvious to us as to require no additional comment. To head-off such criticism, 
Aristotle offers the following: 
 
[4] So then, by perception the parts [of humans] are not unclear; but just the same, for 
the sake of not neglecting order and also grasping the logos in addition to the 
perception, the parts must be considered, first the instrumental [parts], and then 
the uniform [parts]. (HA I.6, 491a23-a26) 
 
Τῇ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσει οὐκ ἄδηλα τὰ μόρια· 
ὅμως δ’ ἕνεκεν τοῦ μὴ παραλιπεῖν τε τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τοῦ 
491a25 λόγον ἔχειν μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, λεκτέον τὰ μέρη πρῶτον  
μὲν τὰ ὀργανικά, εἶτα τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ. 
 
While admitting that the parts of the human body are “not unclear to perception,” Aristotle 
apparently offers two reasons why the investigation should nonetheless begin there: first, in order 
                                                                                                                                                             
historia with the parts of humans because they are most familiar, he is primarily invoking a 
methodological prescription that enables us to move from one kind of particular 
instantiation of a universal (e.g. human legs) to another (e.g. four footed live bearing legs), 
and not from a particular (human legs) to a universal (legs). Just the same, I do think that 
the historia is ultimately aimed at providing us with a grasp of this universal, even if it is 
not actually achieved at this stage of investigation.   
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not to neglect the proper “order” (ephexês), and second, for the sake of grasping the logos in 
addition to the perception, which is already clear.  What can we make of these two reasons?
 218
 
Regarding the first, Aristotle is in effect repeating the claim he made immediately above, 
that the proper order of investigation dictates that one begin with what is best known or most 
familiar. The subject matter under consideration is the parts of animals. Since the parts of 
humans are best known to us, the historia should begin there, and should not e.g. move directly 
to the parts of other blooded animals. But this just raises the question again: why should 
beginning at the natural beginning be important, if this natural beginning is already well known? 
That is, why must we rigidly adhere to the proper order of investigation if these beginning facts – 
those associated with the parts of the human body – are already obvious?  
Aristotle’s response is that, although the parts of the human body are clear to perception 
(aisthêsis), we need “to grasp the logos” of each of these parts in addition to the perception. That 
is, perception does not provide the logos, and it is this logos that is sought and will be provided 
by the discussion in the historia. But logos is a rich word for Aristotle, resonating with many 
different meanings. What does he mean by contrasting logos with aisthêsis here? 
                                                 
218 Peck’s translation of the kai in 491a24 as “i.e.” indicates that he takes Aristotle not as 
providing two distinct reasons, but rather one reason, with the second conjunct elucidating 
why following the proper order is important. But the Greek construction is te . . . kai, which 
typically indicates two distinct conjuncts (see Smyth 2974). As I go on to argue, I believe 
Aristotle is offering two reasons why beginning the historia with the parts of humans is 
appropriate. First, since these parts are most familiar to us, they can act as a touchstone to 
better understanding both the parts of other animals, many of which are similar to the 
parts of humans, and the parts understood in full generality. And second, though the parts 
of humans are clear to perception, this clarity of perception does not provide the logos of 
the human parts, which here indicates, as I show below, a detailed written account. 
Grasping this logos is important because, as Aristotle goes on to say in passage [5], it will 
better position us to identify differences between the parts of humans and those of other 
animals.  
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Aristotle uses the opposition between aisthêsis and logos elsewhere in the context of 
biological investigation. Typically in these passages logos refers to an explanation or causal 
account of why a certain state of affairs is the case, or to a definition that provides such a cause. 
For example, at Juv. 2, 468a13ff., Aristotle claims that the archê of the nutritive soul is located 
in the middle part of the body, between the part responsible for taking in food and the part 
responsible for expelling residue. According to Aristotle this is clear both kata tên aisthêsin and 
kata ton logon. The argument from aisthêsis relies primarily on evidence derived from severing 
the bodies of various kinds of animals at different places and observing the results. Specifically, 
the severed part that includes the middle section appears to live on longer and possess more 
motion than the other, indicating that the principle of soul is likely located in the middle. The 
argument from logos relies instead on a version of a principle Aristotle often makes reference to 
in his biological works, namely that nature always does what is best, given what is possible (a 
variant of the familiar nature does nothing in vain).
219
 By placing the archê of soul in the middle 
part of the body, nature ensures that it is close to both the other parts, and this is the best place 
for it, if it is to control the other parts. Thus logos here seems to mean something like “reasoned 
argument” or “deduction from reasonable principles”220: given that the archê of soul resides in 
one of the three major divisions of the body,
221
 and given that nature always does what is best 
from what is possible, it follows kata ton logon that it resides in the middle part.  
                                                 
219 See Lennox 1997. 
220 Ogle translates as “rational inference,” while Hett offers “is in itself reasonable.” See also 
Bolton 2009, who argues that arguments that are kasta ton logon or eulogos are dialectical, 
and Karbowski 2014, who argues, pace Bolton (and in agreement with me), that at least 
some such arguments “rely upon general facts (sumbainonta) about animals established by 
empirical induction.” See especially his n18. 
221 For non-rational animals, each of the “parts” of soul resides in a part of the body. 
According to Aristotle, only nous is unembodied. See DA II.1, 413a6ff.; GA II.3, 736b21ff..  
 183 
Similarly, in GA I.2 Aristotle argues that the male and the female differ according to 
logos, in so far as they possess different capacities (the male to generate in another, the female to 
generate within oneself), and also according to aisthêsis, in so far as they have different parts. As 
he discusses in the passage, the capacities have priority over the parts, since the parts are for the 
sake of performing the activities corresponding to the capacities. Logos in this passage means 
something like definition: the capacity to generate in another is what it is to be male, and the 
capacity to generate within oneself is what it is to be female.
222
 The perceptible differences in the 
parts of the male and the female (i.e. the differences kata tên aisthêsin) are caused by this 
essential difference in capacity.
223
  
In each of these cases the logos functions to identify causes – the reasons why the facts 
made clear by perception are indeed the case. In passage [4] above Aristotle argues that the 
historia of the parts of the human body will allow us to “grasp the logos” of these parts, but 
earlier, in the methodological passage in HA I.6, Aristotle states that the goal of the historia is to 
grasp the differences between animals prior to searching for their causes. Thus it is unlikely that 
by logos Aristotle here intends something like cause, explanation, or definition.
224
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222 As Bolton 1987 notes, this appears to be only a preliminary account of what it is to be 
male and female. Aristotle’s analysis of these different capacities ultimately points to a 
difference in the ability to concoct seed from blood, which the male can do better or more 
completely than the female (see GA IV.1, 769b9ff.). The difference between them, then, is in 
a sense a difference in degree, in so far as one has the ability to perform an activity better 
than the other. However, not being able to do something as well as something else is one 
sense of incapacity or inability. See Metaph. ∆.15, 1019a23-26. 
223 See GA III.10, 760b27-33 on the generation of bees, where Aristotle discusses how the 
logos, again understood as reasoned account, must be adapted to cohere properly with the 
best evidence available by aisthêsis. See Karbowski 2014 for a detailed discussion of this 
very passage. 
224 In APo. II.2 Aristotle discusses the sense in which what something is (i.e. the definition) 
is the same as why it is, and in II.8 he introduces the notion of a definition that is like a 
demonstration with the elements rearranged (e.g. thunder is noise in the clouds due to the 
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Aristotle uses much the same language near the end of his discussion of the external parts 
of humans in HA 1.15, where he considers the orientation of these parts with respect to the 
cosmic directions up, down, left, and right. He defends the need for that discussion in a similar 
manner as passage [4], but provides an additional comment on why pursuing such questions, in 
light of their apparent obviousness, is still important. He states: 
 
[5] But regarding the position of the parts with respect to up, down, front, back, left 
and right, one might consider this to be clear to perception for the external parts. 
But nonetheless we must speak of this for the same reason for which we spoke 
earlier: in order that the order should be followed, and, by reckoning them in this 
way, it will be less likely that we should overlook those things that do not hold in 
the same manner in the other animals as in man. (HA I.15, 494a20-26) 
 
494a20 Ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν μερῶν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ πρόσθιον 
καὶ ὀπίσθιον καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερὸν ὡς ἔχει, φανερὰ μὲν 
                                                                                                                                                             
extinction of fire). Thus the definition identifies the causal factor(s) responsible for the 
properties that belong to a certain kind of thing, and thus explain those properties. The pre-
causal nature of the historia appears to restrict it from being able to say just which 
properties that belong to a thing are essential and which follow from them. In fact, in HA I.6 
Aristotle states that the historia will provide the material for constructing such a definition 
(the peri hôn and ex hôn, or “about which things” and “from which things,” i.e. the 
conclusions and premises of demonstrations), but appears to stop short of identifying 
which are which. Thus it appears unlikely that the historia will bring to light definitions of 
this kind, and thus unlikely that by logos in passage [4] Aristotle means “definition.” 
However, such definitions may only be one kind of definition recognized by Aristotle. See 
Bolton 1976, 1978, 1987; Charles 2000, ch. 8, 2010a. 
225 Although the historia may not provide the logos in this sense, one may read the passage 
as stating that the ultimate aim (or one of the aims) of the project to which the historia 
belongs is grasping such a logos, even if the historia is only a preliminary step. On this 
reading grasping the logos is not something achieved in the historia. 
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ἂν εἶναι δόξειε τὰ ἔξωθεν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ 
διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν λεκτέον δι’ ἥνπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερον εἰ- 
ρήκαμεν, ἵνα περαίνηται τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ καταριθμουμένων 
a25  ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα τρόπον ἐπί τε 
τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 
 
Here the claim is that although the spatial orientation of the external parts of humans is clear kata 
tên aisthêsin, it is nonetheless necessary to discuss it “for the same reason we gave earlier.”226 
Again, two reasons are apparently cited: first, following the proper order (ephexês), and second, 
“by reckoning them in this way” (katariathmoumenôn hopôs) we will be less likely to pass over 
differences between humans and other animals, i.e. similar parts that are differently arranged or 
structured in humans as compared to other animals. If we take Aristotle here as offering two 
distinct reasons, as before, and if, as Aristotle indicates, these reasons are the same as the ones 
given earlier, then the first, following the proper order, is a restatement of the methodological 
prescription to begin with what is most familiar to us; and the second, that of identifying the 
differences between humans and other animals “by reckoning them in this way,” is either 
equivalent to, or related to, the goal of grasping the logos of the parts in addition to the 
perception. That is, “reckoning them in this way” refers to the treatment these parts will receive 
in the historia, one that provides us with the logos, as opposed to relying on the mere perception 
of them.
227
 
                                                 
226 Note the singular here of tên autên aitian, perhaps suggesting that one reason was given 
earlier. 
227 It may be argued that the hopôs in a25 refers to following the proper order, i.e. 
discussing the spatial orientation of the parts of the human body is necessary because by 
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5.1.1.4 Logos and akribeia 
But it is still unclear precisely what Aristotle means by logos in this passage, or how the 
historia marks an advance over perception. In passages [4] and [5] Aristotle claims that, although 
some aspects of the parts of the human body are clear to perception, these parts nonetheless 
warrant discussion in the historia. The implication is that the mere perception of these parts fails 
to provide us with important information that is pertinent to the goals of the historia. In passage 
[4] the perception of the parts fails to provide a grasp of the logos, and in passage [5] it seems 
that relying on perception will make it more likely that we will fail to recognize certain 
differences between humans and other animals. Thus a grasp of the logos, as opposed to relying 
on aisthêsis, will better enable us to identify these differences. 
By stressing the importance of discussing even the seemingly obvious parts of humans, 
Aristotle is emphasizing the level of detail and precision that he is seeking. The notion that the 
historia provides greater precision (akribeia) is attested to by many of the references to historiai 
in the other biological treatises – references that most scholars take to refer to HA. 228 Such 
references often appear in the midst of explanations, and are provided to the reader looking for 
greater detail, typically regarding the characteristics and arrangements of certain parts. From 
these references we can infer that the historia is intended to include meticulous descriptions of 
                                                                                                                                                             
discussing them first we will be less likely to pass over differences between humans and 
other animals. My suggestion, however, is that the hopôs refers not to following the proper 
order, but to discussing the orientation of these parts in the historia, rather than relying on 
our perception of them. Just as in passage [4], following the proper order offers its own 
benefits, apart from the benefits that the historia provides over perception. These benefits 
are discussed further below. 
228 A TLG search returns 26 different references to historiai that likely refer back to HA, 3 in 
On Respiration, 1 in Progression of Animals, 11 in Parts of Animals, and 11 in Generation of 
Animals. Of these, 7 specifically mention the greater degree of akribeia that is found in the 
historia. See Appendix A. 
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the parts of animals, including details that may literally be “overlooked” if we relied only on our 
perceptions of the parts.
229
  
Interestingly, many of these references to historiai are paired with references to 
dissections (anatomai), which were apparently either drawings of dissected animals, or actual 
displays of the same.
230
 In either case, they were something looked at and not rendered into 
words. In some of these references Aristotle gestures towards the differences of what can be 
learned from the anatomai and historiai. For example, in On Respiration, in a discussion of the 
heart and gills in certain fish, Aristotle states:  
 
[6] The position of the heart relative to the gills should be studied visually from the 
anatomai, and in detail from the historiai. (Resp. 478a34-b2) 
 
ὡς δ’ ἡ θέσις ἔχει 
τῆς καρδίας πρὸς τὰ βράγχια, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ τῶν 
478b1  ἀνατομῶν δεῖ θεωρεῖν, πρὸς δ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν· 
 
In this passage the historiai are said to provide precision or detail (pros d’akribeian) 
regarding the relative positions of the heart and gills, which is distinguished from the visual 
study (pros men tên opsin) of these parts provided by the anatomai. The implication is that 
visually one can gain a certain sense of the arrangement of these parts relative to one another, but 
                                                 
229 For a possible example of such an error, see the discussion of the parts of the malakia in  
HA IV.1, 523b21ff., where Aristotle states that many confuse the head of the malakia with 
the “sac” (kutos), which contains the internal organs, because the head is continuous with 
the feet. 
230 See Lennox 2001a, p. 299. 
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the precise details require an account in words that specify the manner in which each part is 
situated. Rendering what is seen in the anatomai into words in the historiai appears to bring to 
the study a level of precision and detail that perception alone cannot provide.231  
That the historia provides a detailed and precise description or account in words, 
and that this is the sense of the logos it provides, is further supported by the following 
reference from Parts of Animals, which again compares what can be learned from the 
historiai to the anatomai: 
 
[7] All these, and the other hard-shelled animals, as was said, have a mouth, a 
tongue like part, a stomach, and a residual outlet, though each part differs in 
position and size. The manner in which each of them has these parts should 
be studied with the help of the historiai of animals and of the anatomai. For 
some of these things need to be clarified by a logos, others rather by visual 
inspection. (PA IV.5, 679b35-680a1, tr. Lennox) 
 
Πάντα μὲν οὖν 
679b35 ἔχει, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα στόμα  
τε καὶ τὸ γλωττοειδὲς καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος 
τὴν ἔξοδον, διαφέρει δὲ τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν. Ὃν δὲ 
680a1  τρόπον ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον, ἔκ τε τῶν ἱστοριῶν τῶν 
                                                 
231 Interestingly, at HA III.1, 511a13, Aristotle states the study of the uteruses of different 
kinds of fish may be done “with greater precision” (akribesteron) using “the figures from 
the dissections” (tois schêmasin ek tôn anatomôn). Thus the precision one can gain via 
aisthêsis or logos appears to depend on the subject matter at hand. 
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περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρείσθω καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ 
λόγῳ τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῶν σαφηνίζειν δεῖ μᾶλλον. 
 
In this passage the historiai are said to provide clarity by means of a logos, while the 
anatomai provide clarity by means of visual inspection.  The contrast here clearly points to 
a difference in viewing a picture and reading an account in words,232 but the clarity that is 
thereby conferred is not necessarily one that comes via explanation. That is, the sense of logos 
used here need not indicate an argument or demonstration. Rather it is the detail provided by 
words that is sought, either because the reproduction of the drawings is limited, or because 
Aristotle cannot rely on the acuity of the reader to perceive the detail necessary for the argument.   
A final reference secures the claim that the sort of detailed account provided by the 
historia is one in words. In GA II.7, in a discussion of the arrangement of umbilical cords in the 
uterus of animals that produce multiple embryos, Aristotle states: 
 
[8] It is necessary to study these things using the diagrams in the anatomai and the 
writings in the historiai. (GA II.7, 746a15-16) 
 
746a15 δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν παραδειγμάτων τῶν ἐν 
ταῖς ἀνατομαῖς καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις γεγραμμένων. 
  
                                                 
232 As was noted earlier, logos is an especially rich word in Greek generally, and in Aristotle 
especially, but its root meaning is essentially tied to speaking (legô) and thus with the sort 
of rational account that can only be provided in words.  
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Here Aristotle contrasts the diagrams (paradeigmata) in the anatomai to the writings 
(gegrammena) in the historiai,
233
 the implication being that the former contain pictures, while 
the latter contain written words. 
Based on these references to historiai and anatomai, we can conclude that when, in 
passage [4], Aristotle states that, despite their obviousness to perception, the parts of humans 
must be studied in order to grasp the logos in addition to the perception, he is emphasizing the 
visual nature of our perceptual knowledge of the human body, and how an account of the same in 
words is capable of providing a greater level of detail and precision. And it is this greater level of 
detail, according to passage [5], that will render us less likely to overlook differences between 
the human body and the bodies of other animals.
234
  
 Aristotle states that the historia of animals is primarily a study of the differences 
exhibited by animals. It begins with a study of their parts, because it is by means of these parts 
that we first distinguish one kind from another, using the parts to analyze the differences first 
recognized in animals’ whole bodies. Our initially uncritical perception of animals is able to 
make discriminations between them at a general level, however these first perceptions are poorly 
differentiated and in need of further analysis. To facilitate this analysis, Aristotle argues that it is 
fitting to begin the historia with the parts of humans, because we will be able to use our 
familiarity with the human body as a touchstone, as it were, to analyzing the bodies of other 
                                                 
233 Interestingly, Peck fails to note this difference, translating the passage as “All this should 
be studied with the help of the illustrative diagrams given in the dissections and 
Researches.” It may be that Peck has in mind references to diagrams that apparently 
appeared in the HA. See e.g. HA III.1, 510a29-35, which makes reference to a diagram of the 
male reproductive parts. 
234 Again, this is not to say that a very detailed picture cannot be made, but rather that 
Aristotle cannot necessarily rely on the “untrained eye” to make note of the details that are 
important for his exposition. 
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animals. However, despite this familiarity, he argues that it is nonetheless important to discuss 
the parts of humans, because by so doing we will advance our knowledge beyond what is 
provided by the mere perception of our bodies: we will grasp the logos. This sort of detailed 
account in words renders it less likely that we will fail to grasp certain differences between the 
human body and those of other animals. Rendering what is seen into words provides a sort of 
precision that is unattainable otherwise, and it is this level of precision at which the historia 
aims. 
5.1.2 Organization of the discussion of parts 
For the reasons discussed above, Aristotle begins the discussion of the parts of animals 
with those of humans. The aims of this discussion are: (1) to document the features exhibited by 
these parts in order that differences between the parts of humans and the parts of other animals 
may more easily be identified; and (2) to develop the primary part-concepts used to analyze other 
animals. The discussion is divided by parts that are external (I.7-15) and those that are internal 
(I.16-17).  
5.1.2.1 The external parts of humans: HA: I.7-15 
The discussion of the external parts of humans is organized around the following initial 
division of the human body: head (kephalê), neck (auchên), trunk (thorax), arms (brachiones), 
and legs (skelê). The discussion proceeds as follows: 
 
 Parts of the head: ch. 7-11 
 Parts0 of the neck: ch. 12 (to 493a10) 
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 Parts of the trunk: ch 12-15 (to 493b25) 
 Parts of the arms: ch 15 (493b25-494a4) 
 Parts of the legs: ch 15 (494a4-19) 
 Arrangmenet of these parts with respect to up/down, back/front, left/right (ch. 
15, 494a19-b18).  
 
Consistent with the goal of using our familiarity with the parts of humans as a guide to 
understanding the parts of other animals, the discussion in this section sometimes makes 
reference to the corresponding parts of other animals, typically for the purpose of identifying 
differences between them. For example:   
 
 The part below the skull is called the face in humans, but not in other animals 
(491b10). 
 Like humans, all other animals have eyes except for the ostrakoderma and any other 
imperfect (ateles) animal; in particular all live-bearing animals have eyes, and even 
the mole has something like an eye beneath a flap of skin (491b26). 
 The white of the eye is very much the same in all animals, but the black shows many 
differences (492a1). 
 Humans are the only animal that possesses ears but cannot move them; not all 
animals that have hearing have ears, some merely have passages; all live-bearing 
animals have ears apart form the seal, dolphin, and other cetaceans (492a23).  
 All animals with jaws move the lower jaw except the river crocodile, which moves 
the upper jaw instead (492b24). 
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These additional details bring to light features that (a) are not universally associated with 
the part in question, and thus are not essential features of that part, and (b) are uniquely 
associated only with certain kinds of animals, and thus must be explained by making reference to 
some other unique feature of those animals.  For example, all live-bearing animals have eyes, but 
since the black differs among them, we cannot take the black of the human eye as a feature that 
belongs to the eye in itself, while the white of the human eye, being basically the same as the 
white in other animals’ eyes, may be taken as a feature belonging to the eye in itself. Similarly 
not all animals that can hear have ears, and thus the presence (or absence) of ears must be 
explained by something other than the mere capacity for hearing. And finally, being able to open 
and close the jaw is a feature shared by all animals with jaws, but which part of the jaw moves 
differs. What is necessary is that some part moves, and the explanation for whichever part moves 
in a given animal will be specific to the kind (or kinds) that have jaws that move in that way. 
Although the focus in this section is clearly on the human parts, the ultimate goal of identifying 
the differences between humans and other animals is clearly represented.
235
 
5.1.2.2 The internal parts of humans: HA: I.16-17 
Following the discussion of the external parts of humans, Aristotle turns to the internal 
parts of humans. However, unlike the discussion of the external parts, the internal parts of 
humans are mostly unknown to us: 
 
                                                 
235 Interestingly, for reasons that are not clear to me, references to animals other than 
humans appear almost exclusively in the discussion of the parts of the head.  
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[9] So then, the visibly external parts are arranged in this manner, and just as was 
said, for the most part are named and well-known due to their familiarity; but it is 
the opposite for the internal parts. For the parts of human beings are mostly 
unknown, so that it is necessary to study the parts of other animals, which have a 
similar nature.   
 
494b19  Τὰ μὲν οὖν μόρια τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦτον 
τέτακται τὸν τρόπον, καὶ καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, διωνόμασταί τε  
μάλιστα καὶ γνώριμα διὰ τὴν συνήθειάν ἐστιν· τὰ δ’ ἐντὸς τοὐ- 
ναντίον. Ἄγνωστα γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε 
δεῖ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μόρια ζῴων ἀνάγοντας σκοπεῖν, οἷς 
ἔχει παραπλησίαν τὴν φύσιν. 
 
Aristotle does not state why the internal parts of humans are mostly unknown 
(presumably due to taboos against human dissection), and he gives no details regarding the 
criteria that will be used to judge which animals are similar enough to humans to stand in for the 
study of internal parts. The animals most often cited in the actual discussion (dog, pig, ox) are all 
among the four-footed live-bearing, which Aristotle consistently ranks, with humans, as the more 
perfect and complete animals.
236
 
The question arises: if the study of external parts began with humans because of our great 
familiarity with them, then why should the study of internal parts also begin with humans, if 
these are least well known to us? It’s clear that the benefits discussed above relating to beginning 
                                                 
236 E.g. GA II.1, 732b28ff. 
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with what is most familiar will not be conferred upon the study of internal parts, if we begin with 
humans. Why nonetheless start here? 
On the one hand, it may be that, since humans were discussed first for the external parts, 
so, for the sake of consistency, they are discussed first here as well. Although Aristotle does not 
evince great concern with organizing his discussions of the parts of animals (or any of their 
differentia for that matter) around individual kinds (or forms) of animals, grouping the discussion 
of the parts of humans, both external and internal, in one place may seem like a good idea, given 
the understandable interest in these parts. On the other hand, it may be that, since humans are the 
most complete animals, their internal parts too reflect this completion and perfection, and thus 
serve as exemplary instances of the parts in question. Little good this will do if the human parts 
are mostly unknown. However, if Aristotle can plausibly/reasonably turn to certain other animals 
as a proxy for humans, then beginning here may still make sense. As mentioned above, Aristotle 
offers no argument or insight regarding the criteria he uses to judge which animals have a 
“similar nature” (paraplêsian tên phusin) to humans, but if he believed that he had hit upon such 
similarly-natured animals, such that the study of their parts, together with the little knowledge 
available of the human parts, provided an accurate picture of the internal parts of humans, then 
treating humans first would still make sense. That is, beginning with humans may still reflect the 
proper order of procedure, as was stressed above with the external parts. The parts of humans, 
both external and internal, would then provide the model or framework within which the parts of 
other animals are considered.
237
   
                                                 
237 The discussion of the internal parts follows the “top down” approach (relative to 
humans) used for the external parts. 
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The discussion of the internal parts follows the same basic divisions of the body used for 
the external parts: 
 
 Internal parts of the head (brain, passages from eyes to brain): ch. 16 (494b25-
495a18) 
 Internal parts of the neck (esophagus, Windpipe, Epiglottis): ch. 16 (495a18-
b24) 
 Internal parts of the torso (Lung, Stomach, Gut, Omentum, Mesentry, Heart, 
Diaphragm, Liver, Spleen, Gallbladder, Kidney, Bladder): ch 16-17 (495b24-
497b2) 
 
The discussions of these parts tend to focus on their size, character, and arrangement, but 
little or no mention is made of the functions played by these parts. At times there are comments 
that imply their functions, but the clear focus is on describing the shape and placement of the 
parts, and their mutual interconnections and relations.   
Similar to the discussion of the external parts, reference is sometimes made to similarities 
and differences between the human parts and those of other animals. For example: 
 
 All blooded animals have a brain, as do the malakia; man’s brain is largest and most 
fluid (494b26). 
 Differences in the lung; its tendency to be double (dimerês); least visible in humans, 
most visible in egg-bearing animals (495b1). 
 Man’s stomach resembles the dog’s; the lower stomach is like the pig’s (495b25). 
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 Man’s liver resembles the ox’s (496b24). 
 Man’s kidney resembles the ox’s (497a1). 
 
Unlike the discussion of the external parts, many of these references to other animals 
appear to be for the sake of identifying animals with similar natures, and thus similar internal 
parts that can be studied in place of those of humans, rather than identifying differences between 
humans and other animals. 
In fact, one often gets the sense that the discussions of these parts are focused more on 
the part in question, rather than on the way in which that part appears in humans. For example, in 
his discussion of the brain, the only detail Aristotle provides that is unique to humans is that, 
relative to their size, humans have the largest and most fluid brains (494b29). All of his other 
comments are applicable either to all animals with brains, or important large subsets of them 
(e.g. the blooded animals). On the one hand, this may simply reflect Aristotle’s ignorance of the 
internal anatomy of humans, but on the other hand (or additionally) it may reflect Aristotle’s 
interest in grasping the primary, common features exhibited by the part in question, in order to 
come to an understanding of the part qua specific part, so that unique differentiations of the part 
as it appears in different kinds of animals may more easily be noticed. 
 
5.1.2.3 External parts of blooded animals 
Following the discussion of the parts of humans, Aristotle considers the parts of other 
animals, beginning with the blooded animals. The discussion in these chapters is at times hard to 
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follow (especially in II.1)
238
, and it is difficult to discern the principles that are organizing the 
material. However, hey become more apparent if we attend to the various introductory and 
concluding statements Aristotle makes as new subjects are introduced.  
For example, II.1 begins with a reiteration of the forms of sameness and difference first 
discussed early in book I, then turns to what appears to be a discussion of the ways these forms 
of sameness and difference manifest themselves among four-footed live-bearing animals, 
however the discussion wanders into differences exhibited by egg-bearing animals, birds, and 
seals. At 502b27, about five Bekker pages into book II, we find the following statement: 
 
[10] The parts of the live-bearing animals that are external hold in this manner 
(502b27) 
 
Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰς τὸ ἐκτὸς ζῳοτοκούντων μόρια τοῦτον 
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.  
 
Thus it appears that the preceding discussion was intended to treat the external parts of 
the live-bearing animals. All live-bearing animals, or only some subset? Passage [10] does not 
specify, but the initial statement that introduced the section (immediately following the 
reiteration of the forms of sameness and difference, at 497b14) specified four-footed live-bearing 
animals.  
The next section is introduced with the following:  
                                                 
238 Indeed the chapter divisions in the early portions of book II are especially confused 
(and, notably, post-Aristotelian), and the reader often does well to pay them little mind. 
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[11] But the four-footed, egg-bearing, blooded animals (and no land animal is egg-
bearing and blooded unless it is four-footed or footless) have a head, neck . . . 
(502b28) 
 
502b28    Τὰ δὲ τετράποδα μὲν ᾠοτόκα δὲ καὶ ἔναι- 
μα (οὐδὲν δὲ ᾠοτοκεῖ χερσαῖον καὶ ἔναιμον μὴ τετράπουν ὂν 
b30  ἢ ἄπουν) κεφαλὴν μὲν ἔχει καὶ αὐχένα 
  
The inclusion of four-footed with egg-bearing (and blooded) here suggests that the 
absence of four-footed from the concluding statement of the previous section is either for the 
sake of brevity or an over-sight. But what of the comment here on the footedness of egg-bearing 
land animals? The fact that egg-bearing land animals are either four-footed or footless is a 
relevant addition only if the discussion is intended to treat land animals. That is, turning to four-
footed egg-bearing animals might cause a reader pause if the expectation was to proceed from 
live-bearing land animals to egg-bearing land animals. Why restrict the discussion, a reader 
might ask, to the four-footed egg-bearing land animals? Aristotle’s response: “All egg-bearing 
land animals are either four-footed or footless; we shall treat the four-footed ones first, and turn 
to the footless later.” 
Thus it appears that the primary organizing principles of these early sections of book II 
are, first, external vs. internal parts; second, for the external parts, land animal vs. water animal; 
and third, for the external parts of land animals, live-bearing versus egg-bearing. This suggestion 
is confirmed by examining how the discussion proceeds from here. Having treated egg-bearing 
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land animals (the river crocodile
239
 and the chameleon are the only ones mentioned), Aristotle 
turns to birds (another egg-bearing land animal), then fish. He introduces the discussion of fish 
as follows: 
 
[12] Among the water animals, the kind of fishes is one, distinct from others, 
embracing many forms. Fishes have a head . . . (504b13-15) 
 
Τῶν δ’ ἐνύδρων ζῴων τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων γένος ἓν ἀπὸ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἀφώρισται, πολλὰς περιέχον ἰδέας. Κεφαλὴν μὲν 
γὰρ ἔχει . . .  
 
This appears to mark a transition from land animal to water animal. The last kind of 
animal discussed in the section on external parts, immediately following the discussion of fishes, 
is snakes, regarding which Aristotle states: 
 
[13] It remains to speak, among the blooded animals, of the kind of snakes. And they 
are common to both, for the majority of them are land animals, while a few, those 
of the water animals, spend their time in fresh water. (505b5-7) 
 
Λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν ἐναίμων ζῴων τὸ τῶν ὄφεων γένος. Ἔστι 
δὲ κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν χερσαῖόν ἐστιν, 
                                                 
239 One might object that the river crocodile is a water animal, in the sense that it lives and 
spends most of its time in the water. Fair enough, but I suggest that the sense of land 
animal / water animal at work here focuses on taking in air and taking in water. 
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ὀλίγον δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐνύδρων ἐν τοῖς ποτίμοις ὕδασι διατελεῖ. 
 
The snakes are discussed last because they are not easily classified as land or water animals: 
certain forms are land animals, others water. Thus it seems that the major division of the larger 
discussion of the external parts of blooded animals (other than humans) is between land and 
water animals. That Aristotle should use this difference as the primary means of organizing his 
discussion is consistent with the emphasis he placed on the difference in the introductory tupos 
of book I. I stated earlier that it is likely that Aristotle considered the difference land 
animal/water animal as one of bios. That this difference in bios is used to organize the discussion 
of the parts of these blooded animals suggests that the parts of animals will show similarity based 
on which side of this bios division they fall: land animals will show greater similarity of parts as 
compared to water animals. And this, in turn, suggests that bios has explanatory priority over the 
parts. And this is just what we should expect given the discussion of explanation and 
demonstration in PA I. 
5.1.2.4 Example: external parts of birds 
In order to get a better sense of Aristotle’s actual method of procedure in the HA, in this 
section I provide a brief analysis of a single part of the discussion of the external parts of blooded 
animals—those of birds. The discussion of the external parts of birds is as remarkable for what is 
not said as for what is. The entire discussion barely takes up a Bekker page (503b29-504b14), 
but its brevity is accounted for by Aristotle’s focus on noting the similarities between birds and 
the animals already discussed (i.e. humans, four footed live bearing, and four footed egg 
bearing), and on describing those parts that are peculiar or unique (idion) to birds.  
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The discussion begins by noting the broad similarities and differences between a bird’s 
body and the bodies of the animals already discussed (four-footed, live-bearers/egg-bearers), 
using the schematic model of the body developed from humans. It is specified that all birds have 
a head, neck, back, underside, and the analogue of a chest (503b30), but nothing further is said 
about this, presumably because the differences between e.g. a bird’s head and a human’s, in so 
far as they are heads, are not very remarkable. That birds have two legs is called out, because it is 
remarkable that birds and humans have this similarity, which most other animals lack. Thus the 
lack of detail with regard to these parts is due to the fact that they do not exhibit any great 
differences that require additional explanation. 
The following parts are specifically highlighted as differing in, or being unique to, birds 
compared to other animals:  
 
 Wings instead of forefeet or hands 
 Unusually long haunch-bone 
 Beak for a mouth 
 Feathers instead of horny-scales or hair 
 Ability to utter articulate sounds 
 The appearance of spurs and crests in some forms 
 
All of these attributes are unique to birds compared to other animals, and thus an 
explanation of these features (if there is one)
240
 must proceed from the nature of birds rather than 
                                                 
240 It is possible that some such features are inexplicable, in so far as they may be essential, 
un-mediated features of birds. For example, the possession of a beak is common to all birds 
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any higher level of organization or classification. Although the HA stops short of identifying 
features as being essential to a given kind (and therefore falls short of explicitly identifying the 
possible causal relationships between features), it regularly uses the language of “common” 
(koina) and “unique/peculiar” (idion).241 By identifying features as common to larger groups and 
unique to smaller ones, the HA enables one to formulate the sort of “follows/followed by” 
extensional relationships between features emphasized in APo. II, and thus to aim further 
research into possible causes. This explains the great lack of detail regarding many of the 
features of birds, and the abundance of detail for other parts. 
5.1.3 Reflection on the discussion of parts in HA 
I have argued above that the historia of the parts of animals aims at providing the reader 
with both a grasp of the various parts found among many animals, understood at a level of 
generality that is common to these many animals, and a grasp of the differences in these parts as 
they actually appear in the various animals that possess them. There is a marked interest in 
establishing the level of generality at which a part is common to many animals, and unique to 
few.
242
 The organizing principles employed in these sections are primarily the important 
differentiae blooded/bloodless, land/water, and live-bearing/egg-bearing. The use of the megista 
genê as organizing principles is subordinate to these (e.g. the division between birds and fish 
follows from the division of land and water animals), and I suggest that this is because Aristotle 
recognized many extensional correlations of features with these differences, and, I suspect, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and is perhaps not further explicable, though the shape, length, hardness, etc. of the beak 
possessed by a particular form of bird may have an explanation. 
241 See Lennox 1990, p. 178 for additional examples. 
242 See Lennox 1987a, 1991; Gotthelf 1988. 
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believed that these organizing differentiae had causal relevance in the explanation of the various 
correlated features. There is not great concern evinced in these discussions with identifying the 
precise forms of animals that exhibit the various differences he lists, below the level of “birds,” 
“fish,” etc. Rather Balme’s comment that the animals are “brought in as witnesses” to the 
differentiae seems closer to what we actually find in the discussions. 
5.2 HA V-VI, IX: ON GENERATION AND REPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITES 
Books V, VI, and IX
243
 of HA treat the generation and reproductive activities of animals, 
broadly speaking. Book IX is focused on humans (but appears to only begin to address the topic), 
and books V-VI treat the other animals. The discussions in these books are wide-ranging and 
more difficult to characterize relative to the picture of a historia I have attempted to develop in 
the preceding chapters. 
                                                 
243 All the MSS of HA have the book dedicated to reproduction in humans ordered last (i.e. 
IX), as do all the translations of HA prior to the Latin edition of Theodorus of Gaza (c. 1398 
– c. 1475), who re-ordered the treatise, placing the book on human reproduction 
immediately following books V and VI on reproduction in other animals. This new ordering 
was retained by all future editions of HA (most notably Bekkers), until Balme restored the 
MS ordering in his 1991 Loeb edition, and the edito maior that followed in 2002. I follow 
Balme’s ordering. See Balme 1991, pp. 18-9, 2002, pp. 1-2; Beullens and Gotthelf 2007; 
Gotthelf  2012a, pp. 289-92 
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5.2.1 Summary of Contents 
The following provides a brief summary of the contents of books V, VI, and IX:
 244
  
  
HA V.1: introduction and modes of reproduction 
The opening lines of book V state that the discussion will be “about generation” (peri tôn 
geneseôn), and announce the order in which the discussion will proceed. Animal generation will 
be discussed according to the megista genê, but in the opposite order as the discussion of parts, 
treating humans last instead of first. V.1 continues with a review of the different modes of 
reproduction, from sexual to spontaneous. The discussion is similar to that found in GA I.1, 
where Aristotle is concerned with establishing sexual generation as the norm.
245
 Here, however, 
the emphasis seems to be on differences in modes of reproduction, with extended comments on 
the spontaneously generated animals that nonetheless have males and females that copulate, and 
the unique cases of seemingly hermaphroditic fish.  
 
HA V.2-14: differences in copulation, breeding seasons, and sexual maturity 
The official discussion of reproduction in the various megista genê is postponed, and 
beginning with V.2 there follows a discussion of the different modes of animal copulation, 
breeding seasons, and ages of sexual maturity. These discussions generally proceed by megiston 
genos, but treat humans and the “higher” kinds first (i.e. proceed in reverse order to that 
announced in V.1). 
                                                 
244 Note that the discussion of the uniform and non-uniform reproductive parts (e.g. 
testicles, penis, uterus, seed) appear in book III (non-uniform in III.1, uniform in III.20-22). 
Additionally, IV.11 discusses various differences between the male and the female.  
245 See Balme 1992, p. 127. 
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HA V.15-32: reproductive practices – bloodless animals 
Beginning with V.15 Aristotle enters into the proper discussions of reproduction in the 
various animal kinds, following (for the most part) the order which he laid out in V.1. The 
spontaneously generated ostrakodema, sea anemones, and sponges are treated first (15-16), then 
the malakostraka (17) and malakia (18). Following this is a long discussion of the insects (19-
33), with special emphasis given to bees and wasps (20-24). 
 
HA V.33-VI: reproductive practices – blooded animals 
The discussion of reproduction in blooded animals extends from the end of book V 
through book VI. Book V ends with a discussion of the egg-bearing four-footed animals, 
including turtles, lizards, and crocodiles (V.33), and the snakes and vipers (V.34). These chapters 
focus on the animals’ breeding seasons, the number and character of the eggs they lay, and their 
incubation habits. Book VI opens with a discussion of birds (VI.1-9). The focus is on birds’ 
breeding seasons, the number of eggs they lay, and their nesting and incubation habits (1); a 
detailed discussion of the similarities and differences between birds’ eggs (2); the development 
of the bird embryo within the egg (3); and then proceeds to a discussion of different forms (i.e. 
“species”) of birds, including pigeons, vultures, eagles, cuckoos, and peafowl, focusing again on 
their breeding seasons, the number of eggs they lay, and their nesting and incubation habits (4-9). 
From birds the discussion next turns to water-dwelling animals, especially fish (VI.10-17). It 
begins with the live-bearing fish (i.e. the selachia) (10-11) and cetacean (12), then moves to the 
egg-bearing fish (13-14), spontaneously generated fish (15), and eels (16). The discussion of fish 
ends with an extended discussion of the differences in breeding seasons (17). Book VI ends with 
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a discussion of the blooded, live-bearing footed animals (VI.18-37). The discussion begins with 
general remarks on the pleasure and excitement associated with copulation that is shared by all 
these animals, and the fierce and sometimes unusual behavior that results (18). Next, following a 
discussion of menstruation in these animals (18), then individual “forms” or “species” are 
treated, including pigs (18), sheep and goats (19), dogs (20), cattle (21), horses (22), asses (23), 
mules (24), camels (26), elephants (27), wild boars (28), deer (29), bears (30), lions (31), hyenas 
(32), rabbits (33), foxes (34), wolves (35), cats (35), half-asses (36), and mice (37).  The 
treatment of the domesticated animals – such as pigs, cattle, and horses – tends to be much 
longer and more detailed than the wild animals. The discussions are quite varied, but often focus 
on breeding and copulation habits, age of sexual maturity, the number of offspring generated, the 
duration of pregnancy, and the rearing of the young. 
 
HA IX: reproductive practices: humans 
Book IX announces its subject matter with the following: “regarding the generation of 
humans . . . as many things as happen due to their proper nature, are in this manner” (peri d’ 
anthrôpou geneseôs . . . osa sumbainei dia tên phusiv tên oikeian, tond’ echei ton tropon) 
(581a9-11). The discussion begins with the signs of sexual maturity in men and women and the 
changes their bodies undergo (1), then moves to menstruation in women (2). Next the signs of 
successful conception in women are discussed, as well as the early development of the fetus (3). 
Further changes in women during pregnancy are addressed next, as well as varying durations of 
pregnancy (4). A consideration of the typical ages of sexual maturity and decline appears next, 
including a discussion of reproductive problems among men and women (5-6). The development 
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of the embryo is next examined (7-8), then labor and childbirth (9-10) and changes in women 
after giving birth (11). Finally, the condition of new-born babies is briefly discussed (12). 
5.2.2 HA V.1: introduction to the discussion of generation 
Aristotle begins the discussion of generation with the following comment regarding the order 
according to which the discussion should proceed: 
 
[14] It remains to discuss the generation of animals, beginning with those things that 
are primary. These are many and diverse, some dissimilar, and others in some 
manner similar to one another. And since the kinds have been divided earlier, in 
the same way also now we must attempt to make our investigation, Only before 
we made our beginning of the study of parts with man, but now we must speak of 
this last because it involves much work. We must begin first with the 
ostrakoderma, and after these the malakostraka, and the others in this way in 
order.  
 
539a1      περὶ δὲ τῶν γενέσεων αὐτῶν λοι- 
πὸν διελθεῖν, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν πρώτων. Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλαὶ καὶ 
πολλὴν ἔχουσαι ποικιλίαν, καὶ τῇ μὲν ἀνόμοιοι, τῇ δὲ τρό- 
πον τινὰ προσεοίκασιν ἀλλήλαις. ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὰ γένη 
a5  πρότερον, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ νῦν πειρατέον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν  
θεωρίαν· πλὴν τότε μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποιούμεθα σκοποῦντες 
περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπου, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταῖον 
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λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν. πρῶτον δ’ ἀρ- 
κτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν 
a10  μαλακοστράκων, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐφεξῆς· 
 
 
Aristotle then lists the order of the kinds to be treated, but the actual discussion in HA doesn’t 
follow this order perfectly: 
 
Announced in HA V.1   Actual order in HA 
ostrakoderma     ostrakoderma 
malakostraka     malakostraka 
malakia     malakia 
insects      insects 
fishes (live-bearing/egg-bearing)  footed egg-bearing animals, and 
snakes 
birds      birds 
footed egg-bearing animals   live-bearing fishes and cetacea, 
  egg-bearing fishes 
footed live-bearing animals   footed live-bearing animals 
humans     humans 
 
Birds (VI.1-9) are actually treated before fishes (VI.10-17); the egg-bearing four-footed 
animals are discussed in V.33, not with the live-bearing four-footed animals, but just after the 
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insects and before the birds. (I think the principle behind the actual ordering is egg-bearing: 
walking, flying, swimming). Snakes and vipers are discussed with the egg-bearing four-footed 
animals.   
Why should the historia of generation proceed in the opposite order compared to that of 
the parts of animals? The reason Aristotle provides is that it “involves the most work” (dia to 
pleistên echein pragmateian), but what does this mean? In what sense is the generation of 
humans more complicated, or its study involve more work, than the other animals? If anything, 
one might suspect that the study of generation in humans would be easier, due to the (forgive the 
pun) intimate knowledge we have of its methods and procedures. Alternatively, if the reference 
is to the actual development of the human fetus, from embryo to newborn, then such a project 
may involve the most work for Aristotle, given the relative paucity of information he must have 
had at his disposal regarding these stages of development, given the restrictions on human 
dissection and, presumably, research. 
We may approach an answer to this question by first rendering more precise what 
Aristotle means when he says the subject matter of these books is genesis. A review of the 
contents of these books from the previous section suggests that their focus is less on the 
physiological processes that take place in generation (i.e. the manner in which the male and 
female seeds interact and change in order to bring about an offspring one in form with the 
parents—arguably the focus of GA), 246 and more on the different manners in which animals 
achieve the goal of reproduction, i.e. the different ways in which they copulate, their breeding 
seasons and ages of sexual maturity, the number of offspring they have and how they go about 
                                                 
246 If I am correct in differently characterizing the primary subject matters discussed in GA 
and these books of HA, then it brings into question whether the relation between these 
books of HA and GA is one of hoti to dioti.  
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caring for them, if at all, etc. in fact, much of what is discussed in these books of HA may be best 
characterized as reproductive activities.  
Understood in this way, we may now ask whether reporting the details of the 
reproductive activities of humans requires “more work” than those of other animals. There is 
reason to think that Aristotle believed that it did. As will be discussed further below,
247
 Aristotle 
held that the greater the cognitive capacities of an animal kind are, the more complicated their 
activities and manners of life become. Thus while the actual physiological process of generation 
may be equally complicated in the so-called “lower” forms of animals as the higher, the activities 
surrounding the conception, birth, and rearing of the offspring of the higher kinds (with humans 
understood as the highest) will be more varied and complicated, and thus require “more 
work.”248 
5.3 ON MANNERS OF LIFE, ACTIVITIES, AND CHARACTERS 
In many ways, the subject matter discussed in book VII is quite different from book VIII, 
however their joint presentation may be defended by the introductions that begin each book, 
which share many of the same themes. In fact, it may very well be that the first chapter of book 
                                                 
247 See HA VII.1, 589a1ff., and below, section 4.2. 
248 It’s interesting that the contents of book IX on human generation, focused as it is on 
many physiological aspects of pregnancy and reproduction, do not support this conclusion 
as well as I’d like. One possible reason is that the discussion we have in book IX represents 
only the beginning of a discussion of human generation. As it stands, the HA lacks an 
exhaustive treatment of many aspects of the activities and lives of humans. It may be 
argued that at least some of these topics are covered in other treatises, such as NE and Pol. 
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VII serves as an introduction to both books, with the introduction to book VIII reiterating some 
of the main points made in VII, while adding a few of its own.  
In what follows I provide brief summaries of the contents of books VII and VIII (section 
4.1), and I then turn to the introductory passages of both books (section 4.2), in which Aristotle 
establishes the bios, praxis, and êthos as legitimate subjects of scientific investigation. I then turn 
to an analysis of select passage in these books (section 4.3), which is followed by a concluding 
reflection on books VII and VIII (section 4.4). 
5.3.1 Brief summaries of HA VII and VIII 
Book VII may be divided into the following five sections: 
 
1.  Philosophical introduction (VII.1, 588a16-589a10) 
The first chapter of book VII consists in an extended philosophical reflection on (1) the 
presence in other animals of certain differentiae (especially those related to êthos) commonly 
associated only with humans, and (2) the near continuous gradation of variation in animal 
differentiae across the different kinds of animals. The whole introduction seems to serve as a 
defense of the study of differentia relating to bios, praxis, and, especially, êthos, in animals other 
than humans. 
 
2.  Water vs. land animal (VII.2, 589a10-b18) 
The introduction to book VII ends by noting the relationship between an animal’s 
material constitution and the food the animal typically eats. This leads to a consideration of the 
environments in which animals characteristically live. The basic division water animal/land 
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animal is introduced here again, as it was in the tupos of book I, and similar divisions are again 
discussed. Greater emphasis is now placed on the importance that bodily blend (krasis) plays in 
determining whether an animal is a land or water animal. Indeed, bodily blend appears to be the 
primary consideration, while that of taking in and expelling water or air is a sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition. 
 
3.  Feeding and nutrition (VII.2-11, 589b18-596b20) 
The recognition of the close relationship between the environment in which an animal 
lives, the material blend of its body, and the food it eats leads naturally to a discussion of feeding 
and nutrition (trophê). Three primary differentia are introduced: flesh-eater, plant-eater, and all-
eater, and they are applied to animals according to megista genê. 
 
4.  Migration, hiding, and the shedding of skin (VII.12-17, 596b20-601a23) 
The discussion turns next from nutrition and feeding to the different manners by which 
animals protect themselves from excessive heat or cold in their environments. The topics are 
related in so far as they are in part determined by the environment in which an animal lives. The 
topics discussed in this section include migration, hiding (hibernation/aestivation), and the 
shedding of skin. 
 
5.  Conditions in which animals thrive (VII.18-30, 601a23-608a7) 
In this final long section Aristotle discusses a number of conditions that affect the good 
health and general “thriving” of different animals. These include the seasons during which 
animals most thrive and the diseases that most commonly affect them (VII.18-27, 601a23-
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605b21); the places where animals thrive most and generally how animals in different places 
differ (VII.28-29, 605b21-607a34); and how pregnancy affects animals’ conditions (VII.30, 
607b1-608a7) 
 
The thematic connection between these disparate sections appears to be as follows: the 
primary elemental environment in which an animal lives and spends most of its time in part 
determines the material make up of the animal’s body, and thus also the food it is required to eat 
in order to survive. Thus there is a natural connection between the environment in which an 
animal lives and its nutrition. An animal’s environment also changes seasonally, and thus 
animals must protect themselves from seasonal excesses of heat and cold in order to survive and 
thrive, and different animals do so in different manners. Indeed, the factors that affect an 
animal’s thriving and good condition are varied. As Balme states: “the whole (of book VII is 
held together by the theme of natural constitutional health . . .”249 
Book VIII may be divided into the following six sections: 
 
1.  Philosophical Introduction (608a11-21) 
Similar to book VII, book VIII begins with a short reflection of the study of êthos in 
animals other than humans. Its purpose is to establish that animals exhibit traits of character, 
though to a lesser extent than humans. 
  
2.  Differences in character between males and females (608a21-b18) 
                                                 
249  Balme 1991, p. 57, note b. 
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The discussion of character begins by noting differences of character that generally apply 
to males and females, regardless of animal kind. 
 
3.  Friendship and Enmity among animals (608b19-610b19) 
A long discussion of friendships (philiai) and enmities, or “wars” (polemoi), among 
animals follows. The cause is identified as living in the same place and feeding on the same 
things (or, indeed, on one another).  
 
4.  Intelligence and stupidity in animals (610b20-629b5) 
This section focuses on the various ways in which animals seem to act intelligently in 
order to help themselves. The discussion begins with four-footed animals (chs. 3-6), and 
proceeds to a long treatment of birds (chs. 7-36), water animals (fish, malakia, etc.; ch. 37) and 
insects (38-43), especially bees. 
 
5.  Gentleness and wildness in animals (629b5-631b4) 
In this section Aristotle returns to a topic touched upon in the section on friendship and 
enmity, namely the traits of gentleness (praotêta) and wildness (agriotêta). The discussion is 
abbreviated and not very focused, beginning with a treatment of certain land animals (lion, 
“thos,” bison, elephant, camel), and turning then to water animals, but discusses only the 
dolphin. 
  
6.  Other activities that affect character (631b5-633b8) 
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Book VIII ends with a brief discussion of the manner in which changes in an animal’s 
pathê (which Balme translates as “occasional bodily states”) may affect their character, as also 
their activities. The actual topics discussed include changes in the bodily form and character of 
animals due to castration (631b19-632a34), the effects of rumination (632a35-b14), and seasonal 
changes to birds (632b15-633b8). 
 
5.3.2 Philosophical introductions: HA VII.1 and VIII.1 
Both books VII and VIII begin with philosophical reflections on the relationship between 
the cognitive capacities exhibited by animals, and those exhibited by humans. The similarities of 
these introductions suggest that the two books form something of a pair, though the subjects 
discussed in them are ultimately quite different. 
 
5.3.2.1 Introduction to HA VII 
VII.1 begins with a transitional statement,
250
 marking the end of the discussion of 
generation in books V and VI,
251
 and the beginning of a new subject matter in VII: 
 
                                                 
250 In some manuscripts, this sentence appears at the end of book VI instead. This variation 
in ending and beginning sentences between books is common in the manuscripts. 
251 But what of Book IX, which treats, to some degree, of generation in humans? The best 
account of the ordering of these books holds that book IX begins the discussion of bios, 
praxeis, and êthê in humans, but only gets it off the ground. See Gotthelf 2012a, pp. 289-92. 
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[15] Such then is the nature of the animals in other respects, and also in their 
generation. Their activities and ways of life differ according to their characters 
and nutrition. (588a16-18) 
 
588a16 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν 
γένεσιν τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ οἱ βίοι 
κατὰ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς τροφὰς διαφέρουσιν. 
 
Aristotle here asserts that the activities and manners of life of animals differ “according 
to” their characters and nutrition. The kata in a18 is ambiguous regarding the exact relationship 
between praxis and bios, on the one hand, and êthos and trophê on the other. As one set varies, 
so also, apparently, does the other, but whether they are causally related, such that e.g. 
differences in bioi cause differences in êthê, or vice versa, is underdetermined.
252
 The ensuing 
discussions in books VII and VIII do treat both êthos and trophê (êthos in VIII, trophê, among 
other things, in VII), so the connection is drawn here in order to introduce these topics by way of 
their relationship with the established forms of difference discussed earlier, bios and praxis.
253
 
The inclusion of êthos here, and the defense of the study of êthos in other animals that follows, 
suggests that this rather philosophically oriented reflection introduces not only the subject 
matters discussed in book VII, but book VIII as well.  
                                                 
252 As one would expect in a historia. 
253 It’s interesting that êthos was introduced as one of the four main forms of differentia in 
the tupos, but trophê was not. 
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Following this transitional statement, and picking up particularly on the use there of 
êthos, Aristotle proceeds by defending the study of êthos in animals other than humans by 
arguing that “traces of the ways of soul” are present even in animals:254 
 
[16] For even the other animals mostly possess traces of the ways of soul, such as 
present differences more obviously in the case of humans. For tameness and 
wildness, gentleness and roughness, courage and cowardice, fears and boldness, 
temper and mischievousness are present in many of them together with 
resemblances of intelligent understanding, like the resemblances that we spoke of 
in the case of the bodily parts. For some characters differ by the more and less 
compared with man, as does man compared to the majority of animals (for certain 
characters of this kind are present to a greater degree in man, certain others to a 
greater degree in the other animals), while others differ by analogy: for 
corresponding to art, wisdom and intelligence in man, certain animals possess 
another natural capability of a certain sort. (588a18-31) 
 
588a18       Ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς 
πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν 
a20  τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς δια-  
φοράς· καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πραότης καὶ 
χαλεπότης, καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δειλία, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, 
καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργίαι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως 
                                                 
254 See Lennox 1999 for an excellent discussion of êthos in animals compared to humans. 
 219 
ἔνεισιν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν με- 
a25  ρῶν ἐλέγομεν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει  
πρὸς  ἄλλοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον δια- 
φέρει· ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις, 
οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζῴων ἐστί τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύνα-  
μις. 
 
Aristotle begins by claiming that “traces of the ways of soul” that are more obviously 
observed in humans are nonetheless present in other animals as well.
255
 As examples he offers 
the following: 
 
tameness and wildness (hêmerotês kai agriotês) 
gentleness and roughness (praotês kai chalepotês) 
courage and cowardice (andria kai deilia) 
fears and boldness (phoboi kai tharrê) 
temper and mischievousness (thumoi kai panourgia) 
resemblances of intelligent understanding (tês peri tên dianoian suneseôs  
homoiotêtes) 
 
Many of these traits are mentioned in the section of the tupos on êthos,
256
 but none of 
them are discussed in book VII. As we shall see, a similar list is offered in VIII.1. 
                                                 
255 Compare with the opening of book VIII, where Aristotle claims that êthê in “the less 
developed and shorter lived” animals are less apparent to perception compared to those of 
the longer-lived animals. See 608a11-13. 
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In the second half [16] Aristotle explicitly applies the topology of sameness and 
difference he developed in relation to the parts of animals in the tupos to the “ways of soul” 
discussed here. Recall that, in the earlier discussion, differing by the more or the less indicated a 
sameness in genos and a difference in eidos. These same relations hold between traits of 
character: some of the character traits exhibited by animals differ from those exhibited by 
humans by the more or the less, thus rendering the traits the same in genos but different in eidos, 
while other traits are only analogously similar.  
The applicability of this topology of sameness and difference opens up the study of these 
features for scientific investigation, and puts them on a par, as it were, with the parts of animals. 
That is, since the activities and characters that manifest themselves in animals can be organized 
according to the modes of similarity and difference discussed earlier, we should be able to 
establish relationships between different kinds of animals based on the manner in which they 
possess these features, and, by so doing, potentially bring to light their causes. 
Up to this point, Aristotle has not offered any argument in support of the notion that these 
traits of character/ways of soul are indeed exhibited by animals. It is not entirely clear that he 
owes us such an argument. It may be that careful observation of the relevant animals sufficiently 
substantiates his claim. However, he does proceed by offering an argument of sorts. By 
comparing the similar mental capacities of certain animals to human children, the claim that 
these character traits are in fact exhibited by many animals becomes more plausible: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
256 Gentle (praa), 488b13; rough-tempered (thumôdê), 488b14; cowardly (deilia), 488b15; 
courageous (andreia), 488b17; wild (agria), 488b18; mischievous (panourga), 488b20. 
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[17] This kind of thing is clearest if we look at the age of childhood; for in children, 
though one can see as it were traces and seeds of the dispositions that they will 
have later, yet their soul at this period has practically no difference from that of 
wild animals, so that it is not illogical if some characters are the same in the other 
animals, while others are very like, and others are analogous. (588a31-b3) 
 
588a31 Φανερώτατον δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων 
ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τῶν μὲν ὕστερον ἕξεων 
ἐσομένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἴχνη καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ’  
b1  οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν 
χρόνον τοῦτον, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταὐτὰ τὰ δὲ 
παραπλήσια τὰ δ’ ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. 
 
The argument, at its core, is that since the soul of a child is practically the same as that of 
a wild animal (thêriôn), it is “not unreasonable” (ouk alogon) that we should observe “traces” of 
the characteristics of soul in animals, just as we do in children. These traces, in children, are as 
“seeds,” which later develop, in maturity, into stable dispositions of character (hexeis). In 
animals, however, the implication seems to be that the traces are not seeds and do not develop 
further. However, they nonetheless are present, and they exhibit enough differentiation so as to 
merit further study.
257
 
                                                 
257 See Lennox 1999 for a close examination of this argument and a comparison with 
similar passages in NE. See also Leunissen 2013. 
 222 
Following this defense of the study of êthos and the “ways of soul” in animals, Aristotle 
proceeds by arguing that it is possible to arrange living things along a near continuous scale of 
slight variation, representing an ever-increasing “possession of life” (mallon . . . metechein zôês, 
mallon zôên echonta). Certain plants, Aristotle argues, when compared to more complex 
animals, seem as though they are inanimate, but when compared to actually inanimate things, 
these plants seem amazingly alive. Similarly, certain animals seem to be no more animate – 
“possess life” to no greater degree – than plants. But always, “little by little” one finds additional 
kinds of animals that appear to bridge the gap between the most simple and the most complex 
kinds.  
Aristotle draws no notion of evolutionary development from this striking fact. Instead he 
uses it to strengthen and further secure his subject matter – the bios, praxis, and êthos of animals 
– as a topic of serious study. Since the gradation from higher to lower animals is nearly 
continuous, so also are the gradations in their activities and cognitive capacities. He offers 
activities related to generation as an example: most plants appear to have no other function 
(ergon) than producing seed and thus reproducing themselves; and indeed this function is shared 
by all (or almost all) living things. But, as he states, when sensation is added (i.e. when greater 
cognitive capacities are added) the activities surrounding their generation become more complex, 
e.g. more time is spent rearing and caring for the young. The message of the example is clear: 
animals that possess greater cognitive capabilities will show greater variety or sophistication in 
their activities, manners of life, and characters, but these forms of difference are nonetheless 
present even in the relatively “simple” animals, and are thus viable subjects of scientific study. 
The example Aristotle uses, that of generation, was of course the subject matter of the 
previous two books. He now completes the transition to his new subject as follows: 
 223 
 
[18] Now while one part of living consists for them in the activities to do with the 
producing of young, a further and different part consists in those to do with food; 
for these two objects in fact engage the efforts and lives of all animals. (589a2-5) 
 
589a2     Ἓν μὲν  
οὖν μέρος τῆς ζωῆς αἱ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν εἰσὶ πράξεις 
αὐτοῖς, ἔτι δ’ ἕτερον αἱ περὶ τὴν τροφήν· περὶ γὰρ δύο τού- 
a5  των αἵ τε σπουδαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πᾶσαι καὶ ὁ βίος.  
 
The transition from generation to the gathering of food serves two purposes. First it 
begins the introduction to the next section, but second it ties the gradations in the activities 
relating to generation to those relating to food. Just as we observe the activities related to 
generation become more complex as the cognitive capacities of the animals in question increase 
(as was demonstrated in the preceding books), so also we might expect a similar complexity in 
the activities surrounding the gathering of food. And since feeding occupies as much of an 
animal’s life as procreating (indeed, arguably more), we should expect the discussion to be an 
involved one.
258
 
                                                 
258 Recall that Aristotle identifies the nutritive and generative capacities of soul: both are 
capacities for producing an animal that is one in form with the “parent” (which, for the 
nutritive capacity, is the individual possessing soul). See DA II.4, 416a20ff.; GA II.1, 
735a17ff. 
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But nutrition is not the first subject treated in book VII. Instead, the subject of nutrition 
leads to the further consideration that the food an animal eats is determined by the material out of 
which the animal’s body is composed, its bodily blend or krasis:259 
 
[19] And their food differs chiefly according to the matter out of which they are 
constituted. For each one’s growth comes naturally out of the same matter. And 
what is natural is pleasant; and all pursue their natural pleasure. (589a5-9) 
 
589a5          Αἱ  
δὲ τροφαὶ διαφέρουσι μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἐξ οἵας συν- 
εστήκασιν. Ἡ γὰρ αὔξησις ἑκάστοις γίνεται κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ 
ταύτης. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ· διώκει δὲ πάντα τὴν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἡδονήν. 
 
This consideration, in turn, leads to a discussion of the characteristic environments in 
which animals live and spend most of their time. An animal’s bodily blend matches or 
corresponds to the environment in which it lives, be that environment more watery, more earthy, 
etc. Thus a relationship exists between (1) the environment in which an animal lives, (2) the 
material blend of an animal’s body, and (3) the food an animal characteristically eats. These 
topics form the core of the discussion in book VII. 
 
                                                 
259 As Allan Gotthelf pointed out, for Aristotle it is not that “you are what you eat” but 
rather that “you eat what you are!” 
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5.3.2.2 Introduction to HA VIII 
Before turning to the main discussions of book VII, let us first compare the introduction 
to book VII with that of book VIII. For it too begins with a defense of the study of êthos in 
animals: 
 
[20] The characters of animals are, among the less-developed and shorter-lived, less 
obvious to us by perception, but, among the longer-lived, more obvious. For they 
appear to have a certain natural capacity regarding each of the affections of the 
soul, regarding intelligence, stupidity, courage, and cowardice, and regarding 
tameness and ferocity, and the other dispositions of this sort. And some [animals] 
at the same time share in some learning and teaching, some from each other, 
others from humans, as many as have hearing, not just as many as [hear] sounds, 
but also those that distinguish the differences of signs. (608a11-21)  
 
608a11   Τὰ δ’ ἤθη τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἀμαυροτέρων καὶ  
βραχυβιωτέρων ἧττον ἡμῖν ἔνδηλα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῶν 
δὲ μακροβιωτέρων ἐνδηλότερα. Φαίνονται γὰρ ἔχοντά τινα 
δύναμιν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθημάτων φυσικήν, 
a15  περί τε φρόνησιν καὶ εὐήθειαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δειλίαν, περί 
τε πραότητα καὶ χαλεπότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύ- 
τας ἕξεις. Ἔνια δὲ κοινωνεῖ τινὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ 
διδασκαλίας, τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων, ὅσαπερ ἀκοῆς μετέχει, μὴ μόνον ὅσα τῶν ψό- 
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a20  φων, ἀλλ’ ὅσα καὶ τῶν σημείων διαισθάνεται τὰς διαφο- 
ράς. 
 
Here again we have the claim that the ethê exhibited by animals are generally less 
apparent or obvious to us, though here in VIII.1 we are given the additional information that they 
are especially hard to discern in the “less developed and shorter lived” animals, and more easily 
recognized in the “longer lived.” What, in VII.1, were described as “traces of the ways of soul” 
are here referred to as “a certain natural capacity regarding each of the affections of soul,” but 
that the two phrases refer to the same things is shown by the list of examples provided. Recall in 
VII.1 a similar list was offered – here are both: 
 
VII.1 
tameness and wildness (hêmerotês kai agriotês) 
gentleness and roughness (praotês kai chalepotês) 
courage and cowardice (andria kai deilia) 
fears and boldness (phoboi kai tharrê) 
temper and mischievousness (thumoi kai panourgia) 
resemblances of intelligent understanding (tês peri tên dianoian suneseôs  
homoiotêtes) 
 
VIII.1 
intelligence and stupidity (phronêsis kai euêtheia)  
courage and cowardice (andreia kai deilia)  
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tameness and ferocity (praotêta kai chalepotêta) 
other dispositions of this sort (tas toiautos hexeis) 
 
While these examples show that Aristotle has the same traits in mind, in VII.1 he seems 
to stop short of referring to these traits, as they appear in animals, as “dispositions” (hexeis), 
which he seems there, as elsewhere, to reserve for humans. Here in VIII.1 he does not hesitate to 
call them hexeis.
260
  
Also, Aristotle makes the further observation in VIII.1 that some animals are receptive to 
a certain amount of learning and teaching. This is restricted to those animals that are not only 
capable of hearing sounds, but also of distinguishing “the differences of signs” (tôn sêmaiôn . . . 
tas diphoras).
261
 While this information is of a piece with the observation in VII.1 that many 
animals possess “resemblances of intelligent understanding”, it nonetheless represents a new 
observation, and though the topic of teaching and learning amongst animals is not treated 
directly in book VIII, the many ways in which animals act intelligently (or seemingly 
intelligently) is.  
 In short, VIII.1 begins much as VII.1 did, with a defense of the study of êthos in animals. 
Why then is the discussion of êthos postponed to book VIII? Recall that VII.1 began with the 
observation that bios and praxis differ “according to” êthos and trophê. From the beginning these 
were the two main topics to be discussed. But, while it was clear that all animals need nutrition, 
and that different animals feed differently, it was perhaps not clear that all animals, or at least 
                                                 
260 See Lennox 1999, Leunissen 2013. 
261 See Metaph. A.1, 980b25ff.; below ch. 6, section 3. 
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most,
262
 exhibit traits of character similar to those found in humans. The defense of the study of 
êthos in VII.1 led to the reflection on the near continuous gradations of change between animal 
kinds, and the manner by which their activities become more complex as their cognitive 
capacities increase. This in turn led to the consideration that together generation and feeding 
occupy most the time and energy of animals, and thus feeding, and its relationship to bodily 
blend and environment, was introduced as a topic to be discussed. The introduction to book VII 
sets the agenda for books VII and VIII. 
5.3.3 Select Passages from HA VII and VIII 
5.3.3.1 Feeding and nutrition (HA VII.2-11, 589b18-5496b20) 
 
The discussion of feeding and nutrition in book VII proceeds more or less “up” through 
the megista genê, beginning with the ostrakoderma
263
 and moving through the bloodless animals 
to the blooded. Each section is characterized by the application of one or more differentiae of 
feeding to either the whole group or some division of the group. The most common feeding 
differentiae are: flesh-eating (sarkophaga, i.e. carnivores), plant or grass-eating (poêphaga, i.e. 
herbivores), and all-eating or pamphaga (this seems to extend beyond our notion of “omnivore”, 
                                                 
262 Namely those with relatively higher cognitive capabilities. As Lennox points out to me, 
“sponges and sea cucumbers have relatively uninteresting characters.” 
263 Throughout the dissertation I have chosen to use the transliterated Greek names for the 
following bloodless animals: ostrakoderma (“potshard-skinned,” i.e. testaceans), 
malakostraka (“soft-shelled”, i.e. crustaceans), malakia (“softies,” i.e. cephalopods). I’ve 
done so both because the referents of the terms we use today are generally not well known 
among people working in ancient philosophy (and thus little is lost using the Greek term), 
and by retaining the Greek it emphasizes the “name-like” nature of appelations, on which 
see Lennox 1991, n19, n24. 
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in so far as Aristotle reports that some such animals eat wood, stones, even dung). The 
discussion of feeding in birds includes the most varied of such attributes, including grub-eating, 
grain-eating, thorn-eating, and snipe-eating.
264
 
In discussing a given attribute Aristotle often picks out the animals to which it belongs by 
using a second attribute. Often it seems there is a close connection between the two attributes, 
and it may be in this way that Aristotle points to or suggests possible causal relationships 
between attributes. Notably, it does NOT seem that the differentia selected to pick out certain 
animal kinds from the larger group is designated to define the kind so identified. Rather the 
extensional correlation of the attributes seems aimed at suggesting causal relations. 
In what follows I look at three examples from the section on feeding: the ostrakoderma, 
birds, and four-footed live-bearers. 
 
Ostrakoderma (590a19-b10) 
The first kind of animal discussed are the ostrakoderma. In the discussion Aristotle 
divides the larger kind into those that are capable of locomotion (kinêtika), and those that are 
immobile (akinêta). The feeding attributes are then associated with this division: the immobile 
ostrakoderma feed on potable water, and the ones capable of motion feed on other animals and 
plants. What is the connection between the feeding attributes and those of locomotion? It seems 
clear that a flesh-eating animal could not survive (or survive well) if it were immobile: being 
                                                 
264
 For evidence of their feeding habits Aristotle often looks to the sort of bait used to catch or 
capture the animal; this is especially true of the sea creatures. This seems to point to the source 
of at least some of Aristotle’s information. Similarly, the discussion of four-footed live-bearing 
animals seems to be organized around wild and tame, and among the tame animals, information 
is provided by the shepherds and other professionals engaged in raising these domesticated 
animals. 
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mobile provides the conditions under which an animal can hunt and thus feed on other 
animals.
265
 The correlation of these attributes leads one to consider whether e.g. being immobile 
is a cause of feeding on potable water, or whether feeding on potable water obviates the need for 
locomotion in these animals, and thus is a cause of their being immobile.  
It is of note that the similar differentiae monima (stationary) and metabltika (capable of 
movement) are discussed in the introductory tupos, as are the differentiae related to feeding. 
Nothing in either discussion suggests a causal priority of one over the other.
266
 
 
Birds (592a29-594a1) 
The discussion of birds is divided between land-dwelling and water-dwelling birds, 
though the division is not initially announced as such.
267
 Among the land-dwelling birds, the first 
picked-out are the crook-taloned birds (gampsônuchoi). These are immediately singled out as 
flesh-eaters (sarkophaga). Here again we find a correlation between attributes that seems to 
imply either a causal relationship or an underlying common cause. The connection between 
being gampsonuchos and sarkophaga is not further discussed here in HA, but it is explored at 
length in PA IV.12. There the bios of gampsonuchos birds explains the presence of their crook-
talons; it is grounded in the need to over-powering and master other animals. Being flesh-eating 
seems to be a more primary aspect of these birds’ lives, and is thus explanatory of their crook-
talons.
268
  
                                                 
265 Aristotle does note that one immobile animal, the sea anemone, is a flesh-eater, feeding 
on whatever fish happens to approach its mouth, but it also feeds on potable water. 
266 This is especially true of the related discussion in the tupos, where the topics are not 
even treated consecutively. 
267 See Balme 1991, p. 105, note b. 
268 See Lennox 2010b for a discussion of this chapter and the role of bios in explanation. 
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A number of other feeding differentiae are subsequently introduced (grub-eater, thorn-
eater, sknipe-eater, grain-eater, herb-eater), with examples of kinds of birds that exhibit the 
differentiae. The pattern in this section is first to introduce the differentia of feeding, next to 
identify one or more kinds/forms of bird that exhibit the differentia, and finally to provide 
additional information about the birds so identified, perhaps to facilitate the actual identification 
of the bird in the wild. No indication is given that the differentia of feeding is an essential feature 
of the kind of bird identified, nor is it offered as a “specific difference,” i.e. one that would figure 
into a more complex definition of the kind of bird. Rather, the specific forms of bird are offered 
as mere examples of animals that exhibit the feature in question.  
 
Four-footed live-bearing (594a25-596b10) 
Interestingly, the discussion of the four-footed live-bearing animals appears to be divided 
first by the differentiae wild (agria) and tame (hêmera). The wild animals are discussed first, and 
it is immediately noted that all wild animals that are saw-toothed (karcharodonta) are flesh-
eaters (sarkophaga). Examples include the wolf, bear, and lion. Similar to the discussion of 
feeding in birds, here the feeding differentia sarkophaga is correlated with another differentia (in 
this case karcharodonta), examples of animals are given, then additional information about these 
animals is provided. No definite causal relationship is specified between these differentiae, but, 
similar to the cases of ostrakoderma and birds, the reader is left to wonder if one might be the 
cause of the other. Also similar to the case of birds, in PA we find a more detailed account of 
why being karcharodonta is useful for eating flesh, and how this relates to the bios of such 
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animals.
269
 Flesh-eating again appears to be a more primary attribute of bios, and is thus 
explanatory of being saw-toothed. 
 
These examples serve to illustrate that in the HA Aristotle often appears to offer 
correlations between attributes that he feels either are or are likely to be causally related in some 
important way. Exactly what is explanatory of what is not made clear, but what emerges is a 
complex picture of the interwoven relationship between these attributes, and suggests that 
understanding why a given animal exhibits a given attribute will require a deep acquaintance 
with the many facets of animal life.  
Interestingly, the same attributes of feeding are discussed in the different megista gene, 
but no explicit effort is made to group these animals together as all being e.g. flesh-eaters. Rather 
being e.g. a flesh-eater appears to bring about different effects in different kinds of animals: 
ostrakoderma are often immobile, but those that are flesh-eaters are (mostly) mobile; birds have 
a beak rather than teeth and peculiar feet/toes, so flesh-eating affects the shape of their beak and 
their claws; four-footed live-bearing animals all have teeth, and flesh-eating requires those teeth 
to be saw-like. How does this sit with the discussion in APo. II.17 on the coextension of cause 
and effect? If I’m correct in suggesting that Aristotle views flesh-eating in these cases as a cause 
of the various other attributes discussed, then we have a case of the same cause bringing about 
different effects in different kinds of animals. The demands that flesh-eating put upon an animal 
vary with the specific kind of animal in question (and the bodily structures that are unique to 
those kinds), and thus the “effects” (i.e. the differentiation of attributes) brought about by flesh-
eating varies across the kinds.  
                                                 
269 See PA III.1. 
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It is important to emphasize that Aristotle does not specifically employ causal language 
in these sections, and indeed perhaps consciously avoids it. However, given e.g. the related 
discussions in PA, as well as Aristotle’s teleological view of explanation in animals, it is difficult 
to read these extensional correlations without seeing an underlying causal relationship at least 
being hinted at.   
Note also, importantly, that in each case the differentiae that are picked out do not appear 
to be offered as specific differentiae, i.e. differentiae that properly divide the kind into eidei. The 
concern is not to define e.g. bears as saw-toothed flesh-eaters. Rather the interest appears to be in 
finding a way of dividing the larger kind into subgroups, all of which possess the feeding 
attribute in question. No suggestion is made that the subgroups that result from the division form 
any sort of ontologically privileged sub-kind. The focus is not on how one might go about 
grouping, ordering, or indeed defining kinds of animals, but rather on kinds of attributes and the 
relationships among them.
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5.3.3.2 Migration, hiding, and the shedding of skin (596b20-601a23) 
This section of book VII is divided among the three topics listed in the heading: 
migration (ektopizein, 596b30-599a5), hiding (phôlein, 599a5-600b15), and the shedding of the 
“old age” (ekdunô to gêras, 600b15-601a23). It is introduced with the following comment: 
 
[21] Their activities are all related both to mating and the raising of young, or to the 
supply of food, or are contrived against periods of cold and heat, or against the 
changing of the seasons. For all [animals] have an innate perception of change 
                                                 
270 Lennox stresses this in his 1990. 
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with respect to hot and cold, and just as among humans some move indoors 
during the winter, and others who command much land spend the summer in the 
cold parts and the winter in the warm sunny parts, so it is also with the animals 
that are capable of changing locations. And some find protection in their habitual 
places, while others migrate . . . (596b20-30) 
 
596b20  Αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν ἅπασαι περί τε τὰς ὀχείας 
καὶ τὰς τεκνώσεις εἰσί, καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐπορίας τῆς τροφῆς, 
καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη καὶ τὰς ἀλέας πεπορισμέναι, καὶ πρὸς 
τὰς μεταβολὰς τὰς τῶν ὡρῶν. Πάντα γὰρ τῆς κατὰ τὸ 
θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν μεταβολῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχει σύμφυτον, 
b25  καὶ καθάπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὰς οἰκίας τοῦ χει- 
μῶνος μεταβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ πολλῆς χώρας κρατοῦντες θερί- 
ζουσι μὲν ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς χειμάζουσι δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἀλεεινοῖς, 
οὕτω καὶ τῶν ζῴων τὰ δυνάμενα μεταβάλλειν τοὺς τόπους. 
Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς συνήθεσι τόποις εὑρίσκεται τὰς 
b30  βοηθείας, τὰ δ’ ἐκτοπίζει . . . 
 
In the first sentence Aristotle connects his current topic of discussion (protection from 
changes in cold and heat) with those that came before, namely activities pertaining to 
reproduction and feeding (the two areas that he claimed occupy most all of an animal’s life). The 
comparison with humans moving indoors during the winter or to a cooler place in the summer 
serves to connect activities that are commonly recognized among humans with similar activities 
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found in other kinds of animals. In effect this is a specific instance of what was argued for in 
VII.1, namely that certain characteristics more commonly recognized in humans also are 
exhibited by other animals, and may serve as objects of scientific investigation. 
The discussions are structured as follows: 
 
Migration (596b30-599a5) 
The discussion of migration begins with some general remarks, and then focuses 
specifically on birds (597a30-b30) and then fish (597b30-599a5).
271
 The differences in migratory 
habits are generally not named by a single name (as in the case of e.g. feeding), but those 
discussed include migrating: shorter or longer distances, in flocks/schools or alone, during the 
day or at night (or both). 
Of particular interest in this section is the explicitly causal language Aristotle uses 
regarding the various aspects of migration: the timing of migration aligns with seasonal changes 
because animals migrate to avoid excessive heat/cold, or to seek food, or both; weaker animals 
tend to have established migratory habits for the sake of preserving their more delicate 
constitutions, etc. This, of course, is markedly different compared to the lack of causal language 
elsewhere in HA. 
But, even if the underlying causes of migration are clearly stated, the causes of many of 
the particular differences in migratory habits are not. For example, why do some birds or fish 
migrate great distances while others travel relatively short distances? Why do some migratory 
                                                 
271 Perhaps because the distances travelled by birds and fish are more remarkable then 
most land animals? 
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animals travel in groups rather than alone?
272
 No real effort is made to offer correlations between 
these attributes and other features. Instead a large part of this discussion is devoted to offering 
examples of forms of birds/fish that exhibit the migratory tendencies, and to provide additional 
details about these forms and the manner in which they are hunted.  
 
Hiding (599a5-600b15)  
The discussion of hiding is introduced by noting that many of the phenomena associated 
with migration occur with hiding. Specifically, animals tend to hide when the temperature 
becomes excessively hot (i.e. aestivation) or cold (i.e. hibernation), and come out when it 
becomes more moderate. This applies to land animals as well as to birds and fish. It is noted that 
in some cases entire kinds of animals hide (e.g. ostrakoderma), while in others some forms do 
and some do not. Similar to the section on migration, much of the discussion is devoted to 
identifying the forms of animals that do or do not hide, and few differentiae of hiding are 
offered. What is made clear is that hiding serves a similar purpose as migration. 
 
Shedding of Outer Skin or “Old Age” (600b15-601a23) 
 The shedding of the outer skin or shell—what Aristotle refers to as the “old 
age”—is discussed primarily in relation to hiding: some animals that hide also cast the old age 
(primarily horny-scaled animals, insects, ostrakoderma, and malokostraka). This is not done in 
order to avoid excessive temperature (at least Aristotle does not say so), but rather is offered as a 
correlation with hiding, with no notion of causal relation implied.   
                                                 
272 Interestingly, occasional reference is made to whether the flocks or schools have 
“leaders” (hêgemona, 597b16, 598a30)—a facet of political organization discussed in the 
introductory tupos in I.1. 
 237 
 
What is most striking about these sections is the explicit causal language used to account 
for the primary attributes under consideration (viz. migrating and hiding), and the lack of 
correlations made with the attributes of migrating and hiding. Beyond listing forms of animals as 
examples, Aristotle does not offer any other attributes that “follow” or are “followed by” these 
attributes. On might argue that this is because the cause is already known, however what is 
lacking is any account of why different kinds of animals migrate or hide in the specific manner 
that they do (e.g. short or long distances, in groups or alone, etc.), or indeed why some migrate or 
hide at all, while others do not.
273
 
5.3.3.3 Friendship and enmity among animals (608b19-610b19) 
The section on friendship and enmity or hostility among different kinds of animals is 
divided between land animals (608b19-610b1) and water animals (610b1-b20). Interestingly, 
similar to the preceding discussion of water and land animals in VII.2, Aristotle introduces this 
discussion with a comment on the causes of these attributes: 
 
[22] So then there is war against each other among the animals, as many as occupy the 
same places and make their lives from the same things. For if food is scarce, even 
those of the same breed fight against each other . . . Further all are at war with the 
flesh-eaters, and these with the others, for their food is the animals . . . If food 
were not scarce, those that are now frightened and wild would act tamely both 
                                                 
273 Aristotle does note that certain “weak” (asthenê, 597a19) animals migrate, the 
implication being that their weakness necessitates that they escape the excessive heat or 
cold of the seasons, but does not emphasize or elaborate on this point. 
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towards humans and in the same manner towards each other. (608a19-22, 25-7, 
30-2)   
 
608b19  Πόλεμος μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν, ὅσα 
τοὺς αὐτούς τε κατέχει τόπους καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖται 
τὴν ζωήν· ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ σπάνιος ἡ τροφή, καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα 
τὰ ὁμόφυλα μάχεται . . . 
b25        . . . Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς ὠμο- 
φάγοις ἅπαντα πολεμεῖ, καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἀπὸ 
γὰρ τῶν ζῴων ἡ τροφὴ αὐτοῖς·. . .   
b30   . . . εἰ ἀφθονία τροφῆς εἴη, πρός τε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους 
ἂν ἔχειν τιθασσῶς τὰ νῦν φοβούμενα αὐτῶν καὶ ἀγριαίνον- 
τα, καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.  
 
 
The observed regularities in the “friendships” and hostilities among different kinds of 
animals is, according to Aristotle, primarily due either to one kind of animal feeding off of 
another, or both feeding on the same things. This is again striking given the non-causal language 
that is generally used throughout the historia. For example, the section treating land animals ends 
with the following: 
 
[23] So then the friendships and wars of these wild animals happen because of their 
food and their way of life. (610b33-5) 
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610b33     Αἱ μὲν οὖν φιλίαι καὶ οἱ πόλε- 
μοι τοῖς θηρίοις τούτοις διὰ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὸν βίον συμ- 
βαίνουσιν. 
 
Again the dia suggests that trophê and bios have causal priority over philiai and polemoi. 
The detailed information Aristotle offers in this section agrees with these causal claims. For 
example: 
 
 The eagle and dragon snake are at war because eagles eat snakes (609a4) 
 The poikilis, lark, pipra, and chloreus (all birds) are at war because they eat each 
others’ eggs (609a7) 
 The aigithos (a bird) and the ass are at war, because the ass rubs itself on the thorn 
bushes that the aigithos nests in, and thus disrupts the eggs (609a30) 
 Birds that live at sea (e.g. brenthus, gull, harpe) are at war because they feed on the 
same things (609a24) 
 The wolf is at war with the ass, bull, and fox because it is a flesh-eater and thus feeds 
on these animals (609b1) 
 The raven and the fox are friends, because the raven is at war with the merlin, which 
is at war with the fox (because it seeks to eat the fox’s young) (609b33) 
 The laedos and the green woodpecker are friends because they live in different places 
(the one in rocks and mountains, the other by rivers and thickets)(610a10) 
 
 240 
It seems, generally, that by being at “war” Aristotle means acting aggressively towards 
one another and seeking to kill one another, while “friendship” indicates, at best, ambivalence. 
Aristotle’s comment in [23] that both trophê and bios bring about war and friendship indicates 
that it is not only the fact that one animal eats another, or that both eat the same things, that 
causes war, but also the way of life associated with e.g. flesh-eating or living in a certain place 
(e.g. at sea, in the mountains, etc.). Bios in this sense determines (or partially determines?) the 
activities an animal engages in, and it is conflicts among such activities that bring about war. 
Aristotle’s comment, early in this section, that the “dissociations and associations” of the 
“diviners” are actually based on war and friendship among animals, and due to the causes he 
identifies, may indicate that his purpose in this section is to provide a rational account for the 
relations among these animals that were previously noted and explained in more mystical ways. 
5.3.4 Reflection of HA VII and VIII 
The attributes discussed in these books vary greatly, but all fall under the major headings 
of bios, praxis, and êthos. The specific passages discussed above exhibit Aristotle’s interest in 
either documenting correlations among attributes that may point to causal relationships, or in 
explicitly calling out causal factors related to the attributes under consideration. As noted above, 
this latter tendency is unique to this section of the historia. Why Aristotle decided to cast the 
sections on hiding, migration, friendship, and war in causal terms, while sticking with the 
language of correlation in the section on feeding and nutrition is unclear. It may be that some of 
these passages were originally composed, in whole or part, as separate treatises that were not 
originally designed to appear in a historia, and thus did not avoid reference to causes.  
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6.0  HISTORIA AND EMPEIRIA 
In the previous chapters I have discussed Aristotle’s notion of historia and how the 
stage of investigation reported in a historia fits into Aristotle’s views on inquiry, 
explanation, and demonstration. I’ve argued that a historia is a collection of hoti-level facts 
aimed at facilitating the discovery of causes, and thus at the transformation of hoti-level 
knowledge to dioti. In the methodological passage from HA I.6 and a related discussion in 
APr. I.30, Aristotle suggests that a historia provides the researcher with both the 
conclusions of demonstrations that are sought (i.e. the “problems” to be solved) as well as 
the premises that can be used to demonstrate those conclusions. But, given that the historia 
precedes the actual discovery of causes,274 it seems unlikely that at that stage of 
investigation the researcher will be able to identify which of the propositions established in 
the historia are the correct premises to use in an apodeixis. Thus if the historia supplies the 
researcher with the premises of demonstration, it does not identify them as such.  
How is it that the investigator determines which propositions can successfully act as 
principles of demonstration? In this regard, Aristotle often emphasizes the importance of 
experience, or empeiria, in coming to know the relevant causes. This is especially so in so 
                                                 
274 As noted before, one must bear in mind the distinction between the stage of 
investigation that precedes the search for causes, and the composition of a treatise that 
reflects this stage. I’ve suggested above that Aristotle had in mind many of the causal 
relationships he posits between attributes in other treatises when he wrote the HA.    
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far as experience plays a key role in the cognitive process of formulating universal 
generalizations that ultimately become first principles. However, as I will argue below, 
Aristotle also used the notion of experience in a different, but related, manner, with 
reference not only to formulating the sort of universal generalizations that can act as first 
principles, but also in identifying them as principles. It is this sense of experience that 
connects with Aristotle’s notion of historia, and understanding the relationship between 
the two sheds light on the manner in which a historia can aid in the identification of first 
principles, and thus causes, and the move from hoti to dioti. 
6.1 HISTORIA AND EMPEIRIA 
Our first task is to motivate the idea that for Aristotle there is an important 
connection between the notions of historia and empeiria. Let us begin by looking again at 
the important methodological passage in HA I.6. Recall what Aristotle says there: 
 
[1] These things have now been said in this way as an outline, for the sake of a 
taste of how many and what sort of things must be studied; we shall speak 
with precision later, in order that we should first grasp the existing 
differences and attributes for all. After this we must attempt to discover the 
causes of these; for this is the natural way to conduct an investigation, the 
historia regarding each thing being complete. For both the about-which-
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things and the from-which-things that demonstration must be come to be 
clear from these things. (HA I.1, 491a7-14) 
 
491a7  Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον εἴρηται νῦν ὡς ἐν 
τύπῳ, γεύματος χάριν περὶ ὅσων καὶ ὅσα θεωρητέον· δι’ 
ἀκριβείας δ’ ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἵνα πρῶτον τὰς ὑπαρχούσας   
a10  διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πᾶσι λαμβάνωμεν. Μετὰ δὲ 
τοῦτο τὰς αἰτίας τούτων πειρατέον εὑρεῖν. Οὕτω γὰρ κατὰ φύ- 
σιν ἐστὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον, ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς 
περὶ ἕκαστον· περὶ ὧν τε γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀπό-    
δειξιν, ἐκ τούτων γίνεται φανερόν. 
 
Note especially Aristotle’s comments near the end of the passage, where he states 
that both the peri hôn and ex hôn of apodeixis come to be clear from the work done in the 
historia. Previously I argued that by peri hôn Aristotle is referring to the conclusions of 
demonstrations (i.e. the conclusion is that “about which” a demonstration is), and by ex hôn 
he is referring to the premises of demonstrations (i.e. the premises are those things “from 
which” a demonstration proceeds). Thus the historia provides both the conclusions of 
apodeictic demonstrations, as well as their premises. But Aristotle’s comments here make 
it clear that the historia precedes the actual discovery of causes.275 Thus if the historia 
                                                 
275 This is at least true for the “logical” relationship between the report of the facts 
(historia) and the demonstration of their causes. That the actual composition of any given 
historia chronologically precedes the composition of a treatise on causes is never assured, 
and, in the case of HA, is very much in question.  
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makes the ex hôn of demonstration clear, then it does so in such a manner as to fall short of 
identifying the premises of a demonstration as such, i.e. as the causally relevant premises 
relative to the conclusion. Put another way, the historia may reveal which propositions can 
serve as principles, but does not identify them as principles.276 I argued earlier277 that the 
process by which hoti-level facts are established by the investigator of nature bares close 
similarity to the process by which first principles are grasped. Both seem to be instances of 
epagogê, the difference being, in the one case, that the investigator recognizes that the fact 
so established may be explained further (i.e. is a mediated fact), and in the other, that the 
fact established is an immediate, indemonstrable, first principle. This suggests that the 
recognition of a principle as a principle involves something more than the mere 
establishing of the hoti-level fact via epagogê.278 I shall consider what that “something 
more” is below.  
This understanding of historia relative to the principles of apodeixis agrees with the 
related discussion of these matters in APr. I.27-30. There Aristotle provides an algorithmic 
procedure for identifying middle terms that can connect major and minor terms in 
deductions. In short, the method consists in first identifying the major and minor terms of a 
given “problem,” then finding all the terms that follow the major term, and all the terms 
that are followed by the minor, and finally comparing the lists in order to identify any 
common terms. These common terms can then be used as middle terms in deductions 
                                                 
276 Did Aristotle himself recognize this distinction? Many commentators believe he did (e.g. 
Kosman 1973, Charles 2000, Bronstein 2010), though agreement is not universal.  
277 See ch. 3, section 3.2.1. 
278 The question of how, on Aristotle’s account, first principles gain their epistemic warrant 
is much debated in the literature (e.g. Kosman 1973, Burnyeat 1981, Irwin 1990, Frede 
1996, , Ferejohn 2009, etc.), and is often cast in “rationalist/empiricist” language. As will be 
seen below, I tend towards an “empiricist” interpretation, largely in line with Kosman. 
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connecting the major and minor terms. Aristotle characterizes the stage at which these 
many facts regarding the various terms and their connections with the major and minor 
terms are collected as a historia. He writes: 
 
[2] Consequently, if the facts concerning any subject have been grasped, we are 
already prepared to bring the demonstrations readily to light. For if nothing 
that truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of our historia, then 
concerning every fact, if a demonstration for it exists, we will be able to find 
that demonstration and demonstrate it, while if it does not naturally have a 
demonstration, we will be able to make that evident. (APr. I.30, 46a17-27, 
trans. Smith) 
 
ὥστ’ ἐὰν ληφθῇ  
τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἕκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἤδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις  
ἑτοίμως ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν παρα- 
a25  λειφθείη τῶν ἀληθῶς ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἕξομεν  
περὶ ἅπαντος οὗ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὑρεῖν καὶ ἀπο- 
δεικνύναι, οὗ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν.   
 
As long as “nothing that truly belongs to the subjects has been left out of our 
historia,” i.e. as long as all the relevant facts regarding the major and minor terms are 
included, then we will be in a position to determine whether a deduction can be formed or 
not. However, nothing in the formula for identifying middle terms guarantees that the 
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middle term so identified is the true cause of the minor term inhering in the major, and 
thus nothing guarantees that the deduction so formed qualifies as an apodeixis in the strict 
sense.279  
There is evidence, however, that Aristotle recognizes this. Immediately prior to 
passage [2] above he writes: 
 
[3] The majority of principles for each science are peculiar to it. Consequently, it 
is for our experiences (empeirias) concerning each subject to provide the 
principles. I mean, for instance, that it is for astronomical experience to 
provide the principles of the science of astronomy (for when the appearances 
had been sufficiently grasped, in this way astronomical demonstrations were 
discovered; and it is also similar concerning any other art or science 
whatsoever). 
 
46a17    ἴδιαι δὲ καθ’ ἑκάστην αἱ πλεῖσται. διὸ τὰς  
μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐμπειρίας ἐστὶ παραδοῦναι,  
λέγω δ’ οἷον τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς ἀστρολογι- 
a20  κῆς ἐπιστήμης (ληφθέντων γὰρ ἱκανῶς τῶν φαινομένων οὕτως  
εὑρέθησαν αἱ ἀστρολογικαὶ ἀποδείξεις), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ  
ἄλλην ὁποιανοῦν ἔχει τέχνην τε καὶ ἐπιστήμην· 
 
                                                 
279 See Lennox 1991, pp. 44-5, where he describes the procedure as providing a “short-list” 
of possible explanatory middle terms. 
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This passage highlights the role of experience (empeiria) in coming to know the 
principles of a science. Here experience is correlated with (equated to?) a comprehensive 
knowledge of the facts of a domain of study. As Aristotle states, it is only when the 
“appearances”280 have been sufficiently grasped, i.e. in all their multitudinous variety, that 
the principles were discovered. And as passage [2], which follows this one, makes clear, a 
sufficient grasp of the phenomena is achieved in a completed historia. 
These considerations suggest that the gap left between grasping the propositions 
that can serve as principles of demonstration, and recognizing them as such, is filled (at 
least in part?) by empeiria. The historia both collects the propositions, and aids in the 
identification of the explanatory relationships between the relevant terms by providing the 
reader with experience, understood (at least at this preliminary stage) as a sort of 
comprehensive grasp of the subject matter at hand. 
6.2 APODEIXIS, ARCHAI, AND EMPEIRIA 
Elsewhere in the corpus, especially in APo. II.19 and Metaph. A.1, Aristotle outlines a 
role for empeiria in coming to know first principles, a role that is significantly different 
                                                 
280 It is likely that the term phainomena was used in a rather technical sense with reference 
to astronomy. Euclid’s work on astronomy is titled Phainomena. This technical sense 
presumably is comparable to the more general sense of “grasping the appearances” relative 
to any field of study, however determining what counts as a relevant “appearance,” i.e. 
which facts are the important ones to note, is not entirely clear. In astronomy, these would 
be the positions of the various celestial bodies at different times. In other fields, it seems 
that knowing the facts, and knowing which are likely to be the important facts, are both 
products of experience.    
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from the one briefly sketched above. In this section I examine the relevant passages from 
these works and consider them in light of the previous discussion.  
As has been discussed earlier in this dissertation, according to Aristotle knowledge, 
in the fullest sense of the term, results from the possession of a demonstration that reveals 
the cause of what is to be understood. The ultimate premises of such demonstrations are 
themselves indemonstrable starting points or first principles. Since our knowledge of such 
principles cannot be the product of demonstration, there must be another means for 
arriving at such knowledge. Repeatedly in APo. Aristotle hints at such an alternative means 
of grasping first principles, and finally, in APo. II.19, he takes up the matter directly. The 
chapter has been much debated in the scholarly literature, but a detailed engagement with 
these scholarly debates is not necessary for our current purposes.  Rather I would like 
simply to call to our attention the role Aristotle claims that experience (empeiria) plays in 
our acquisition of first principles, and consider that role in light of the discussion of 
experience in section (2) above. 
In APo. II.19, having laid out the problem of how we can come to know a principle 
that is indemonstrable, given that causal demonstration has been put forward as the 
standard by which we can be said to know in the fullest and most strict sense, Aristotle 
outlines a process whereby human beings can move from knowledge of particulars to 
knowledge of universals.281 The process begins with perception, which he describes as an 
“innate discriminatory capacity” (dunamin sumphuton kritikên). In animals that 
                                                 
281 Does this process result in the formation of universal concepts or propositions? Or does 
the formation of a universal concept entail/imply the formation of certain propositions? 
The scholarly literature is divided on the issue. On my reading, especially in light of APo. 
I.1-2, the focus must be on propositions, given that establishing if a thing exists (to ei esti) 
involves establishing that a certain subject exhibits a certain attribute. 
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additionally have the capacity for memory, perceptions are retained and stored as “traces” 
in the soul, as Aristotle elsewhere describes them. Such animals, by dint of their faculty of 
memory, can have knowledge (gnôsis) even when they are not actively perceiving, 
presumably by attending to the memory of past perceptions. And for a select few animals 
(likely only human beings), the retention of these past perceptions in memory can give rise 
to a reasoned account (logos). But prior to that happening, Aristotle outlines an additional 
cognitive state that follows upon memory, but precedes the acquisition of the reasoned 
account. This middle state he calls experience (empeiria): 
 
[4] So then from perception memory comes to be, as we say, and from repeated 
memories of the same thing, experience (empeiria); for numerically many 
memories are/form a single experience. And from experience, or from all of 
the universal that has settled in the soul, the one besides the many, which 
would be the same one in all these, there arises a principle of art (technê) and 
understanding (epistêmê): if it is regarding that which comes to be, art, and if 
it is about being, understanding. (Apo. II.19, 100a3-10) 
 
100a3      Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη,  
ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομέ- 
a5  νης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία  
μία ἐστίν. ἐκ δ’ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ κα- 
θόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπα- 
σιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, 
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ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. 
 
While nearly every word of this passage has been debated in the literature, one may 
conclude without great objection that in this passage Aristotle sees experience as 
occupying a sort of middle ground between aisthêsis and nous, i.e. the cognitive state that 
grasps first principles. The capacity for experience (which Aristotle says most animals 
either totally lack or possess in a minimal way) seems vital to the process whereby the 
traces of perceptions stored in memory give rise to our grasp of principles, but precisely 
how experience functions in this regard is not clearly stated. Experience seems to 
transcend the particular nature of perception,282 and yet fall short of the universal nature of 
nous.283 
How one interprets the role of experience in this process depends in part on how 
one interprets the “or” (ê) in 100a6.284  Is it epexegetical, glossing what is meant by 
experience? Is it corrective, describing a related, but different, state than experience? Is it 
simply disjunctive? The text here in APo. II.19 largely underdetermines the issue, but a 
related text, in Metaph. A.1 may help. The legomen in 100a4 may very well be a reference to 
Metaph. A.1, where Aristotle discusses this very process at greater length. The context of 
that discussion regards the acquisition of wisdom (sophia), which Aristotle argues is the 
knowledge of principles and causes. In a manner similar to APo. II.19, he argues that 
                                                 
282 But what of the comment in APo. II.19 that “although you perceive particulars, 
perception is of universals”? 
283 Indeed experience seems to fall short of any form of universal knowledge, not just 
knowledge of first principles grasped by nous. 
284 See Barnes (1993), p. 264; Charles (2000), pp. 149ff.; Hasper and Yurdin (2010); 
Salmieri (2010), pp. 181ff. 
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experience results from the memory of multiple perceptions, and that it is from experience 
that human beings derive “art” (technê) and “reasoning” (logismos): 
 
[5] So the other animals live by images and memories, but have a small share of 
experience, but the human race lives also by art and reasoning. And for 
human beings, experience arises from memory, since many memories of the 
same thing bring to completion a capacity for one experience.  
 
980b25        τὰ  
μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμ- 
πειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ 
τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγμα- 
981a1   τος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.  
 
Here we find a similar account of a plurality of memories giving rise to experience, 
only here it is specified that it is many memories “of the same thing” (tou autou pragmatos) 
that go into forming a single experience. Ultimately, as Aristotle will make clear further on, 
it is the recognition of what is similar in the multiple memories that forms the core of the 
knowledge or principle that emerges from the particular perceptions, but the experience 
that arises from the multiple memories appears to fall short of the actual recognition of 
what is similar. Indeed, just as memory mediates the relationship between perception and 
experience, so to it seems that experience mediates memory and nous. Indeed Aristotle 
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goes on to claim that the grasp of the universal is something that emerges out of 
experience, rather than being constitutive of experience: 
 
[6] Now experience seems to be almost the same thing as knowledge (epistêmê) 
or art, but for human beings, knowledge and art arise from experience, for 
experience makes art, as Polus says, but inexperience makes chance. And art 
comes into being whenever, out of many conceptions from experience, one 
universal judgment arises about those that are similar.  
 
981a1        καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν 
ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ’ 
ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἡ 
μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ 
a5  δ’ ἀπειρία τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν  
τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ 
τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. 
 
Just as many particular perceptions of the same thing somehow give rise to a single 
experience, so too many “conceptions from experience” (tês empeirias ennoêmatôn) give 
rise to one universal judgment concerning like things. However this does little to clarify 
precisely the cognitive advance that experience has over perception (and knowledge has 
over experience). 
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According to Aristotle, experience alone is often sufficient to correctly guide action, 
but the person with experience lacks “the reasoned account” (logos).285 And even though 
the person with experience may sometimes act more successfully than the person with the 
logos and without experience, Aristotle nonetheless credits the one with the logos as more 
clearly possessing knowledge. And it is in this regard that Aristotle makes a comment that 
is important for our current purposes. He states: 
 
[7] Nevertheless we think that knowing and understanding are present in art 
more that in experience and we take the possessors of arts to be wiser than 
people with experience, as though in every instance wisdom is more 
something resulting from and following along with knowing; and this is 
because the ones know the cause while the others do not. For people with 
experience know the fact (to hoti), but do not know the reason why (to dioti), 
but the others are acquainted with the reason why and the cause.  
 
981a24    ἀλλ’ ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ 
τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σο- 
φωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς 
κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι· 
τοῦτο δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ’ οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ’ οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι 
                                                 
285 On this, and generally the relationship between memory, experience, and knowledge, 
see Machamer 2001. 
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a30  καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.  
 
Here Aristotle claims that the person with experience knows that (hoti) certain 
things are the case (such that e.g. she may direct her actions appropriately), but does not 
know why (dioti) they are the case, i.e. does not know the causes. The appearance of hoti 
and dioti in this passage, and the correlative association of dioti with knowledge of causes, 
appears to connect Aristotle’s discussions of empeiria with the notion of historia. The 
person with experience knows to hoti but not to dioti, just as the historia is a collection of 
hoti-level facts that is aimed at facilitating the discovery of, but does not yet achieve, dioti-
level knowledge. 
However the connection is not perfect. As it is described in APo. II.1-2, to hoti 
represents a universal proposition of the form AaB, while to dioti expresses the reason why 
such a proposition is the case, i.e. expresses the causal middle term that connects A with B. 
But the discussions of empeiria in APo. II.19 and Metaph. A.1 seem to make clear that the 
person with experience does not yet grasp the universal that embraces the particulars from 
perception.  
Aristotle illustrates the relationship between experience and art or knowledge in 
A.1 with the familiar example of the doctor treating Socrates and Callias. He states: 
 
[8] For to have a judgment that this thing was beneficial to Callias when he was 
sick with this disease, and to Socrates, and one by one in this way to many 
people, belongs to experience. But the judgment that it was beneficial to all 
such people, marked out as being of one form, when they were sick with this 
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disease, such as to phlegmatic or bilious people, when they were feverish 
with heat, belongs to art.  
 
981a7      τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι 
Καλλίᾳ κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ 
Σωκράτει καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· 
τὸ δ’ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ’ εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι,  
κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώ- 
δεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης. 
 
In this passage, the doctor with only experience as a guide recognizes that a certain 
treatment was successful for a number of people with a given disease, but fails to recognize 
what it is that these people have in common, by dint of which the treatment was successful. 
Thus the doctor with only experience grasps that the treatment was successful in these 
various cases, but not why it was. According to the example, the reason why the treatment 
was successful is that the patients share some attribute that for some reason renders the 
treatment efficacious (e.g. they are all phlegmatic or bilious).  
Notice that this sort of explanation is what Lennox describes as an “A-type” 
explanation: it locates each individual subject within a wider kind, to which the predicate in 
question belongs per se. It is in so far as Calias, Socrates, etc. are e.g. phlegmatic that the 
treatment is effective. The doctor with experience alone does not grasp this common 
feature that groups the patients together, but nonetheless knows that in the past the 
treatment was effective for other patients with the given disease, and perhaps even has a 
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sense that the present patient is either similar or dissimilar to the past cases, though is 
unable to enunciate precisely how. So understood, the person with experience does not 
grasp to hoti, at least not in the manner in which to hoti was interpreted earlier. What the 
person with experience does grasp is the particular, i.e. she grasps that several particular 
propositions are true, without being able to formulate the universal proposition that 
embraces all the particulars.286 But grasping the universal in this case would amount to 
grasping to hoti, as the term was understood in e.g. APo. II.1, and as it was developed 
relative to the notion of historia. 
Thus Aristotle appears to vary in his usage of the term to hoti, such that its use in 
this passage, and thus the putative connection between empeiria and historia, seems 
doubtful. Indeed, the sense of empeiria developed in APo. II.19 and Metaph. A.1 does not see 
to correspond with the way in which the term was used in passage [3] from APr. I.30.287 
While in the one case empeiria was described as a sort of cognitive state that stands 
midway between perception and knowledge, in the other it seems to indicate a thorough 
and comprehensive grasp of the (universal) facts related to a domain of study. It is this 
second sense of empeiria that bears on the notion of historia, and though it differs from the 
famous and contentious uses of the term in APo. II.19 and Metaph. A.1, I believe Aristotle’s 
                                                 
286 The situation is perhaps more complicated, since passage [6] above suggests that the 
one with experience is able to formulate “conceptions” (enoma), which seem to fall short of 
propositional knowledge of universals, but exceed the knowledge of particulars.  
287 It is possible to interpret passage [3] from APr. I.30 as stating that it was only when each 
particular astronomical phenomena was grasped (e.g. the phenomena associated with Mars 
at this time, Venus at this time, etc.) that the universal principles were achieved. In this way 
the experienced astronomer would be in a similar position as the experienced doctor, 
grasping the particulars but failing to see the universal that embraces them.    
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other uses of the notion of experience (and inexperience) elsewhere in the corpus provide 
the link to the notion of historia. 
6.3 TWO SENSES OF EMPEIRIA 
In the sections above I have discussed Aristotle’s notion of experience and the role it 
plays in establishing first principles, in so far as experience is a necessary stage along the way to 
forming universal generalizations from perception. However, I also have the sense that when, in 
passage [3] from APr. I.30, Aristotle states that experience is necessary for discovering the 
principles that are peculiar to each science, he is also intimating that our experience with a 
subject matter will help us develop a sense of what counts as a cause in the given field of study, 
and thus what is capable of explaining the presence of other features. Experience in this sense 
corresponds more closely to the comprehensive knowledge of a field of study embodied in a 
historia.  
There are a number of passages that suggest that experience aids in identifying first 
principles because it provides us with a grasp of many different relevant facts, and that our grasp 
of a putative first principle is strengthened when we see it explain many of these facts—when we 
come to recognize its explanatory power.
288
 For example, in GC I.2 Aristotle states: 
 
[9] Inexperience is a cause of the relative inability to comprehend the admitted 
facts. Wherefore those who have dwelt more among natural things are better 
                                                 
288 This is the view defended in Kosman 1973. 
 259 
able to postulate principles of the sort that can connect many things together; 
while those who, from engaging in many arguments, have failed to study 
things as they are, readily show themselves capable of seeing very little. (GC 
I.2, 316a5-10; trans. Joachim) 
 
316a5  Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογούμενα συνορᾶν (5) 
ἡ ἀπειρία. Διὸ ὅσοι ἐνῳκήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς 
μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἳ ἐπὶ πολὺ  
δύνανται συνείρειν· οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι 
τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλέψαντες, ἀποφαίνον- 
a10  ται ῥᾷον. 
 
According to this passage, people with experience are better able to set down principles 
that are capable of explaining many things, and I take it this is a sign that they are in fact hitting 
on the true principles. I take it also that experienced people are able to do this because of their 
vast knowledge of many relevant facts.  
 
This idea is substantiated by a passage in DA I.1: 
 
[10] Knowledge of a thing’s essential nature is of course a valuable assistance 
towards the examination of the causes of its attributes . . . But the converse is 
also true; the attributes contribute materially to the knowledge of what a 
thing is. For when we are in a position to expound all or most of the 
 260 
attributes as presented to us, we shall also be best qualified to speak about 
the essence. For the starting-point of every demonstration is the statement of 
the subject’s essential nature, and definitions which do not enable us to know 
the attributes, or even to make a tolerable guess about them, are clearly laid 
down merely for argument’s sake and are utterly valueless. (DA I.1, 402b16-
28; trans. Sachs) 
 
 
402b16        ἔοικε δ’ 
οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι 
τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς 
μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπί- 
b20  πεδον, πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι  
ἴσαι), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται  
μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχω- 
μεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκό- 
των, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας 
b25  ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα· πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ 
τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καθ’ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμ- 
403a1  βεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐ- 
μαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες. 
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Here the claim is that extensive knowledge of a thing’s non-essential attributes will put us 
in a better position to hypothesize regarding its essential attributes, because we will be in a better 
position to see whether a putative first principles can explain the many facts we know. Such 
extensive knowledge of a thing’s attributes is provided by the historia, and this seems very much 
to me to be what Aristotle referred to above as experience. 
Both these examples suggest that greater experience leads to a more comprehensive grasp 
of the facts pertaining to a field of study, and thus allows us to test possible explanatory 
principles against a wider array of data. Our belief or conviction in a putative first principle as a 
principle is thus strengthened by witnessing it explain many different facts. Thus this conviction 
requires experience, as Aristotle explains in this passage from the EN: 
 
[11] A sign of what is being said is why young people become skilled 
geometricians and mathematicians, and wise in respect of such things, but 
they do not seem to become possessed of practical judgment, and the reason 
is that practical judgment has to do with particulars, which become known 
by experience, but the young are not experienced, since it is length of time 
that produces experience. And then one might consider this, why it is that a 
child might become a mathematician, but not wise or knowledgeable about 
nature. Is it not because things of the one sort come from abstraction, while 
the principles of things of the other sort come from experience? The young 
are not convinced of the latter, but talk about them, but what the former 
things are is not unclear. (EN VI.8, 1142a12-25; trans. Sachs, modified) 
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1142a11    σημεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου 
καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται 
καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ’ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. 
αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται 
a15  γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ’ ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος 
γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄν τις σκέ- 
ψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ’ ἄν, σο- 
φὸς δ’ ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι’ ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, 
τῶν δ’ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν 
a20  οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; 
 
Experience gives the mature practitioner of a science a higher level of conviction or 
belief (the verb is derived from pistis) in the principles. On the one hand, this may be greater 
conviction in the fact expressed by the principle, in so far as additional experience strengths the 
inductive justification of the fact, but also it leads to greater conviction in the principle as a 
principle. 
Thus the historia, and the experience that underlies it, provides a wide set of data upon 
which explanatory principles may be tested, and thus aids in our grasp of principles as principles. 
In other examples, it seems that a lack of experience causes problems because it results in 
a lack of knowledge of specific, important facts pertinent to a domain of study. The point here is 
not so much that we are at risk of accepting a principle prior to testing it against a wide array of 
data, but rather that inexperience leads to ignorance of certain, important facts that would 
immediately speak against certain explanations.  
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For example, in criticizing his predecessor’s views on respiration in animals, Aristotle 
states: 
 
[12] A few of the earlier natural philosophers have dealt with respiration; some of 
them have offered no explanation why this phenomenon occurs in living 
creatures; others have discussed it without much insight, and with 
insufficient experience of the facts. Again, they say that all living creatures 
breathe; but that is not true. (Resp. 1, 470b6-10; trans. Hett) 
 
470b6  Περὶ γὰρ ἀναπνοῆς ὀλίγοι μέν τινες τῶν πρότερον φυ- 
σικῶν εἰρήκασιν· τίνος μέντοι χάριν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, 
οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεφήναντο, οἱ δὲ εἰρήκασι μέν, οὐ καλῶς δ’ 
εἰρήκασιν ἀλλ’ ἀπειροτέρως τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἔτι δὲ πάντα 
b10  τὰ ζῷά φασιν ἀναπνεῖν· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές. ὥστ’ ἀναγ- 
καῖον περὶ τούτων πρῶτον ἐπελθεῖν, ὅπως μὴ δοκῶμεν ἀπ- 
όντων κενὴν κατηγορεῖν. 
 
In the first place, these earlier natural philosophers erred in so far as they assumed that all 
animals respire, which, as Aristotle points out, is not true. Had they known this, then presumably 
their account of respiration would have differed significantly. Aristotle goes on to argue that 
their ignorance with regard to the internal anatomy of animals also led them astray.  Some of his 
predecessors believed that fish are able to take in air from the water through their mouths, as 
other, respiring animals do. But this would do a fish little good, Aristotle points out, since in fish 
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the passage from the mouth leads directly to the stomach, and, in any event, fish do not have 
lungs.  
So a lack of experience leads to ignorance regarding important facts that would 
materially affect the sorts of explanations one might attempt to formulate.  
A similar diagnosis of the failure of earlier natural philosophers due to inexperience 
emerges from a discussion in the GA regarding the generation of certain kinds of fish. It was 
believed by some that certain kinds of fish are impregnated by swallowing the milt (i.e. 
spermatic residue) emitted by the male fish, which they are, in fact, seen to do. Aristotle again 
criticizes the proponents of this theory for their lack of knowledge of the internal anatomy of fish 
(for how can the milt make its way to the uterus if its taken into the mouth, which leads to the 
stomach?), but in addition, he criticizes them for not observing the phenomena in the correct 
manner. He states: 
 
[13] Another point which helps deceive these people is this. Fish of this sort take 
only a very short time over their copulation, with the result that many 
fisherman even never see it happening, for of course no fisherman ever 
watches this sort of thing for the sake of knowing. All the same, the 
copulation has been observed. (GA 756a30-34; trans. Peck, modified) 
 
756a30       Συμβάλλεται δὲ 
πρὸς τὴν ἀπάτην αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ταχὺν εἶναι τὸν συνδυασμὸν 
τῶν τοιούτων ἰχθύων ὥστε πολλοὺς λανθάνειν καὶ τῶν ἁλιέων· 
οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐθὲν τηρεῖ τοιοῦτον τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, ἀλλ’ 
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ὅμως ὠμμένος ὁ συνδυασμός ἐστιν. 
 
The fishermen who support this notion that female fish are impregnated by swallowing 
milt presumably do have rather extensive experience with fish, in so far as they have observed 
them often and over a long period of time. And yet their failure comes in not observing in the 
right manner—not observing for the sake of knowing.289 
But what does this amount to? Aristotle’s point is that the fisherman do not observe the 
fish with the goal of determining the causes of what they see. Had they inquired into just how the 
milt swallowed by the female might affect reproduction, they would have recognized how 
unlikely it is, and thus would have sought an alternative explanation. 
The important lesson I draw from these examples is that, for Aristotle, recognizing a putative 
first principle as a first principle requires one to embark on the project of explanation and 
requires one to test the explanatory power of a putative principle against the facts that are already 
established. 
                                                 
289
 As an interesting side note, Both Aristotle and the fishermen in this example appear to have 
been wrong in their analyses. Aristotle notes how both the female fish are observed swallowing 
the male’s milt, and the male fish are observed swallowing the female’s eggs, and this is true. 
But the eggs are actually impregnated outside the female’s body, when the male’s milt and the 
female’s eggs come into contact with one another in the water. The swallowing of the milt and 
the eggs appears to be an evolutionary adaptation to ensure that the fish follow each other 
closely, thus increasing the probability that the reproductive residues will comingle. 
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6.4 CONCLUDING REFLECTION 
Given that experience allows one to more effectively test the explanatory power of a 
putative first principle against a wider array of data, one might still wonder how we come to 
recognize successful instances of causal explanation in the first place. If we look to the biology 
and zoology, Aristotle famously subscribed to a form of teleological explanation for many of the 
features exhibited by animals. For example, with regard to their parts, it is generally the case that 
the presence and differentiation of a part of an animal is explained by the function it performs 
and how it contributes to the animal’s way of life. In HA Aristotle claims that practically 
everything an animal does—all of its efforts—are aimed at two activities, feeding and 
reproducing. According to Aristotle, most of the unique features of an animal can be explained 
by inquiring after how those features contribute to an animal’s ability to feed and reproduce, 
given certain other facts about the animal that appear to be fundamental, such as the environment 
in which the animal lives and the structure of its body and certain of its bodily parts. In the case 
of birds, Aristotle seems to hold that certain of their features are simply unique and inexplicable, 
such as that they are fliers or that they have beaks. But, given that they are fliers and that they 
have beaks, many of the features and characteristics exhibited by specific birds can be explained 
in this way. For example, a bird that lives in marshlands needs long legs to successfully walk 
through the muck, but this additionally requires a long neck to reach the water to feed, as well as 
a long beak. Or, given that birds of prey are carnivorous, their way of life demands that they 
overpower their prey, and this in turn demands that they are equipped with strong wings, sharp 
talons, a hooked beak, and the like.
290
  
                                                 
290 See PA IV.12 for a discussion of the relationship between a bird’s bios and its parts. 
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But what led Aristotle to believe that these facts about the birds’ way of life explain the 
features of their parts, rather than the other way around (an explanatory strategy that was most 
certainly on the table)
291
? 
If I am correct in claiming that Aristotle would say that experience observing birds with 
the goal of formulating explanations led to the recognition of way of life as a cause, then we can 
ask, what in this experience led to this conclusion? This is not an easy question to answer, but 
one possibility is that experience would lead one to recognize that many, diverse features of birds 
are correlated with relatively few facts regarding their way of life, and this is true of other 
animals as well. That is, given that this bird is a water-dwelling plant-eater, then it is the case that 
these many different unique features of its body and behavior make sense and reasonably 
contribute to its being able to feed and reproduce successfully. And while it is true that, without 
these features, the bird could not support the given way of life, and thus in some sense the 
features make the way of life possible and could be viewed as a cause of the way of life, the fact 
that relatively few facts about the bird’s way of life can successfully explain many facts about 
the bird’s other features must have spoken strongly to Aristotle regarding the explanatory power, 
and thus explanatory significance, of way of life as an essential feature. 
 
                                                 
291 See e.g. PA I.1, 240a20ff., where Aristotle discusses Empedocles’ view that the backbone 
in humans is articulated in the manner that it is because of the way in which the fetus is 
twisted in the uterus. Thus, on Empedocles’ view, the movements of the body that an 
articulated spin allows for are caused by the circumstances surrounding the formation of 
the parts. As Aristotle argues in the passage from PA I.1, since “a human generates a 
human,” the form of the articulated backbone was already present in the generative 
motions resident in the spermatic fluid, and is ultimately explained by the role such an 
articulated spine (and the corresponding movements it allows) plays in the life of a fully 
developed human. See PA I.5, 645b15ff.      
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APPENDIX A 
REFERENCES TO HA IN THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS 
Below are 24 passages from the Aristotelian corpus (numbered [1]-[24]) that appear to 
make direct reference to HA. The table below indicates which of the passages include reference 
to historia alone, to historia and anatomai, etc. The third column indicates the number of 
passages so referenced out of the total 24. Passages in parentheses do not explicitly make the 
indicated reference, but arguably do so implicitly. 
A.1 SUMMARY 
 historia alone:   1, 4, 5, 7, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 12/24 
historia and anatomai:  2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19 12/24 
akribeia:    1, 3, 8, 13, 14, 17, 21    7/24 
makes reference to  
differences:  (10), 11, 12, 23    5/24 
visual vs. akribeia/logos:  3, 10, (19). 23     4/24 
not about parts:  4, 7, 17, 20, (23), 24    6/24 
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A.2 THE REFERENCES 
[1] Resp. 12, 476b30-477a10 
 
It is for the same reason that the malakia and malakostraka admit water – I mean 
such creatures as lobsters and crabs. None of these happens to need cooling; for 
each of these species is of low temperature and bloodless, so that it is sufficiently 
cooled by the surrounding water; but they admit water in feeding, <and so must 
expel it> so that the water may not flow in as they are absorbing food. The 
malakostraka, such as crabs and lobsters, discharge the water through the folds by 
the hairy parts, but the cuttlefish and polypus through the hollow above the so-
called head. I have given a more exact account of these in my History of Animals. 
Concerning the admission of water, then, we have explained that it occurs for the 
purpose of cooling, and because those creatures which naturally live in water 
must derive their food from the water. (trans. Hett) 
 
 
476b30    διὰ ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο δέχεται καὶ τὰ μα- 
λάκια τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μαλακόστρακα, λέγω δ’ οἷον τοὺς 
καλουμένους καράβους καὶ τοὺς καρκίνους. καταψύξεως μὲν 
γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τυγχάνει δεόμενον· ὀλιγόθερμον γάρ ἐστι 
καὶ ἄναιμον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ὥσθ’ ἱκανῶς καταψύχεται ὑπὸ 
477a1  τοῦ περιέχοντος ὑγροῦ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν <ἀφίησι τὸ ὕδωρ>, 
ὅπως μὴ ἅμα δεχομένοις εἰσρέῃmjuio τὸ ὑγρόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν μαλακ- 
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όστρακα, οἷον οἵ τε καρκίνοι καὶ οἱ κάραβοι, παρὰ τὰ δασέα 
ἀφιᾶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν ἐπιπτυγμάτων, σηπίαι δὲ καὶ πολύ- 
a5  ποδες διὰ τοῦ κοίλου τοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς καλουμένης κεφαλῆς. γέ- 
γραπται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν δι’ ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς περὶ 
τῶν ζῴων ἱστορίαις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ ὑγρόν, 
εἴρηται ὅτι συμβαίνει διὰ κατάψυξιν καὶ διὰ τὸ δεῖν δέχε- 
σθαι τὴν τροφὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὰ τὴν φύσιν ὄντα τῶν ζῴων 
a10  ἔνυδρα.  
 
Although the reference to HA appears in an independent sentence that could easily be 
elided without losing any of the sense or flow of the argument, nothing in Ross’s app crit 
suggests that it is a late (i.e. post-Aristotelian) addition, and its appearance at the end of the 
argument, immediately preceding the summarizing statement at a7, seems appropriate. Just the 
same, that it may easily be removed allows for the possibility that Aristotle (or an associate) 
added the reference himself after the treatise was completed or nearly complete. 
The arrangement of the various inlets and outlets for water, flaps, etc. are challenging to 
visualize, due in large part to the relative unfamiliarity of the anatomy of these creatures. HA 
does contain a more detailed description of these parts. Interestingly, the HA discussion includes 
reference to the parts’ functions, and thus is not totally free of such “theoretical commitments” as 
a purely descriptive anatomy might imply. To what extent does HA also provide an account of 
the function of parts? To what extent is such a functional account tied to a causal/explanatory 
account of the parts? What does PA say of these parts? (It looks like not much! See PA IV.5). 
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Does the additional or more detailed information provided by HA add anything to the 
argument presented here in Resp.? That is, do those details somehow bolster the argument? 
The first part of the argument is based on the claim that animals like malakia and 
malakostraka do not need to take in and expel water for the sake of cooling, but rather the water 
in their environment that surrounds them provides sufficient cooling for their already rather 
moderate levels of vital heat. Thus there need not be any special parts of passageways for water 
to traverse in order to affect the cooling (e.g. trachea, lungs, gills, etc.).  
What evidence is marshaled, and what is the reasoning, that leads to these conclusions? Is 
it that these animals clearly do not possess lungs, and, unlike fish, appear not to possess gills? If 
that is so, and one assumes that there must be some means of cooling the vital heat in order to 
maintain survival, then there must be some other mechanism employed to affect this cooling. In 
the absence of any obvious part, attributing it to the environment seems reasonable enough. And 
in fact, according to Ogle, many such animals actually do respire in this manner (see Ogle, p. 
121, n80). 
But these animals do take in water when feeding, so they need some means of expelling 
that water otherwise the parts that receive food would become filled with water. The parts 
specified expel this water during feeding (and, whether Aristotle recognized or explicitly stated 
it, at other times as well). 
If the HA account of these parts makes it clear that water is expelled by them, and that 
these animals have no obvious organs of respiration, then it would support the argument here in 
Resp., and the reference is appropriate and helpful. In other words, this is the sort of information 
one would hope to find in the HA reference. 
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In sum, Aristotle often refers to “gill-like” parts near these inlet and outlet folds in 
malakostraka, and they are indeed gills, but Aristotle does not seem to recognize them as such. 
His various descriptions of these parts in HA include a “functional” analysis that supports his 
general view that these animals do not need to take in water as a means of cooling their internal 
heat. In this sense the HA descriptions are “theory-laden” – they do in fact speculate on functions 
(and thus cause?!?). 
 
Ogle: See n121 (pg. 127); Ross: HA IV.1, 524a9-12 (koilon aulon of the malakia), b21-22; IV.2, 
526a26-27, b19-21, IV.3, 527b18-22; Hett: HA IV.1, 523a30, etc.; Morel: HA IV.1-3; Balme: ad 
526b18 
 
[2] Resp. 478a21-28 
 
From this it is obvious why animals which have blood in the lungs breathe most; 
for the warmer creature requires more cooling, and at the same time the breath 
passes easily to the source of heat, which lies in the heart. How the heart 
communicates by passages with the lung should be studied from dissections and 
by reference to the History of Animals. Speaking generally, the nature of animals 
requires cooling owing to the fierce heat which the soul acquires in the heart. This 
cooling is achieved by means of breathing in the case of animals which have a 
lung as well as a heart . . .  
 
478a21 καὶ διότι δὴ μάλιστ’ ἀναπνέουσι τὰ ἔχοντα τὸν 
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πνεύμονα ἔναιμον, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· τό τε γὰρ θερμότερον 
πλείονος δεῖται τῆς καταψύξεως, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρ- 
χὴν τῆς θερμότητος τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πορεύεται τὸ πνεῦμα 
a25  ῥᾳδίως.  
Ὃν δὲ τρόπον ἡ καρδία τὴν σύντρησιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν 
πνεύμονα, δεῖ θεωρεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατεμνομένων καὶ τῶν 
ἱστοριῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ ζῷα γεγραμμένων. καταψύξεως μὲν 
οὖν ὅλως ἡ τῶν ζῴων δεῖται φύσις διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς 
a30  ψυχῆς ἐμπύρευσιν. ταύτην δὲ ποιεῖται διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς (30) 
ὅσα μὴ μόνον ἔχουσι καρδίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πνεύμονα τῶν ζῴων. 
τὰ δὲ καρδίαν μὲν ἔχοντα, πνεύμονα δὲ μή, καθάπερ οἱ 
ἰχθύες διὰ τὸ ἔνυδρον αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, τῷ ὕδατι ποι- 
οῦνται τὴν κατάψυξιν διὰ τῶν βραγχίων.  
 
Here Aristotle is arguing that the hottest animals are the ones with much blood in the 
lungs. Air is ideal for cooling in these cases because it is so “rarefied” (leptên) and thus easily 
penetrates the whole lung, while water, being less so, could not (and thus Empedocles was wrong 
in asserting that water animals are hotter). Thus air serves to better cool the blood in the lungs, 
and it also easily passes to the heart (the archê of the natural heat) through the passages from the 
lungs to the heart. Aristotle references both the “dissections” and the “written histories” as what 
should be studied to learn more about the manner in which the heart and lungs are connected. 
Seeing/learning more about the manner in which the heart and lungs are connected 
supports the present argument in so far as without such passages it’s not clear how the respired 
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air could help cool the heart. That is, if one clearly grasps the connections between the heart and 
lungs, then one is in a position to speculate regarding the purpose of these connections: they 
provide easy passage of breath, taken in through the mouth, passed by way of the trachea to the 
lungs, and from there to the heart. 
A likely text answering to the reference, HA I.17, 496a27, states that the passages 
connecting the lungs to the heart “convey it (i.e. breath) to the heart”. This statement seems to 
imply the cooling function described here in Resp., and thus HA may here imply the causal 
analysis in Resp. 
 
Ogle: I.17, III.2-3 (see n132-134, pg. 131); Ross: 496a27-34; Hett: 496a, etc., 511b, etc. 
 
[3] Resp. 478a34-b2 
 
The position of the heart relative to the gills should be studied visually from the 
dissections, and in detail by reference to the History; but to summarize for our 
present purpose, the facts are as follows. 
 
478a34      ὡς δ’ ἡ θέσις ἔχει 
τῆς καρδίας πρὸς τὰ βράγχια, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὄψιν ἐκ τῶν 
b1   ἀνατομῶν δεῖ θεωρεῖν, πρὸς δ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν· ὡς 
δ’ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, ἔχει τόνδε τὸν τρόπον. 
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This reference, dealing with the heart-gill association, is coordinate with that in [2], 
which deals with the heart-lung association. 
 
Ogle: (1) I.17, III.2-3; (2) II.17, 507b3 (see n132-134, pg. 131); Ross: (1) 496a27-34; (2) 507a2-
10; Hett: (1) 496a, etc., 511b, etc.; (2) 507b3 
 
[4] IA 704b8-11 
 
Regarding all these things, and as many others as are similar to these, we 
must investigate the causes. That these thing hold in this way is clear from 
the natural historia, but why they do, must now be examined. 
 
704b8  περὶ δὴ πάντων τούτων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα συγγενῆ τούτοις, 
τὰς αἰτίας θεωρητέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτω ταῦτα συμ- 
b10  βαίνει, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς φυσικῆς, διότι δέ, νῦν  
σκεπτέον. 
 
The facts referred to in this passage all pertain, as the entire treatise does, to aspects of 
animal locomotion, and include such facts as all blooded animals move at four points, all 
bloodless animals move at more than four points, all animals with feet have an even number of 
feet, humans and birds are the only two-footed animals but bend their legs oppositely, etc. In this 
passage, the connection with hoti and dioti forms of enquiry is perhaps even stronger, in so far as 
these terms are actually used in the appropriate sense in the passage itself. It is of note that the 
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language used in this passage – tês historiais tês phusikês – is similarly ambiguous to that found 
in [1]. 
 
[5] PA II.1, 646a9, 11 
 
From which parts and from how many parts each of the animals is constituted has 
been exhibited more clearly in the enquiries about them; it is the causes owing to 
which each animal has this character that must now be examined, on their own 
and apart from what was said in those enquiries. 
 
646a8  Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν μορίων καὶ πόσων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον 
τῶν ζῴων, ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ αὐτῶν δεδήλωται σα- 
a10  φέστερον· δι’ ἃς δ’ αἰτίας ἕκαστον τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, 
ἐπισκεπτέον νῦν, χωρίσαντας καθ’ αὑτὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις 
εἰρημένων. 
  
In this passage Aristotle appears to distinguish two stages of investigation: a preliminary 
stage dedicated to establishing certain facts regarding the parts exhibited by animals, and a later 
stage dedicated to determining the causes that explain why each animal possess the parts that it 
does, and why the parts have the character that they do. This distinction appears to be the same 
one made in the important methodological passage in HA I.1, and it corresponds reasonably well 
to the distinction between the hoti and dioti enquiries discussed in APo. II.1.  
What does Aristotle mean when he states that the causes should be discussed “on their 
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own and apart from what was said in those enquiries”? How separate can an account of the 
causes be from the details of the shape, disposition, etc. of the parts? Does the HA discuss the 
various parts of animals in a manner that is more clear than what is found in PA? That is, can we 
say with any confidence that the reference in [2] is to the HA as we have it today?  
 
[6] PA II.3, 650a32. 
 
For the blood vessels extend all through the intestines, beginning beneath the 
stomach and extending up to it. These things should be studied with the help of 
the dissections and natural enquiries. 
 
650a29     αἱ γὰρ φλέβες κατατείνονται 
διὰ τοῦ μεσεντερίου παράπαν, κάτωθεν ἀρξάμεναι μέχρι τῆς  
κοιλίας. Δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατομῶν καὶ τῆς 
φυσικῆς ἱστορίας. 
 
Context: There must be poroi/archai (see textual note 1, Peck pg. 134) through which 
digested nutriment can pass from the stomach and intestines to the rest of the body, just as the 
roots of plants take nutriment from the earth. What additional information could the historia 
provide? Additional details regarding where the blood vessels attach and where they extend to, 
and how this varies in different animals. The number of blood vessels that extend from the 
stomach/intestines could be specified. 
What information can the dissections provide that the historia cannot, or cannot do as 
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well? If the dissections include or are pictures, then one could see that the blood vessels look like 
roots, thus reinforcing the analogy between them. That is, the structural similarities of roots and 
blood vessels point to a functional similarity. 
To what extent does this explanation assume the theory of blood as final stage of 
nutriment? To what extent does it support it? That is, if one assumes that the blood is a form of 
concocted nutriment that is used to nourish the rest of the body, then there would be a need for 
vessels to carry this nourishment from the stomach and intestines (where food is digested) to the 
rest of the body. 
 
Louis: HA III.4, 514b12; Peck: HA I.16, 495b19ff (really 32ff); III.4, 514b10ff 
 
[7] PA II.17, 660b2.    
 
And though all (birds) also use their tongue to communicate with one another, 
some do so more than others, so that in some cases they even seem to be learning 
from one another; these things have been discussed in the enquiries about 
animals. 
 
660a35   Καὶ χρῶνται τῇ γλώττῃ καὶ πρὸς ἑρμη-  
νείαν ἀλλήλοις πάντες μέν, ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων μᾶλλον, 
b1  ὥστ’ ἐπ’ ἐνίων καὶ μάθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖν παρ’ ἀλλήλων· εἴρη- 
ται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ τῶν ζῴων. 
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The discussion here is not just about birds’ tongues and vocalization, but rather abut the 
relationship between the tongue and vocalization generally. At HA IV.9, 536b14ff there is a brief 
discussion of birds learning and teaching song to offspring. Presumably the reference is meant to 
provide additional particular examples of vocalization in birds to support the generalized 
conclusions made here.  
 
Peck: 504b1, 536a20ff, 597b26, 608a17; Louis: HA IV.9, especially 536a20-b23 
 
[8] PA III.5, 668b30.    
 
But to know with accuracy how the blood vessels are situated relative to one 
another, one should base one’s study on the dissections and the zoological 
enquiry. We may take it that the blood vessels and heart have been discussed; we 
need to examine the other viscera according to the same procedure. 
 
668b28    Τὸ δὲ μετ’ ἀκριβείας ὡς ἔχουσιν 
αἱ φλέβες πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατομῶν δεῖ θεωρεῖν 
b30  καὶ ἐκ τῆς ζωϊκῆς ἱστορίας. Καὶ περὶ μὲν φλεβῶν καὶ  
καρδίας εἰρήσθω, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων σπλάγχνων σκεπτέον 
κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον. 
 
The immediate context is a discussion of the manner by which the major blood vessels 
cross each other as they extend through the body, front to back and back to front, and in this way 
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function to hold the body together, just as plaiting or twining is used to hold material together. 
The reference to the historia and dissections could supplement the argument if additional 
information regarding the manner in which such vessels cross over one another is there provided. 
Additionally, if the dissections included pictures of such crossing vessels, and if these pictures 
did in fact resemble the plaiting or twining of materials, then this could strengthen the argument.  
The final comment (kai peri men . . .) concludes not just this immediate discussion, but the 
entire discussion of the heart and vessels, which began at PA III.4. 
 
[9] PA III.14, 674b16.    
 
The study of the way in which these parts are related to one another in position 
and in their form should be based on the enquiry about animals and the 
dissections. 
 
674b15   Ὃν δ’ ἔχει τρόπον ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῇ 
θέσει καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἔκ τε τῆς ἱστορίας τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα 
δεῖ θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν. 
 
The context is a discussion of animals that have multiple stomachs, and the service they 
perform for these animals. Additional information on the relative positions and forms of these 
parts would not necessarily support the argument regarding their function (especially the point 
regarding the relationship between dentation and digestion), but may serve to demonstrate more 
clearly the manner in which they all look like stomachs, and all receive concocted nourishment 
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one from the next. If the dissections include pictures, then such pictures may communicate more 
clearly the positions and shapes of these parts then a written historia 
 
Peck: HA II.17, 507a36ff; Louis: same 
 
[10] PA IV.5, 680a1.    
 
All these, and the other hard-shelled animals, as was said, have a mouth, a tongue-
like part, a stomach, and a residual outlet, though each part differs in position and 
size. (The manner in which each of them has these parts should be studied with 
the help of the enquiries about animals and of the dissections. For some of these 
things need to be clarified by an account, others rather by visual inspection.) 
 
679b34       Πάντα μὲν οὖν 
ἔχει, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα στόμα  
τε καὶ τὸ γλωττοειδὲς καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος 
τὴν ἔξοδον, διαφέρει δὲ τῇ θέσει καὶ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν. Ὃν δὲ 
680a1   τρόπον ἔχει τούτων ἕκαστον, ἔκ τε τῶν ἱστοριῶν τῶν 
περὶ τὰ ζῷα θεωρείσθω καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ 
λόγῳ τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῶν σαφηνίζειν δεῖ μᾶλλον. 
 
The context of this passage is a discussion of the parts of bloodless animals, specifically 
the malakia, malakostraka, and ostrakoderma. This passage is rather unique in so far as Aristotle 
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points to different reasons why one might study the anatomai as opposed to the historiai. 
Specifically, the anatomai are studied pros tên opsin while the historiai provide a logos. Lennox 
rightly points out that, while it is natural to read these references to anatomai as to pictures of 
some sort, they may just as well be to actual dissections (Lennox 299). One can imagine that in 
some cases simply looking at a part (or two parts in different animals) will reveal its identity, 
function, etc., while in other cases inspection alone may not provide the necessary information. 
But what must be determined in the historiai stage in order to provide this information? 
That is, how is “the manner in which each of them has these parts” determined? How do we 
recognize a part as this part? 
 
Peck: HA 528b10; Louis: HA IV.4 
 
[11] PA IV.8, 684b5. 
 
Each of the parts – what their positions are and what differences there are from 
one animal to another, including in what way the males differ from the females – 
should be studied with the help of the dissections and the enquiries about animals. 
 
684b2         Καθ’ 
ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μορίων, τίς ἡ θέσις αὐτῶν καὶ τίνες διαφο- 
ραὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῶν τ’ ἄλλων καὶ τίνι διαφέρει τὰ ἄρρενα 
b5  τῶν θηλειῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατομῶν θεωρείσθω καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱστο- 
ριῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ ζῷα. 
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“The parts” referred to here are primarily locomotive parts, such as feet, claws, tail, etc.  
The immediate discussion is of the differences of such parts in different kinds of malakostraka. 
However this passage marks the beginning of a transition to a discussion of the internal parts of 
these animals, so the antecedent of “these parts” may be the external parts generally, rather than 
the locomotive parts. 
The references to “position” (thesis) and especially differences (diaphorai) provide an 
especially nice connection to HA, as these are topics that are especially relevant there. 
 
Lennox: HA IV.2, 525a30-527a35; Peck: same, plus 541b19ff; Louis: same, same 
 
[12] PA IV.10, 689a18.    
 
Both how the parts concerned with the seed and embryo are arranged internally 
and in what manner they differ are apparent with the help of the enquiry about 
animals and the dissections, and will be stated later in the works on generation. 
 
689a17    Ἐντὸς δὲ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ πῇ διαφέρουσι τά 
τε περὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν κύησιν, ἔκ τε τῆς ἱστορίας  
τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ἀνατομῶν, καὶ ὕστερον 
a20  λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως. 
 
This reference is of particular interest because the corresponding passage in HA, in III.1, 
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includes a reference to a lettered diagram. What then do the anatomai include that the historiai 
do not? Again reference is here made to the way these parts differ from one another, which 
corresponds well with the purposes of the HA.  
 
Lennox: HA III.1, 510a29-35; Louis: HA I.13, 14 (493a25ff), 17 (497a27); GA I.2-16; Peck: 
same 
 
[13] PA IV.13, 696b15.   
 
Some fish have many gills, some few, and some have double gills, some simple 
ones; in most of them, however, the last one is simple. (For accuracy, one should 
study with the help of the dissections of these things and the enquiries about 
animals.) 
 
696b12       Οἱ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν 
ἔχουσι πολλὰ βράγχια οἱ δ’ ὀλίγα, καὶ οἱ μὲν διπλᾶ οἱ δ’ ἁπλᾶ· 
τὸ δ’ ἔσχατον ἁπλοῦν οἱ πλεῖστοι. Τὴν δ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἐκ τῶν 
b15  ἀνατομῶν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ τὰ  
ζῷα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. 
 
As Lennox points out (pg. 340), the reference to the dissections here is slightly 
different (“the dissections of these things”), and the suggestion may be to study the 
actual dissections, and not a written or pictorial account of them.  
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Peck: HA 504b28ff; Lennox: HA II.15, 505b8-18; Louis: HA II.13, 504b28, 505a20 
 
[14] GA I.3, 716b31 
 
I have given a more accurate account of these in the historia about animals. 
 
716b30         διώρι-  
σται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀκριβέστερον ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ταῖς περὶ 
τῶν ζῴων. 
 
 The discussion here is about the testicles and their presence, position, etc. in different 
kinds of animals. As noted by Peck, HA III.1 seems to answer the reference.  
 
[15] GA I.4, 717a31-34 
 
In the vivipara, as for instance in horses and other such animals, and also in man, 
they [the testicles] do this by maintaining in position the doubling-back of the 
passages (for a description of this reference must be made to the Researches upon 
Animals), since the testes are no integral part of the passages . . . 
 
717a31    ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζῳοτόκοις οἷον ἵπποις 
τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις σώζοντες 
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τὴν ἐπαναδίπλωσιν (ὃν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει αὕτη ἐκ τῶν ἱστο- 
ριῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ ζῷα δεῖ θεωρεῖν)· 
 
Peck: HA 510a20ff., GA 718a15 
 
[16] GA II.11, 719a8-10 
 
However, to ascertain the arrangement of the uterus of the selachians and other 
kinds as well, the Dissections should be inspected and also the Researches. 
 
718a8          δεῖ 
δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτης καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑστερῶν, ὃν τρόπον 
a10  ἔχουσιν, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνατομῶν τεθεωρηκέναι καὶ τῶν ἱστοριῶν. 
 
Peck: 510b5ff 
 
[17] GA 728b14  
 
An exact account of this matter, as it concerns every sort of animal, is to be found 
in the historia about animals. 
 
728b12     δι’ ἀκριβείας δέ, πῶς συμβαίνει 
ταῦτα περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ζῴων, γέγραπται ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰ 
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ζῷα ἱστορίαις. 
 
The discussion is about menstruation in female animals. Peck notes HA VI.18, 572b29ff. 
 
[18] GA 740a19-23 
 
. . . for an animal, the ultimate for of nourishment is blood or its counterpart. Of 
these fluids the blood vessels are the receptacle, and therefore the heart is the first 
principle of them as well. This is clearly brought out in the Researches and in the 
Dissections. 
 
740a19    τροφὴ δὲ ζῴου ἡ ἐσχάτη αἷμα καὶ 
τὸ ἀνάλογον, τούτων δ’ ἀγγεῖον αἱ φλέβες· διὸ ἡ καρδία 
καὶ τούτων ἀρχή. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ τῶν 
ἀνατομῶν. 
 
Peck: HA III.3 
 
[19] GA II.7, 746a15 
 
All this should be studied with the help of the illustrative diagrams given in the 
anatomai and in the writings in the historiai 
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746a14 δεῖ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν παραδειγμάτων τῶν ἐν 
 ταῖς ἀνατομαῖς καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις γεγραμμένων. 
 
 
The discussion is of the connection between the umbilical cord and the uterus in different 
kinds of animals. Peck provides no reference to HA. 
 
[20] GA 750b31 
 
Some of them (i.e. fish), as we can see, have eggs from the very outset, as is 
recorded in the historiai 
 
750b30      ἔνιοι γὰρ εὐθὺς ἔχοντες  
ᾠὰ φαίνονται, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις γέγραπται περὶ 
αὐτῶν. 
 
The discussion is of whether males are necessary for generation in all birds and fish. Peck 
refers us to HA VI.13, 567a30. 
 
[21] GA 753b17 
 
For an exact account of how these stand to one another both at the beginning of 
the process of generation and during the process of the young animals’ formation, 
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also for an account of the membranes and umbilical cords, what is written en tais 
historiais should be studied; for our present inquiry it is sufficient that thus much 
should be clear, viz., that once the heart has been formed (this comes first of all) 
and the Great Blood-vessel has been marked off from it, two umbilical cords 
extend from this blood vessel . . . . 
 
753b14    δι’ ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν, ὃν τρόπον ἔχουσι 
ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα κατ’ ἀρχάς τε τῆς γενέσεως καὶ συν-  
ισταμένων τῶν ζῴων, ἔτι δὲ περί τε ὑμένων καὶ περὶ ὀμφαλῶν ἐκ 
τῶν ἐκ ταῖς ἱστορίαις γεγραμμένων δεῖ θεωρεῖν· 
 
The discussion is of the development of the embryo in an egg. Peck refers us to HA VI.3, 
561a3-562b2, but notes “the description there is no fuller.” 
 
[22]  GA III.8, 758a23-25 
 
For a figure showing the way in which it is situated during the process of 
formation, the Researches should be consulted 
 
758a23        τὸ δὲ 
σχῆμα τῆς θέσεως ὃν ἔχει γιγνόμενα τρόπον δεῖ θεωρεῖν 
ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν.  
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Peck: HA 550a10ff. 
 
[23] GA III.10, 761a10 
 
To find out the various differences between each of these kinds of creatures, and 
between them and bees, the records given peri tas historias should be studied. 
 
761a8          πόσας 
δ’ ἔχουσι διαφορὰς ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἕκα- 
στον ἢ πρὸς τὰς μελίττας ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἱστορίας ἀναγε- 
γραμμένων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. 
 
The discussion is of the generation of hornets and wasps, and how it differs from that of 
bees. Peck cites HA VIII(IX).41, 627b23ff; VIII(IX).42, 628b32ff. 
 
[24] GA III.11, 763b16 
 
For an account dealing with these individually, and the places where they grow, 
the student should consult ek tês historias. 
 
763b15 τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐν οἷς γίγνονται τόποις 
ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας θεωρείσθω. 
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The discussion is of the spontaneous generation of the ostrakoderma. Peck provides no 
reference to HA. 
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APPENDIX B 
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II.17, 99A30-B7: THE “SCHEMATIC” PASSAGE 
APo. II.17, 99a30-b7 (the “schematic” passage) is a challenging passage which 
commentators have found difficult to interpret and fit into the general argumentative context of 
II.16-18. II.17 considers the relationship between a cause and its effect, specifically whether the 
same effect always has the same cause. Ross offers a rather contrived reading of the text, which, 
though consistent, seems unlikely. Barnes suspects that “there is no reconciliation” of the 
passage with its immediate argumentative context, and Charles suggests emendations to the text 
to help make sense of his reading. 
B.1 THE ARGUMENT OF POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II.16-18 
APo. II.16 raises the question of whether cause (aitia) and effect (ou aition) are 
coextensive, such that the presence of a cause implies the effect, and the presence of the effect 
implies the cause. The chapter proceeds, apparently aporetically, by suggesting, first, that if 
cause and effect are coextensive, then deductions may be constructed with either cause or effect 
as the middle term, such that one may “prove” the effect through the cause, or the cause through 
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the effect. Aristotle points out that things cannot be mutually explanatory, such that the 
demonstration of the cause through the effect would not give the reason why (dioti) the cause 
holds, but rather only the fact that (hoti) it holds. Extension, for Aristotle, does not indicate 
causal priority. 
II.16 next asks whether the same effect may have more than one cause, such that the 
presence of the cause would imply the effect, but the presence of the effect would not imply a 
specific cause, only some cause. This suggestion is not explicitly endorsed or rejected. 
Finally, the chapter ends with the suggestion that cause and effect are coextensive, when 
considered from the correct level of generality. The example of leaf-shedding is offered as an 
illustration: many different forms of plant may shed their leaves, however all together the leaf-
shedders form a single kind to which leaf-shedding belongs primitively (i.e. the kind is 
coextensive with leaf shedding). The cause of the shedding of leaves (e.g. coagulation of sap) is 
always present to this kind when leaves are shed. Again, this alternative is not explicitly 
endorsed or rejected. 
II.17 raises the question anew, and is typically interpreted as Aristotle’s “positive” 
response to the problem of the relation of cause and effect treated aporetically in II.16.  The 
chapter begins by asking whether the same effect may have different causes in different things. 
Aristotle first allows that the cause may be different in different things if the demonstration 
revealing the cause proceeds either incidentally or “in virtue of a sign.” But in these cases the so-
called “cause” so identified is not the true cause, and it is thus only in a manner of speaking that 
an effect can have more than one cause. 
He then proceeds to elaborate on the leaf shedding example introduced in II.16, 
indicating that this example does illustrate his views on the relation between cause and effect. In 
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this discussion he makes it clear that an attribute may extend further than a given subject, but 
when grouped together all the subjects that exhibit the attribute will form a single kind to which 
the attribute belongs primitively, and to this kind a single cause will apply that explains the 
presence of the attribute. Thus we have: 
 
Vine 
Fig  Broad-Leafed  Sap congeals  Leaf-Shedding 
Etc. 
 
The problem “why do vines shed their leaves?” is solved first by locating vines into the 
more general kind (i.e. broad-leafed) to which the feature “leaf-shedding” belongs primitively. 
Then a cause is (somehow) found that is responsible for the shedding of leaves in this kind. In 
this case, two middle terms are used to connect “vine” with “leaf shedding,” and so in one sense 
there is more than one cause of leaf-shedding in vines, but in another there is only one cause (i.e. 
sap congealing) that applies to the kind that possesses the attribute primitively.  
The schematic passage, which apparently is meant to illustrate this very point, follows 
and ends the chapter. 
II.18 then takes up the question of which of the middle terms connecting a subject with 
an attribute is best considered the cause of the attribute, the one closest to the subject of attribute 
(or, if more than two, some one in between)?  
The argumentative flow of these chapters thus begins with Aristotle considering the 
relationship between cause and effect, specifically whether the same effect can have more than 
one cause, proceeds aporetically by offering possible solutions, and concludes by offering 
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Aristotle’s own preferred solution. 
The problem, recognized by many commentators, is that the schematic passage appears to 
conflict with the solution Aristotle offers in the first part of II.17.Appendix subsection. 
B.2 THE “SCHEMATIC” PASSAGE 
Here is Ross’s text of the schematic passage, followed by a translation.  
 
99a30  (1)Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων ὧδε ἀποδώσει ζητοῦσι τὴν παρ- 
ακολούθησιν τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ οὗ αἴτιον. (2) ἔστω τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρ- 
χειν παντί, τὸ δὲ Β ἑκάστῳ τῶν Δ, ἐπὶ πλέον δέ. (3) τὸ μὲν 
δὴ Β καθόλου ἂν εἴη τοῖς Δ· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγω καθόλου ᾧ 
μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, πρῶτον δὲ καθόλου ᾧ ἕκαστον μὲν μὴ ἀντι- 
a35  στρέφει, ἅπαντα δὲ ἀντιστρέφει καὶ παρεκτείνει. (4) τοῖς δὴ  
Δ αἴτιον τοῦ Α τὸ Β. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ Α ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ Β ἐπεκ- 
τείνειν· εἰ δὲ μή, τί μᾶλλον αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦτο ἐκείνου; (5) εἰ 
δὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς Ε τὸ Α, ἔσται τι ἐκεῖνα ἓν ἅπαντα 
ἄλλο τοῦ Β. εἰ γὰρ μή, πῶς ἔσται εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾧ τὸ Ε, τὸ 
99b1  Α παντί, ᾧ δὲ τὸ Α, οὐ παντὶ τὸ Ε; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται 
τι αἴτιον οἷον [τὸ Α] ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς Δ; (6) ἀλλ’ ἆρα καὶ 
τὰ Ε ἔσται τι ἕν; ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔστω τὸ Γ. 
(7) ἐνδέχεται δὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείω αἴτια εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῖς αὐ- 
b5  τοῖς τῷ εἴδει, οἷον τοῦ μακρόβια εἶναι τὰ μὲν τετράποδα  
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τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χολήν, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ τὸ ξηρὰ εἶναι ἢ ἕτερόν 
τι. 
 
It shall be exhibited/shown in the case of the figures (by the figures) in this way, 
if/when you are seeking the interrelation of cause and that which is caused. Let A 
belong to all B, and B to each of the Ds, but also to more. B would then be 
universal to the Ds. For I call that universal which does not convert, but the 
primitive universal is that which does not convert with each, but does convert 
with all together and coextends. Then for the Ds, B is the cause of A. Therefore it 
is necessary that A extend to more than B; if not, why will this be the cause rather 
than that? If then A belongs to all the Es, all of these will be some one thing other 
than B. For if not, how will it be said that that to which E belongs, A belongs to 
all, but that to which A belongs, E does not belong to all. For why will there not 
be some cause such as belongs to all the Ds? But indeed will the Es be some one 
thing? It is necessary to investigate this, and let it be C. Then it is possible that 
many things are the cause of the same thing, but not for things the same in form, 
for example, [the cause] of long-life with respect to quadrupeds is not having bile, 
but for birds is the dry or something else. 
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B.3 TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 
(1) Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων ὧδε ἀποδώσει ζητοῦσι τὴν παρακολούθησιν τοῦ αἰτίου  
  καὶ οὗ αἴτιον.  
 
It shall be exhibited/shown in the case of the figures (by the figures) in this way, 
if/when you are seeking the interrelation of cause and that which is caused. 
 
The participial phrase beginning with zêtousi indicates that it is the “interrelation of cause 
and that which is caused” that will be made clear by the schematic example. The preceding 
passage in II.17 (that culminates in the leaf-shedding example) begins as follows: 
 
The interrelation between cause, that which is caused, and that for which the 
cause is, holds in the following manner. 
 
99a16        Ἔχει δ’ οὕτω τὸ  
παρακολουθεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὗ αἴτιον καὶ ᾧ αἴ- 
τιον· 
 
The verbal similarities between these passages suggest that the schematic example is 
meant to illustrate the same interrelation as is discussed in the leaf-shedding example. In other 
words, the same interrelation between cause and effect discussed in the leaf-shedding example is 
now to be illustrated “in the case of the figures,” which here seems to mean syllogistically with 
letters. It is possible that the schematic example is meant to illustrate a different interrelation, but 
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indication of this is given, and thus it seems more probable that it is meant to be the same.  As 
mentioned above, this is difficult since most commentators read the schematic passage as 
offering a different relationship between cause and effect than is discussed in the leaf-shedding 
example. 
 
 
(2)  ἔστω τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν παντί, τὸ δὲ Β ἑκάστῳ τῶν Δ, ἐπὶ πλέον δέ.  
 
Let A belong to all B, and B to each of the Ds, but also to more (i.e. extend 
further)  
 
The phrase hekastô tôn D indicates that there is more than one D, and that B belongs to 
each of them. Most commentators take this to mean that D is a kind with many different forms, 
and that B holds of each of these forms. But does the epi pleon de indicate that B extends further 
than all the Ds taken together, or simply further than each individual D, but not further than the 
kind?  
In the preceding passage (99a18-20) Aristotle writes that an effect (i.e. that which is 
caused, to ou aition), extends further (epi pleon) relative to each subject taken individually 
(kath’hekaston), but extends equally (ep’ ison) with the subjects taken altogether. The example 
he gives, first, is the attribute “having exterior angles equal to four right angles” extends further 
than triangle and quadrilateral (etc.), but equally with all such subjects taken together. Next he 
gives the example of leaf-shedding extending further than vine and fig, but extending equally 
with all such together. (Note though that in this example he uses huperechei for “extending 
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further” rather than epi pleon). In these examples an attribute is said to extend further than 
certain individual subjects, but not further than all of them taken together.  
I think the grammar of (2) allows for reading either that B extends further than D (e.g. to 
E), or that B extends further than each D (but not beyond the Ds taken together). But the 
preceding examples suggest that we should interpret the passage as stating that B extends further 
than each individual D, but equally with all the Ds taken together.  
 
(3)  τὸ μὲν δὴ Β καθόλου ἂν εἴη τοῖς Δ· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγω καθόλου ᾧ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, 
πρῶτον δὲ καθόλου ᾧ ἕκαστον μὲν μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, ἅπαντα δὲ ἀντιστρέφει καὶ 
παρεκτείνει. 
 
B would then be universal to the Ds. For I call that universal which does not 
convert, but the primitive universal is that which does not convert with each, but 
does convert with all together and coextends. 
 
This passage states that B is universal “to the Ds.” Does this mean that B is universal to 
each individual D, or to all the Ds taken together (i.e. the kind D)?  
If we interpret passage (2) as stating that B extends further than each individual D, but 
equally with all the Ds taken together, then we should read (3) as stating that B is universal to 
each individual D. Since, on that reading, B extends further than an individual D, B therefore 
does not convert with an individual D, and this is the sense in which Aristotle specifies he is 
using the term “universal”.  
The most natural reading has it that B is universal to each D (i.e. each D implies B), but is 
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not a first universal to any individual D (i.e. B does not imply any individual D). The question is 
whether B is a first universal of the kind D (i.e. B implies some D), or whether B extends further 
than the kind.  
 
 
(4)  τοῖς δὴ Δ αἴτιον τοῦ Α τὸ Β. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ Α ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ Β ἐπεκτείνειν· εἰ δὲ μή, τί 
μᾶλλον αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦτο ἐκείνου; 
  
Then for the Ds, B is the cause of A. Therefore it is necessary that A extend 
further (i.e. to more) than B; if not, why will this be the cause rather than that (or 
“this be the cause of that”)?  
 
Since A holds of all B, and B holds of each of the Ds, a syllogism may be constructed 
connecting A with any individual D, using B as the middle term. 
Is Aristotle concluding that B is the cause of A for each D, or asserting it? Passage (2) 
implies that A belongs to each D, but does not necessarily imply that B is the true cause of A 
belonging to D (understanding aition in the strict sense spelled out in APo. I). 
Ross emends his text to read epekteinein while all the MSS read parekteinein. He reasons 
that parekteinein in a35 just above (see passage (3)) means “are coextensive,” and that cannot be 
the meaning here. In fact, as Ross reads the passage, Aristotle’s point is that A and B must not be 
coextensive (as the epi pleon indicates).  
But why must A extend further than B? How is this a necessary inference from B being 
the cause of A in D, as the dei ara indicates?  
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According to Ross, A must extend further than B because if it did not (i.e. if they were 
equal in extension) then either could act as a middle term to demonstrate the other. He reads the 
second clause as asking “why will this (i.e. A) be the cause rather than that (i.e. B).”  While it is 
true that if they were coextensive either could serve as a middle term, Aristotle has already 
addressed this issue in II.16, making the distinction between demonstrating the fact and the 
reason why. Why bring it up again here? Perhaps because it was discussed aporetically in II.16, 
and its application here is affirmative? But that doesn’t make sense, since Aristotle clearly holds 
that cause and effect may be coextensive while maintaining a causal priority of one term over the 
other. Specifically here, just because A and B are coextensive does NOT mean that we have no 
reason of preferring one over the other as cause (Barnes raises this very point, p. 256). Thus B 
being the cause of A in D does not imply that A must extend further than B.  
Charles reads the dê as de (or de dê), and takes (4) as introducing a new case. As he 
writes: 
 
This case is problematic (let us suppose) because A extends further than B. (If this 
were not so, B would not be the cause of D’s being A but of some wider group 
(e.g. D’s and E’s) being A. (p. 211) 
 
As is reflected in this quote, Charles reads the final question of (4) as asking “why is this (i.e. B) 
rather the cause of the that (i.e. AaD)” (see pg. 211, n24). In other words, if A was equal in 
extension with B, and extended further than D, then why would B be the cause of A in D, rather 
than the cause of A in some larger group that includes D. 
It seems Charles reads the dei ara as indicating that A must extend further than D 
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because the case illustrated is meant to be problematic, namely a case where that which is caused 
(i.e. the effect) has different causes in different things (B for the Ds and, as we shall see, C for 
the Es). 
Reading the touto ekeinou as “this of that” instead of “this [rather] than that” has the 
virtue of absolving Aristotle of making the seemingly errant point that coextension would imply 
bi-causality, but it must be admitted that the Greek text looks as though it reads “this [rather] 
than that.”  
Is there any way to interpret the dei ara where the necessity of A extending further than 
B really does flow from the fact that B is the cause of A in the Ds? The translation given is 
perhaps the most natural reading of the Greek, but could we instead read: 
 
Therefore it is necessary that A extend further WITH B.  
 
On this reading, A must extend further “with” B, i.e. extend further than D. We could justify the 
content of this reading if we interpret (2) as stating that B extends further than the kind D, i.e. to 
things other than D. In that case, A would also extend further than D, since B extends further, 
and B causes A,  
We might then read the second clause as: 
 
 If not, why will this (i.e. B) be the cause of that (i.e. A in D)? 
 
In other words, why would B be the cause of A, if B extends further but A does not? This 
reading supports the notion that the presence of a cause always implies the presence of the effect. 
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In short, it states that if B is the cause of A, then every instance of B implies A. Thus if B 
extends further than D, then A extends further than D also. 
 
(5)  εἰ δὴ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς Ε τὸ Α, ἔσται τι ἐκεῖνα ἓν ἅπαντα ἄλλο τοῦ Β. εἰ γὰρ μή, 
πῶς ἔσται εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾧ τὸ Ε, τὸ Α παντί, ᾧ δὲ τὸ Α, οὐ παντὶ τὸ Ε; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ 
ἔσται τι αἴτιον οἷον [τὸ Α] ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς Δ;  
 
If then A belongs to all the Es, all of these will be some one thing other than B. 
For if not, how will it be said that that to which E belongs, A belongs to all, but 
that to which A belongs, E does not belong to all. For why will there not be some 
cause such as belongs to all the Ds? 
 
Similar to the reference to “each of the Ds” in (2), the plural tois E here suggests that 
Aristotle is positing that A belongs additionally to each of a number of Es, where E is some kind, 
and each E is a form of the kind. 
What does Aristotle mean when he states that “all of these” (i.e. all the Es) will be “some 
one thing other than B”? One possibility is that there must be some middle term other than B 
connecting A and E. But is this a reasonable reading of the passage? Is it plausible that by “all of 
these together (i.e. the Es) will be some one thing other than B” Aristotle means that there will be 
some cause of A in E other than B? Are we to understand that all of the Ds taken together form 
some one thing that is the same as B? 
The concern here seems to be that if all the Es together did not form some one thing other 
than B, then one would not be able to assert: 
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AaE 
And  
~(EaA) 
 
Must we be able to assert this? Yes, on the supposition that AaE (given in passage (6)), and AaD 
(concluded in passage (4)). In other words, if A belongs to all E and all D, then E does not 
belong to everything A belongs to, because E does not belong to D (as far as we know). 
If we take the preceding passage as stating that there must be some term other than B 
connecting A with E, then perhaps Aristotle is stating that if B did connect A with E (just as it 
connects A with D), then E would belong to everything A does, through the term B: 
 
AaB  AaB 
BaD  BaE 
 AaD  AaE 
 
In that case we would conclude that B must connect A with E, just as it connects A with D. But 
then we would have EaA 
The question apparently asks why will there not be some cause of A in the Es, just as 
there was a cause of A in the Ds. If that is the correct reading, then it implies that B is in fact not 
the cause of A in E. 
Although there is good evidence for the to A in the MSS, Ross brackets the to A in his 
text, and past editors appear to have offered other emendations. It does not seem especially 
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problematic to me, if we can translate as follows: 
 
For why will there not be some cause, as in the case of A belonging to all the Ds? 
 
The bracketed to A is an emendation according to Ross.  
 
(6)  ἀλλ’ ἆρα καὶ τὰ Ε ἔσται τι ἕν; ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ τοῦτο, καὶ ἔστω τὸ Γ. 
 
But indeed will the Es be some one thing? It is necessary to investigate this, and 
let it be C. 
 
Again it is unclear what Aristotle means by asking whether the Es will be one thing. Is it 
that each individual E was identified by its possession of A, such that Aristotle is now further 
asking whether the group so collected does indeed form a unified kind? 
 
(7)  ἐνδέχεται δὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείω αἴτια εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῖς αὐ- 
τοῖς τῷ εἴδει, οἷον τοῦ μακρόβια εἶναι τὰ μὲν τετράποδα (5) 
τὸ μὴ ἔχειν χολήν, τὰ δὲ πτηνὰ τὸ ξηρὰ εἶναι ἢ ἕτερόν 
τι. 
 
Then it is possible that many things are the cause of the same thing, but not for 
things the same in form, for example, [the cause] of long-life with respect to 
quadrupeds is not having bile, but for birds is the dry or something else.  
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The passage begins by stating that it is possible for the same thing to have many causes, 
but not for things similar by form. 
This conclusion could be construed as problematic, in so far as Aristotle has indicated 
throughout this section of APo. II that we should look to the extension of an attribute in order to 
guide causal research. In the leaf-shedding example, all of the plants that shed their leaves (vines, 
figs, etc.) were grouped together (in this case, labeled “broad-leafed”), and a single cause was 
sought that applied to the larger kind. If more than one casue could be at work, than nothing is 
gained by grouping together the kinds that exhibit the attribute. 
Further, the example of long-life is problematic, in so far as Aristotle’s treatment of 
makrobia in Long. suggests a greater unity in its explanation (not to mention that it is the wet, not 
the dry, that is responsible). The heteron ti at the end of (7) suggests that the example is intended 
to be illustrative, and may not reflect Aristotle’s considered view on makrobia. 
 Still further, this conclusion raises difficult questions regarding the form/kind groupings 
to which unified causal explanations apply. For example, if we think that the study of animals is 
a unified science, treating a single kind of thing, then we should expect shared predicates to be 
similarly caused. If this is not the case, at what level of kind/form divisions should we expect 
that similarity to hold? And, perhaps worse, which “forms” should we look to as marking off 
common causes? While Aristotle introduces the megista genê as useful divisions within the 
animal world for grouping together the discussion of common attributes, he clearly does 
recognize that some attributes are present across these divisions that are commonly caused (see 
discussion in PA I.1).  
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Perhaps we could read form in passage (7) as picking out infima species, such that animals 
that are the same in form at that lowest level (e.g. two humans) must have their attributes 
commonly caused, but not necessarily at higher levels of generality. 
B.4 CONCLUSION 
The final comments of the schematic passage ((11) above) favor interpreting the entire 
passage as illustrating the notion that the same effect may have different causes in different 
forms of things. This possibility is discussed aporetically in II.16, but is not the notion that is 
illustrated in the leaf-shedding example immediately prior to the schematic passage. In the leaf-
shedding example, different subjects that exhibit the same attribute are grouped together to form 
a wider kind, to which a single cause belongs that is explanatory of the attribute in each of the 
subjects. Thus we are left to ask, is the schematic passage intended to illustrate the case of (i) 
different subjects having different causes of the same attribute, or (ii) different subjects 
belonging to a single wider kind, and thus possessing the same cause? The possibility of the 
same effect having more than one cause is considered in II.13, but there Aristotle concludes that 
a different cause actually implies a different effect, certain superficial similarities 
notwithstanding, in so far as the cause figures into the definition of the effect.
292
 The example 
there is pride, which in certain different people is caused by different things. In II.13 Aristotle 
concludes that there would be two different forms of pride in that case. (A similar argument can 
                                                 
292 See also II.17, 99a21-2, where Aristotle again states that the cause of an attribute figures 
into the attrbiute’s definition. 
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be made in regards to Aristotle’s discussion of what it means for an animal to be water-dwelling 
(enhudron).) 
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APPENDIX C 
ARISTOTLE’S MEGISTA GENÊ 
In HA I.6 Aristotle turns from a discussion of the differentiae exhibited by animals to a 
discussion of the very large kinds (megista genê) into which animals have been divided. These 
very large kinds play an instrumental role in Aristotle’s biological writings. They are typically 
used to structure discussions of important features under study: for a given feature, the 
discussion often proceeds from one very large kind to another. This practice is defended in PA I, 
where Aristotle argues that a proper understanding of a feature exhibited by an animal must 
include the identification of the highest level kind in which the feature is present, and the 
explanation must be applicable at that level of generality. Interestingly, it is not clear which 
kinds Aristotle believed qualified as megista genê. On one reading of the passage in HA I.6, 
Aristotle seems to exclude two kinds of animals traditionally thought to be megista genê: four-
footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing animals. But his comments elsewhere, not to 
mention his practice in the biology, seem to suggest that these two kinds do in fact qualify as 
megista genê. In what follows I provide a reading of the passage that shows that Aristotle did not 
view four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing animals as very large kinds. I further 
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show that Aristotle’s use of these differentiae throughout his biology need not require us to take 
them as marking off very large kinds. 
C.1 THE PASSAGE: HA I.6, 490B7-491A6  
Here is Balme’s text of the passage in question. I’ve divided the text into 6 sections, each 
of which will be commented on separately below. 
 
490b7   (1) γένη δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ζῴων, εἰς ἃ διῄρηται τἆλλα 
ζῷα, τάδ’ ἐστίν, ἓν μὲν ὀρνίθων, ἓν δ’ ἰχθύων, ἄλλο δὲ 
κῆτος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ἔναιμά ἐστιν. ἄλλο δὲ γένος 
b10  ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων, ὃ καλεῖται ὄστρεον· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν  
μαλακοστράκων, ἀνώνυμον ἑνὶ ὀνόματι, οἷον κάραβοι καὶ 
γένη τινὰ καρκίνων καὶ ἀστακῶν· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν μαλακίων, 
οἷον τευθίδες τε καὶ τεῦθοι καὶ σηπίαι· ἕτερον τὸ τῶν ἐντό- 
μων. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέν ἐστιν ἄναιμα, ὅσα δὲ πόδας 
b15  ἔχει, πολύποδα· τῶν δ’ ἐντόμων ἔνια καὶ πτηνά ἐστιν. (2) τῶν 
δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ γένη μεγάλα· οὐ γὰρ περιέχει 
πολλὰ εἴδη ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν αὐτὸ οὐκ 
ἔχον διαφορὰν τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, τὰ δ’ ἔχει μέν, 
ἀλλ’ ἀνώνυμα τὰ εἴδη. (3) ἔστι γὰρ τὰ τετράποδα καὶ μὴ  
b20  πτερωτὰ ἔναιμα μὲν πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ζῳοτόκα τὰ δ’ 
ᾠοτόκα αὐτῶν. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ζῳοτόκα, οὐ πάντα τρίχας ἔχει,  
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ὅσα δ’ ᾠοτόκα φολίδας ἔχει · ἔστι δ’ ἡ φολὶς ὅμοιον 
χώρᾳ λεπίδος. (4) ἄπουν δὲ φύσει ἐστὶν ἔναιμον πεζὸν τὸ τῶν 
ὄφεων γένος· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φολιδωτόν. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι 
b25  ᾠοτοκοῦσιν ὄφεις, ἡ δ’ ἔχιδνα μόνον ζῳοτοκεῖ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ  
ζῳοτοκοῦντα οὐ πάντα τρίχας ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἰχθύων 
τινὲς ζῳοτοκοῦσιν· ὅσα μέντοι ἔχει τρίχας πάντα ζῳοτοκεῖ. 
τριχῶν γάρ τι εἶδος θετέον καὶ τὰς ἀκανθώδεις τρίχας 
οἵας οἱ χερσαῖοι ἔχουσιν ἐχῖνοι καὶ οἱ ὕστριχες· τριχὸς γὰρ 
b30  χρείαν παρέχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ ποδῶν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν θαλαττίων.  
(5) τοῦ δὲ γένους τοῦ τῶν τετραπόδων ζῴων καὶ ζῳοτόκων εἴδη 
μέν ἐστι πολλά, ἀνώνυμα δέ· ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν 
ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος εἴρηται, λέων, ἔλαφος, ἵππος, 
κύων καὶ τἆλλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ἐπεί ἐστιν ἕν τι γένος καὶ 
491a1  ἐπὶ τοῖς λοφούροις καλουμένοις, οἷον ἵππῳ καὶ ὄνῳ καὶ ὀρεῖ  
καὶ γίννῳ καὶ ἴννῳ καὶ ταῖς ἐν Συρίᾳ καλουμέναις ἡμιόνοις,  
αἳ καλοῦνται ἡμίονοι δι’ ὁμοιότητα, οὐκ οὖσαι ἁπλῶς τὸ αὐτὸ  
εἶδος· καὶ γὰρ ὀχεύονται καὶ γεννῶνται ἐξ ἀλλήλων. (6) διὸ 
a5  καὶ χωρὶς λαμβάνοντας ἀνάγκη θεωρεῖν ἑκάστου τὴν φύσιν  
αὐτῶν. 
 
(See below for translations of each section) 
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C.2 ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT 
(1)  490b7-15 
 
490b7   Γένη δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ζῴων, εἰς ἃ διῄρηται τἆλλα 
ζῷα, τάδ’ ἐστίν, ἓν μὲν ὀρνίθων, ἓν δ’ ἰχθύων, ἄλλο δὲ 
κῆτος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ἔναιμά ἐστιν. Ἄλλο δὲ γένος 
b10  ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων, ὃ καλεῖται ὄστρεον· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν  
μαλακοστράκων, ἀνώνυμον ἑνὶ ὀνόματι, οἷον κάραβοι καὶ 
γένη τινὰ καρκίνων καὶ ἀστακῶν· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν μαλακίων, 
οἷον τευθίδες τε καὶ τεῦθοι καὶ σηπίαι· ἕτερον τὸ τῶν ἐντό- 
μων. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα μέν ἐστιν ἄναιμα, ὅσα δὲ πόδας 
b15  ἔχει, πολύποδα· τῶν δ’ ἐντόμων ἔνια καὶ πτηνά ἐστιν. 
 
Very large kinds of animals, into which many/some/other
293
 animals have been 
divided, are these: one is of birds, one of fishes, another of cetaceans. All these 
are blooded. Another kind is that of the hard-shelled, which are called oyster. 
Another is that of the soft-shelled, unnamed by one name, for example crayfish 
                                                 
293 Balme (forthcoming, ad loc.) reads the talla here as contrasting with the loipa in b16: the 
animals here referred to are the very ones that fall into very large kinds, whichever they 
may be. Louis (1964, ad loc., n6) takes the talla as opposed to the allo de genos in b9, which 
introduces the bloodless very large kinds, and thus as referring to the blooded animals that 
fall into very large kinds. He translates “les animaux autres que les non sanguins.”  Gotthelf 
translates talla as “some,” thereby stressing that not all animals fall into very large kinds. 
This reading leaves room for there being other very large kinds, in addition to the ones in 
the following list, e.g. four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing.   Topher 
Kurfess plausibly suggests amending talla to polla, but with no manuscript support. 
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and some kinds of crabs and lobsters. Another is that of the soft-bodied, for 
example teuthides, teuthoi, and squids. A different one is that of the insects. These 
are all bloodless, and as many as are footed are many-footed; some of the insects 
are winged.  
 
The passage begins by introducing “very large kinds” (megista genê) into which animals 
have been divided. The lack of a definite article with genê perhaps suggests that the following 
list is not exhaustive, i.e. not the very large kinds, but rather just a list of very large kinds. But, 
while the grammar allows for this, nothing else in these opening lines suggests that the list is not 
exhaustive, and, as we shall see below, Aristotle’s further comment that the remaining kinds of 
animals are no longer megala (b16) suggests that it is exhaustive.  In would not make sense for 
Aristotle to list only some of the very large kinds, and then say that the remaining kinds (which 
would thus include some very large ones) are not very large.
294
 
The perfect tense of the verb diêrêtai (b7) suggests that the list is of very large kinds that 
have already been recognized in one way or another, and probably reflects popular usage.
295
 But, 
while it may be true that bird and fish (and perhaps even cetacean and insect) were commonly 
used terms and recognized kinds, it is not at all clear that the other kinds listed enjoyed such a 
                                                 
294 However, Gotthelf argues that it is only the remaining popularly recognized kinds that 
are not megala, and that Aristotle is free to argue for the existence of additional, not 
commonly recognized, very large kinds.  Gotthelf argues that Aristotle does just this with 
four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing. I will address  
Gotthelf’s arguments in what follows below. 
295 Gotthelf 2012, pp 296-297. This reading of diêrêtai is important for Gotthelf’s 
interpretation, because it allows him to explain the absence of four-footed live-bearing and 
four-footed egg-laying from this list by making reference to popular usage: those are kinds 
that were not commonly recognized, and so not included in that list. As we shall see, 
Gotthelf goes on to read in the passage an argument for the inclusion of these two 
additional kinds. 
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status in popular usage. In fact, the terms ostrakoderma, malakostraka, and malakia are merely 
substantive adjectives, descriptive terms standing in the place for actual names. In the case of 
ostrakoderma, Aristotle specifies that these animals “are called” (kaleitai) oysters, as if the term 
ostrakoderma was not part of popular usage. Similarly, in the case of malokostraka, Aristotle 
states that this kind is “unnamed by a single name” (b11), which suggests that there was no 
single term recognized in popular usage that unified the animals that fall into the kind.
296
 In fact, 
that Aristotle felt it necessary to include examples of these three kinds of animals, while he felt 
no such need for bird, fish, cetacean, or insect, suggests that these terms refer to animal kinds 
that were not popularly recognized as such. If we are to give force to the perfect tense of the verb 
diêrêtai, it seems more likely that Aristotle is stressing that these are the very large kinds into 
which animals have been divided by us, i.e. by Aristotle and members of his school. Others may 
call the ostrakoderma “oysters,” and may refer to the malakostraka by various names, depending 
on the animal in question, but Aristotle (and presumably his school) will not. 
 
(2)  490b15-19 
 
b15         τῶν 
δὲ λοιπῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ γένη μεγάλα· οὐ γὰρ περιέχει 
πολλὰ εἴδη ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν αὐτὸ οὐκ 
ἔχον διαφορὰν τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, τὰ δ’ ἔχει μέν, 
ἀλλ’ ἀνώνυμα τὰ εἴδη. 
                                                 
296 This need not imply that these animals were not recognized as belonging to a single 
kind, but the lack of a name surely suggests it. 
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Of the remaining animals, the kinds are not large; for one form does not embrace 
many forms, but in one case it is itself simple, the form not having differentiation, 
for example man, while other cases have <differentiation>, but the forms are 
unnamed.  
 
Aristotle explicitly states that, for the remaining animals (i.e. the animals not falling into 
any of the aforementioned kinds) the kinds are not large (presumably megala in b16 has the same 
extension as megista in b7). This does not mean that the remaining animals do not divide into 
kinds, but only that the kinds are not large (or very large). The reason he gives is that “one form 
does not embrace many forms,” which, despite the peculiarity of the use of eidos for both the 
higher and lower levels of classification, agrees with the general notions of genos and eidos 
sketched out at the beginning of HA I.1.  Genos implies a multiplicity of forms that are unified 
by some form of similarity. Recall that in I.1 Aristotle stated that forms of animals that differ 
from one another by “the more and the less” constitute a single kind, while forms that are similar 
only by analogy belong to different kinds. Recall the language at 486a21: 
 
Some <parts> are on the one hand the same, but on the other hand they differ by 
excess and defect, as many as the kind is the same. I mean by kind e.g. bird, and 
fish. For each of these has difference according to kind, and there are many forms 
of fishes and birds. 
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The relationship between a kind and its forms is one of sameness and difference: all the 
forms of a kind share a certain similarity, but they also differ from one another, generally by the 
more and the less. For example, all birds possess wings, but the wings of different forms of bird 
will differ, some being longer, others shorter, some stronger, others weaker, etc.  The notion of 
“one form embracing many forms” reflects this relationship of sameness and difference: the 
higher, embracing form will be more general or abstract in nature, while the embraced forms will 
all be the same as one another at that higher level of generality, while, at the more particular 
level, they exhibit differences. Thus, for the remaining animals that fail to divide into very large 
kinds, there is no single, higher level form that they all share. Presumably the level of generality 
at which this higher-level form would have to operate is quite high, if the kind is to be very 
large. That is, it seems quite unlikely that none of the remaining animals can be organized into a 
kind at some level of generality. What’s at stake is the exact sense that Aristotle used the phrase 
megiston genos. The notion of “one form embracing many forms” seems common to the notions 
of both genos and megiston genos. What’s the difference? Is it that, in the case of a megiston 
genos, there are a great many forms embraced? Or is it that a kind is very large if it embraces 
forms that themselves have differentiation – kinds and sub-kinds?  
In the present passage Aristotle gives two reasons why, for the remaining animals, “one 
form does not embrace many forms”:  (i) the form is simple and does not have any 
differentiation, and (ii) the forms do have differentiation, but the forms are unnamed. Regarding 
(i), these are cases were the animal kind in question simply does not exhibit the sort of 
multiplicity of forms that might render it a very large kind. Aristotle’s stock example of this, and 
the one he offers here, is man. He believed that man differs from the rest of the animals 
significantly enough to exclude it from membership in any other existing kind, and there are no 
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sub-kinds of man. Thus man is a kind of its own, as it were – a genos that embraces a single 
eidos. 
Regarding (ii), there is some ambiguity regarding whether the forms that are unnamed are 
the higher level, embracing forms, or the lower level, embraced forms. The ta de in b18 is 
coordinate with the to men in b17, which suggests that the implied subject in both cases is the 
higher level, embracing forms. In b17 this higher level form has no differentiation, and thus has 
no lower level forms to embrace. In b18 the higher level forms do have differentiation, 
suggesting that there are lower level forms to embrace, and thus the possibility of a very large 
kind. The grammar of the next clause renders it ambiguous whether the ta eidê in b18 are the 
higher level forms implied in the ta de in b18, or the lower level forms that are embraced by the 
ta de forms. Balme points out that the parallel construction of the men/de clauses suggests that ta 
eidê in b19 are in apposition to ta de in b18, just as to men in b17 is in apposition to to eidos in 
b18. On this reading it is the higher level, embracing forms that are unnamed. But, while the 
construction may suggest this reading, it does not require it.   
The question is whether Aristotle held that unnamed embracing forms or unnamed 
embraced forms pose a challenge to a kind’s status as very large. While an unnamed, and thus 
presumably unrecognized, higher level, embracing form would pose a challenge to the natural 
philosopher and would prevent the identification of the proper level of generality at which a 
given explanation should aim (as in the case of alternating proportions discussed in APo. I.5), 
Aristotle repeatedly states that we must be on the look out for such unnamed kinds so that we do 
not fall into this error.
297
 That is, the fact that such kinds are unnamed should not prevent us from 
                                                 
297 See PA I.4, 644b1ff., where Aristotle explicitly uses the language of an “unnamed” form 
“embracing” other forms “like a kind.” The message from this passage is clearly that one 
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using them, however they are marked off, in our research. That they are unnamed does not seem 
to stand in the way of these kinds being taken as kinds (as in the case of the malakostraka, which 
Aristotle specifically states are “unnamed by one name”). Thus it seems unlikely that Aristotle is 
here suggesting that being unnamed is something that prevents these “forms having 
differentiation” from being kinds, or even very large kinds. Rather, if such forms are unnamed, it 
simply reflects a short-coming in popular usage and a lack of knowledge about the animal world, 
one that should not stand in the way of the natural philosopher.
298
 
Instead we can read the passage as stating that it is the lower level, embraced forms that 
are unnamed. But unnamed how? The lowest level forms (the individual species of animal) 
surely have names, and it is these forms that are embraced by the higher form. In what sense, 
then, are they unnamed? I suggest that it is the absence of recognized (and thus named) 
intermediate kinds – between the highest level genos and the infima species – that prevent the 
remaining kinds of animals from reaching the status of megista genê.  Again, Aristotle’s 
comments on the malakostraka are revealing: while the higher-level kind is “unnamed by a 
single name” (malakostraka seems not to be a true name, but a descriptive name-like phrase), it 
embraces other recognized kinds, such as “crayfish, some kinds of crabs and lobsters” (b11-12). 
This is what is lacking in the other forms of animals, and this is explicitly what he states is 
lacking, at b31-32, in the case of four-footed, live-bearing animals: there are no recognized 
further divisions of the kind beyond the individual infima species (with the exception, perhaps, of 
                                                                                                                                                             
should not let the fact that a kind (or a form “like a kind”) is unnamed be an impediment to 
treating it as a kind.  
298 One might argue that the higher level, unnamed kinds are unnamed in popular usage 
only, and thus Aristotle may still use these kinds, even if they are not popularly recognized 
as such. But if this were the case, it is not clear why Aristotle specifically states that the 
remaining kinds are no longer large.   
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the lophoura, on which see below). What’s at stake is not the status of a form with differentiation 
being a genos, but rather being a megiston genos. It is the existence of (many?) intermediate 
kinds that render a higher level kind megiston.  
I maintain that the grammar of the passage allows for this reading, but does it make sense 
with the rest of the passage? Let’s continue and see. 
 
(3)  490b19-23 
 
Ἔστι γὰρ τὰ τετράποδα καὶ μὴ 
b20  πτερωτὰ ἔναιμα μὲν πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ζῳοτόκα τὰ  
δ’ ᾠοτόκα αὐτῶν. Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ζῳοτόκα, πάντα τρίχας 
ἔχει, ὅσα δ’ ᾠοτόκα, φολίδας· ἔστι δ’ ἡ φολὶς ὅμοιον 
χώρᾳ λεπίδος. 
 
For, the four-footed and non-winged ones are all blooded, but some of them are 
live-bearing while others are egg-bearing. So then, as many as are live-bearing all 
have hair, but as many as are egg-bearing, horny scales; the horny scale is similar 
in place to the fish scale.  
 
The gar in b19 indicates that, in some sense, what follows is meant to explicate the 
reasons why the remaining kinds are not great. Presumably four-footed and non-winged is 
offered as an example of a putative kind, and the fact that all these animals are blooded serves as 
further evidence in favor of granting it this status. “But” (alla), Aristotle continues, these animals 
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do not all share a common mode of reproduction. The difference live-bearing/egg-bearing 
suggests that perhaps this grouping does not exhibit the sort of more-or-less unity that a kind 
demands. Thus four-footed and not winged marks off a “form with differentiation,” but this 
differentiation extends beyond the more-or-less form of difference necessary to render it a single 
kind. 
The hosa in the next sentence (b21) presumably modifies “four-footed and non-
winged” from above, but the men oun suggests that a new point is being made, and that is: 
all four-footed live-bearers have hair, while all four-footed egg-bearers have horny scales. 
This fact may be taken to suggest that four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing 
may succeed in marking off a real kind, since the further difference hairy/horny-scaled 
follows them. The further, seemingly parenthetical, remark about horny scales occupying 
the same place as fish-scales also seems to suggest that, just as fish-scales are unique to the 
megiston genos fish (as also feather is to bird), so too the correlation of hair with four-
footed live-bearing, and horny-scale with four-footed egg-bearing may uniquely mark off a 
kind.  
I suggest, instead, that the new point that the men oun sentence beginning at b21 has us 
consider is not whether four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing mark off kinds, but 
rather whether hairy and horny-scaled do. Four-footed and not-winged failed to mark off a kind 
due to the difference live-bearing/egg-bearing, but it came to light that all four-footed live-
bearers are hairy, and all four-footed egg-bearers are horny-scaled. So perhaps hairy and horny-
scaled mark off kinds. These too will fail. The key is the argument regarding the snake that 
follows. 
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(4)  490b23-30 
 
Ἄπουν δὲ φύσει ἐστὶν ἔναιμον πεζὸν τὸ τῶν 
ὄφεων γένος· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φολιδωτόν. Ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι 
b25  ᾠοτοκοῦσιν ὄφεις, ἡ δ’ ἔχιδνα μόνον ζῳοτοκεῖ. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ  
ζῳοτοκοῦντα οὐ πάντα τρίχας ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἰχθύων 
τινὲς ζῳοτοκοῦσιν· ὅσα μέντοι ἔχει τρίχας, ἅπαντα ζῳοτοκεῖ. 
Τριχῶν γάρ τι εἶδος θετέον καὶ τὰς ἀκανθώδεις τρίχας, 
οἵας οἱ χερσαῖοι ἔχουσιν ἐχῖνοι καὶ οἱ ὕστριχες· τριχὸς γὰρ 
b30  χρείαν παρέχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ ποδῶν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν θαλαττίων.  
 
Footless by nature, blooded and land-dwelling is the kind of snakes, and this 
<kind> is horny scaled. But while the other snakes are egg-bearing, the viper 
alone is live-bearing. For not all live-bearing ones have hair, for even some of the 
fishes are live-bearing; however, as many as have hair, all are live-bearing. For 
one must put as a kind of hair the spiny hairs of the sort that the hedgehog and 
porcupine have; for this is their function, but not of feet, as in the case of the sea 
urchins. 
 
The exact function of this passage has long eluded commentators. What seems clear is 
that Aristotle offers the snake as an example of a kind of animal that is horny-scaled,
299
 but also 
                                                 
299 Aristotle also specifically points out that snakes are blooded and land-dwelling, as were 
the four-footed live-bearers and four-footed egg-bearers. The first difference listed, footless, 
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exhibits the difference live-bearing/egg-bearing. He drives this point home by stating that not all 
live-bearing animals are hairy, and that even some fish (i.e. some fish-scaled animals) are live-
bearing.
300
 If we take the earlier statement regarding four-footed and non-winged animals 
exhibiting the difference live-bearing/egg-bearing as a mark against four-footed and non-winged 
as marking off a kind, then the same idea is at work here. Since all four-footed live-bearing 
animals are hairy and all four-footed egg-bearing animals are horny scaled, perhaps hairy and 
horny-scaled mark off kinds, but the snakes, which are horny-scaled, prevent this, because the 
single mode of reproduction egg-bearing does not follow. 
The comment on the hedgehog, porcupine, and sea urchin is best understood as a 
parenthetical aside. The spikey hair of the hedgehog and porcupine are forms of hair, and, unlike 
the similar looking spikey “hairs” of the sea urchin, they do not act as feet, but rather serve as 
outer covering. There also seems to be a play on the Greek names of hedgehogs (hoi chersaioi 
echinoi) and sea urchins (hai thalattiai echinai), which, on the surface, could indicate a sort of 
kinship between the animals.
301
 The point of the passage is that the hedgehog and porcupine, 
both live-bearing animals, are hairy, while the sea urchin, which is egg bearing, is not really 
hairy. Thus the correlation of hairy with live-bearing, holds. 
 
(5)  490b31-491a4 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
is perhaps meant to have us consider whether the number of feet is an important 
difference or not. For if the distinct mode of reproduction egg-bearing belonged to snakes, 
then horny-scaled would turn out to be the common differentia (along with blooded and 
land-dwelling), and number of feet would fall by the wayside.  
300 Of course, if the difference live-bearing/egg-bearing were sufficient to break up a kind 
(as was suggested for four-footed and not winged), then fish would not qualify as a kind.   
301 This point was brought to my attention by Topher Kurfess. 
 323 
Τοῦ δὲ γένους τοῦ τῶν τετραπόδων ζῴων καὶ ζῳοτόκων εἴδη 
μέν ἐστι πολλά, ἀνώνυμα δέ· ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν 
ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος εἴρηται, λέων, ἔλαφος, ἵππος, 
κύων καὶ τἆλλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ἐπεί ἐστιν ἕν τι γένος μόνον 
491a1  ἐπὶ τοῖς λοφούροις καλουμένοις, οἷον ἵππῳ καὶ ὄνῳ καὶ 
ὀρεῖ καὶ γίννῳ [καὶ ἴννῳ] καὶ ταῖς ἐν Συρίᾳ καλουμέναις 
ἡμιόνοις, αἳ καλοῦνται ἡμίονοι δι’ ὁμοιότητα, οὐκ οὖσαι ἁπλῶς 
τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος· καὶ γὰρ ὀχεύονται καὶ γεννῶνται ἐξ ἀλλήλων.  
 
Regarding the kind of four-footed live-bearing animals, there are many forms, but 
they are unnamed. Rather, according to each of them, so to speak, just as man was 
spoken of, <so also> lion, elephant, horse, dog, and the others in the same way. 
Although there is one sort of kind in the case of the so-called lophoura, for 
example horse,  
 
The passage begins by referring to four-footed live-bearing as a kind, but this need not 
indicate that it is a very large kind. And in fact Aristotle immediately cites one of the two criteria 
given above as the reason why the kind is not very large: the forms of the kind are unnamed, i.e. 
they do not organize themselves into recognized intermediate kinds.
302
 Rather, each individual 
species must be studied separately. He allows that there may be one recognized intermediate 
kind, the lophoura, but he refers to this only as a sort of kind (ti genos), and in any event it seems 
                                                 
302 Here, unlike passage (2) above, the grammar requires that it is the lower, embraced 
kinds that are unnamed. Gotthelf prefers to read the first as a reference to unnamed 
embracing forms, and the second to unnamed embraced forms.  
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that one intermediate kind is not sufficient to render the higher kind very large. 
 
(6) 491a4-6 
 
Διὸ 
a5  καὶ χωρὶς λαμβάνοντας ἀνάγκη θεωρεῖν ἑκάστου τὴν φύσιν  
αὐτῶν. 
 
Hence it is necessary to study the nature of each of them by grasping them 
separately. 
 
The dio in a4 presumably refers to the fact that the many forms of four-footed live-
bearing animals are unnamed. It is because these animals, diverse in form, do not organize 
themselves into intermediate kinds that we are restricted from saying very much about them at a 
high level, and thus must study each form individually. 
This does not mean that the differentia group four-footed live-bearing cannot be used to 
mark off animals for study. In fact it can: it provides a useful means for dividing the remaining 
animals to be studied (especially the difference live-bearing). But, nonetheless, the animals so 
divided will have to be studied individually. The absence of higher level, embracing form 
restricts the extent to which one can make generalizations about these animals. 
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C.3 THE EVIDENCE FROM HA II.15 
In HA II.15 the discussion turns from the external parts of blooded animals to the internal 
parts. Prior to discussing these parts Aristotle includes a brief comment on the order in which the 
different kinds of animals should be treated. In it he specifically uses the phrase megista genê, 
and lists some of the animal kinds discussed above. Here is the text Balme prints, followed by 
my translation: 
 
 505b23 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔξω μόρια, καὶ πόσα καὶ ποῖα τῶν ἐναί- 
μων ζῴων, καὶ τίνας ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφοράς, εἴρηται. 
b25  τὰ δ’ ἐντὸς πῶς ἔχει, λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις ζῴοις  
πρῶτον· τούτῳ γὰρ διαφέρει τὰ μέγιστα γένη πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ 
τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔναιμα τὰ δ’ ἄναιμα εἶναι. 
ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ τὰ ζῳοτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων, 
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ᾠοτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων καὶ ὄρνις καὶ ἰχθὺς 
b30  καὶ κῆτος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἴναι  
γένος ἀλλ’ ἁπλοῦν τὸ εἶδος ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ὄφις 
καὶ κροκόδειλος. 
 
So then the external parts of blooded animals, both how many and of what sort, 
and which differences they have compared to one another, have been spoken of. 
How the internal parts are, we must speak of the blooded animals first; for by this 
the very large kinds differ compared to the remaining other animals: in so far as 
some are blooded while others are bloodless. And these are man and also the live-
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bearing of the four-footed, and further also the egg-bearing of the four footed, and 
bird, fish, and cetacean, and if there is any other that is unnamed because of not 
being a kind, but rather the form is simple in the case of each individual, for 
example the snake and the crocodile.  
 
The passage is usually taken as stating that the very large kinds differ from the other 
animals in so far as the very large kinds are blooded, while the remaining animals that do not fall 
into very large kinds are bloodless.
303
 This conflicts with the list of very large kinds given in HA 
I.6, which includes four bloodless kinds animals. Balme brackets the passage (from b26-32), 
calling it “an early interpolation by a systematizing Peripatetic”304, and lists the following 
difficulties: (1) Why are only the blooded kinds called very large, while elsewhere bloodless 
kinds are included? (2) Why is man included in the list of very large kinds? (3) How can snake 
and crocodile exemplify separate forms that must be treated separately? 
I propose that the list of animal kinds at b28 is not intended as a list of the very large 
kinds, but rather is simply a list of blooded animals, as the comments at b25 would have us 
expect. The very large kinds are mentioned at b26 in order to provide some sort of rationale for 
why the investigation should begin with blooded animals. Read in this way, Balme’s problems 
(1) and (2) are resolved. Problem (3), however, remains, and resolving it I believe requires some 
textual emdendation.   
As mentioned above, many scholars read the passage as asserting that the very large 
kinds are blooded, while the remaining other animals are bloodless. This interpretation is based 
                                                 
303 Examples: Peck, Thompson, Louis, Balme 
304 Balme forthcoming, ad loc., 505b26-32 
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on reading the antecedent of the ta men in b27 as ta megista genê in b26, and the antecedent of 
the ta de as ta loipa tôn allôn zôôn. This gives the translation: “the former (i.e. the megista genê) 
are blooded while the latter (i.e. the remaining other animals) are bloodless.” However, it is 
possible to read both the ta men and the ta de as referring to the megista genê. The translation 
would then read: 
 
For it is by this that the very large kinds differ from the remaining other animals, 
in so far as some [of the very large kinds] are blooded while others [of the very 
large kinds] are bloodless. 
 
In this case, Aristotle is simply pointing out that the difference blooded/bloodless is 
present among the very large kinds, but not among the remaining other animals. The gar at b26 
indicates that the statement is offered as an explanation of sorts for why the internal parts of 
blooded animals should be treated first. Perhaps Aristotle’s point is that since the very large 
kinds are divided into blooded and bloodless, the treatment of the internal parts should follow 
this division as well. However the explanatory force of the gar is read, the entire statement seems 
to be something of a parenthetical aside, such that the esti de tauta in b28 picks up the thought 
left off at b25-26: “we must speak of the blooded animals first . . . And these are . . .” Thus the 
list of animals that commences at b28 is a list of blooded animals: man, four-footed live-bearing, 
four-footed egg-bearing, birds, fish, cetaceans, and any other (blooded) animal whose kind is 
unnamed because the form is simple and thus must be treated individually. 
If the passage is read in this way, then Balme’s problem (1) is resolved because the 
megista genê are no longer restricted to the blooded animals, but include the difference 
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blooded/bloodless. Problem (2) is also resolved, because the list at b28 is not of the megista 
genê, but of blooded animals, so the inclusion of man on the list is not problematic. That some of 
the kinds in the list are very large kinds (e.g. bird, fish, cetacean) need not indicate that all of 
them are. And in fact, that the list ends with a reference to animals that are simple in form (i.e. 
definitively not a very large kind) confirms that the list is not one of megista genê. As discussed 
above, the use of the differentia group four-footed live-bearing and four-footed egg-bearing need 
not impart to them the status of megista genê.  
But is it true that the remaining animals that do not fall into one of the megista genê are 
either all blooded or all bloodless? Aristotle never says this directly, but the animals typically 
cited as falling outside of the very large kinds are man and snakes, both of which are blooded. 
This would suggest that all the animals that fall outside of the very large kinds are blooded.  
In HA IV.7, at the end of his treatment of the parts of bloodless animals, Aristotle does 
refer to “some odd animals” (henia zôa peritta) in the sea which, due to their scarcity (dia to 
spania) cannot be placed into a kind (ouk esti theinai eis genos) (532b18). That this statement 
comes at the end of the treatment of bloodless animals might suggest that these odd animals too 
are bloodless. However, the completion of the treatment of bloodless animals also marks the 
completion of the treatment of all animals, both blooded and bloodless. Aristotle’s concluding 
remarks immediately following the passage on odd animals confirms this: 
 
So then the parts of all animals, both external and internal, regarding each kind, 
both peculiar and common, hold in this manner.  
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Thus the placement of the odd animals at the end of this discussion does not indicate that 
Aristotle held them to be bloodless, but rather that he simply saved mention of them for the end 
of the discussion of all animals. Further, it’s not clear that Aristotle held that these odd animals 
do not actually fall into one of the very large kinds, only that their scarcity prevents us from 
determining which of the kinds, if any, they fall into.
305
   
Problem (3) is more challenging, since Aristotle speaks of different forms of snakes and 
crocodiles, and thus they seem to be poor examples of forms without differentiation.  In this case 
emending the text in some way seems necessary. But does this then cast doubt on the rest of the 
passage? I think it need not. The reading I’ve offered eliminates any problem concerning the 
megista genê and is in keeping with Aristotle’s thought and practice. The hoion clause at b31-32 
may be read as a confused, late addition by an editor interested in clarifying the preceding 
statement regarding simple forms, but who failed to pick out forms that were truly simple. 
 
C.4 THE EVIDENCE FROM HA V.1 
HA V begins the discussion of generation in animals, and includes an extended 
introduction in which Aristotle discusses, among other things, the order in which the different 
animals kinds should be discussed. 
 
539a4       ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὰ γένη 
                                                 
305 See Balme (forthcoming), ad loc. 
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πρότερον, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ νῦν πειρατέον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν  
θεωρίαν· πλὴν τότε μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποιούμεθα σκοποῦντες 
περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπου, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταῖον 
λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν. πρῶτον δ’ ἀρ- 
κτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν 
a10  μαλακοστράκων, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐφεξῆς· 
ἔστι δὲ τά τε μαλάκια καὶ τὰ ἔντομα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ 
τῶν ἰχθύων γένος, τό τε ζῳοτόκον καὶ τὸ ᾠοτόκον αὐτῶν, 
εἶτα τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν πεζῶν λε-  
κτέον, ὅσα τ’ ᾠοτόκα καὶ ὅσα ζῳοτόκα. ζῳοτόκα δ’ ἐστὶ 
a15  τῶν τετραπόδων ἔνια, καὶ ἄνθρωπος τῶν διπόδων μόνον. 
 
Since the kinds have been divided earlier, in the same way also now we must 
attempt to make our investigation, Only before we made our beginning of the 
study of parts with man, but now we must speak of this last because it involves 
much work. We must begin first with the ostrakoderma, and after these the 
malakostraka, and the others in this way in order. And this is both the malakia 
and the insects, and after these the kind of fishes, both the live-bearing and the 
egg-bearing of them. Then the [kind] of birds. And after these we must speak of 
the footed/land animals, both as many as are egg-bearing and as many as are live-
bearing. The live-bearers are some of the four-footed, and man alone is two-
footed.  
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Although the phrase megista genê is not used, the list of animal kinds offered, and the 
reference to the kinds “having been divided earlier” (presumably a reference to the passage in 
I.6), strongly suggests that it is the megista genê that are here presented. First in the list are the 
four bloodless kinds (ostrakoderma, malokostraka, malakia, and insects), then fish (noting both 
the live-bearing and egg-bearing forms) and bird – two of the blooded kinds. Then notice that he 
next cites the “footed” or “land-dwelling” animals (pezôn), both the egg-bearing and live-bearing 
among them. He concludes by noting, in what seems to be something of a parenthetical remark, 
that some of the footed live-bearers are four-footed, while man is the only two-footed live-
bearer. 
I think it’s important to note that Aristotle does not use four-footed live-bearing and four-
footed egg-bearing to mark off the relevant animals in the same manner as e.g. bird and fish. 
Rather, he uses the single differentia live-bearing/egg-bearing to divide the land animals 
(obviously relevant to the discussion on generation to follow), then notes that some of these land-
dwelling live-bearers are four-footed. I suggest that the absence of four-footed live-bearing and 
four-footed egg-bearing from this list indicates that Aristotle did not see these “differentia 
groups” as marking off megista genê. Rather, just as he states in I.6, the animals that fall into 
these differentia groups must be treated individually.  
But how does Aristotle actually treat these animals in his discussions of generation in HA 
V and VI? Interestingly, his treatment of the egg-bearing land animals is not organized with that 
of the live-bearing land animals, as the introductory comments lead us to expect. Rather, it 
comes just after the treatment of the insects, and before that of the birds, which are followed by 
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the fish, and finally the live-bearing land animals.
306
 He introduces these animals as the four-
footed, blooded, egg-bearers (557b32), and includes a discussion of snakes immediately 
following them. This discussion ends book V. Book VI begins by discussing the birds. The first 
sentence of book VI looks back at what has been discussed, and mentions specifically the 
generation of snakes, insects, and four-footed egg-bearers (558b8). The actual discussion in book 
V of the egg-bearing land animals is short (557b31-558a24, 25 lines), and mentions 3 different 
kinds of animals: the tortoise (both the fresh-water and sea varieties), lizards, and the crocodile 
(both the land and river varieties). Almost nothing is said of these animals at the level of four-
footed, blooded, egg-bearer.
307
 Instead discussions of the egg-laying and incubation habits of 
these animals takes place at the level of the individual kind.    
When the discussion does finally turn to the four-footed live-bearing animals, Aristotle 
introduces it as follows: 
 
571b3  Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων καὶ πτηνῶν καὶ πλωτῶν, 
καὶ περὶ τῶν πεζῶν ὅσα ᾠοτοκεῖ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων, 
περί τ’ ὀχείας καὶ κυήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοιοτρό-  
πων τούτοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν ὅσα ζῳοτοκεῖ καὶ περὶ ἀν- 
θρώπου λεκτέον τὰ συμβαίνοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. 
                                                 
306 The order of the kinds of animals discussed in books V and VI is: ostrakoderma (V.15), 
malakostraka (V.17), malakia (V.18), insects (V.19-32), egg-bearing land animals (V.33-34), 
birds (VI.1-9), selacia (i.e. live-bearing fish, VI.10-11), cetaceans (VI.12), egg-bearing fish 
(VI.13-14), spontaneously generated fish (VI.15) and eels (VI.16), live-bearing land animals 
(VI.18-37).   
307 It may be noted that the varieties of tortoise and crocodile, and even lizard, which seems 
to mark off a genos of animals more than an eidos, may suggest the sort of intermediate 
kinds that I claimed were necessary to elevate the status of a genos to megiston.  
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So then regarding the other animals, both the fliers and the swimmers, and 
regarding the footed animals, as many as are egg-bearings, we have just about 
spoken of them all. Regarding their coupling and kuêseôs and the other matters 
similar to these. But regarding the footed animals, as many as are live-bearing, 
and regarding man, we must speak of their attributes in the same way. 
 
Note first that the reference back to the four-footed egg-bearing animals is to the 
footed/land animals, as many as are egg-bearing.
308
 That is, four-footed egg-bearing is not used 
to mark these off, instead a different set of (admittedly related) differentiae are used. This same 
formula is then repeated to introduce the four-footed live-bearers – again, a combination of 
pezon and zôôtoka. This variation in marking off the relevant animals to be discussed suggests 
that Aristotle did not recognize four-footed egg-bearing/live-bearing as marking off very large 
kinds, at least not in the same way as bird or fish, or even ostrakoderma, malakostraka, and 
malakia do. Not only is there no single, popularly recognized name for these animals, there is 
further no single name-like-phrase or substantive adjective. Sometimes they are identified simply 
as four-footed, other times by their mode of reproduction, sometimes quantified as land animals, 
and sometimes by some combination of these. This suggests that Aristotle is grouping them by 
shared differentiae that are relevant to the discussion at hand (in this case generation), and not by 
a recognized grouping into kinds.  
                                                 
308 Also note that Aristotle groups the animals previously discussed by their mode of 
locomotion – fliers and swimmers. Was this the underlying principle shaping the previous 
discussion? I do not think so. Rather, I think grouping the animals in this way is mean to 
show that his discussion embraces all the different kinds of animals, namely those of the 
air, sea, and now land.   
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The actual discussion of the live-bearing land-animals that follows focuses almost 
exclusively on the different eidê of these animals, saying almost nothing of them at the level of 
live-bearing land animal, much less four-footed live-bearers.
309
  And indeed a great many 
different eidê are discussed: horse, cow, pig, sheep, goat, dog, mule, camel, elephant, boar, deer, 
bear, lion, hyena, rabbit, fox, wolf, cat, mouse. Again, this is in keeping with the statements 
regarding four-footed live-bearing animals in I.6, namely that each form must be treated 
separately. 
C.5 CONCLUSION 
The forgoing considerations suggest that Aristotle did not recognize four-footed live-
bearing and four-footed egg-bearing animals as megista genê. Despite the frequency with which 
Aristotle uses these differentiae as organizing principles in his discussions, it does not appear 
that he found enough similarity among the many, various animals that fall under these groupings 
to treat them as unified kinds, or so the difficult argument regarding the megista genê in HA I.6 
apeears to state. Nonetheless, the differentiae four-footed (and indeed footed), live-bearing, and 
egg-bearing may still be used by Aristotle to group animals that do share many similar features, 
regardless of whether or not the commonality among them sufficiently marks them off as a 
megista genê. Thus it seems that rather little is at stake whether these two groups qualify as very 
large kinds or not. 
                                                 
309 The differentia four-footed is occasionally used. E.g. 573a9: “the horse, of all four-footed 
animals, most easily delivers its young, produces the least discharge and flow of blood in 
proportion to its size”; a17, a21, a27, 576a23, 578a6, 8. 
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